Politics

A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT

By Aristotle

Translated From The Greek Of Aristotle By William Ellis, A.M.

London & Toronto Published By J M Dent & Sons Ltd. & In New York By E.

P. Dutton &. Co

First Issue Of This Edition 1912 Reprinted 1919, 1923, 1928

INTRODUCTION

The Politics of Aristotle is the second part of a treatise of which

the Ethics is the first part. It looks back to the Ethics as the Ethics

looks forward to the Politics. For Aristotle did not separate, as we are

inclined to do, the spheres of the statesman and the moralist. In the

Ethics he has described the character necessary for the good life, but

that life is for him essentially to be lived in society, and when in the

last chapters of the Ethics he comes to the practical application of his

inquiries, that finds expression not in moral exhortations addressed to

the individual but in a description of the legislative opportunities

of the statesman. It is the legislator's task to frame a society which

shall make the good life possible. Politics for Aristotle is not a

struggle between individuals or classes for power, nor a device for

getting done such elementary tasks as the maintenance of order and

security without too great encroachments on individual liberty. The

state is "a community of well-being in families and aggregations

of families for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life." The

legislator is a craftsman whose material is society and whose aim is the

good life.

In an early dialogue of Plato's, the Protagoras, Socrates asks

Protagoras why it is not as easy to find teachers of virtue as it is to

find teachers of swordsmanship, riding, or any other art. Protagoras'

answer is that there are no special teachers of virtue, because virtue

is taught by the whole community. Plato and Aristotle both accept the

view of moral education implied in this answer. In a passage of the

Republic (492 b) Plato repudiates the notion that the sophists have a

corrupting moral influence upon young men. The public themselves,

he says, are the real sophists and the most complete and thorough

educators. No private education can hold out against the irresistible

force of public opinion and the ordinary moral standards of society.

But that makes it all the more essential that public opinion and

social environment should not be left to grow up at haphazard as they

ordinarily do, but should be made by the wise legislator the expression

of the good and be informed in all their details by his knowledge. The

legislator is the only possible teacher of virtue.

Such a programme for a treatise on government might lead us to expect in

the Politics mainly a description of a Utopia or ideal state which

might inspire poets or philosophers but have little direct effect upon

political institutions. Plato's Republic is obviously impracticable, for

its author had turned away in despair from existing politics. He has no

proposals, in that dialogue at least, for making the best of things as

they are. The first lesson his philosopher has to learn is to turn away

from this world of becoming and decay, and to look upon the unchanging

eternal world of ideas. Thus his ideal city is, as he says, a pattern

laid up in heaven by which the just man may rule his life, a pattern

therefore in the meantime for the individual and not for the statesman.

It is a city, he admits in the Laws, for gods or the children of gods,

not for men as they are.

Aristotle has none of the high enthusiasm or poetic imagination of

Plato. He is even unduly impatient of Plato's idealism, as is shown

by the criticisms in the second book. But he has a power to see the

possibilities of good in things that are imperfect, and the patience of

the true politician who has learned that if he would make men what

they ought to be, he must take them as he finds them. His ideal

is constructed not of pure reason or poetry, but from careful and

sympathetic study of a wide range of facts. His criticism of Plato in

the light of history, in Book II. chap, v., though as a criticism it is

curiously inept, reveals his own attitude admirably: "Let us remember

that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude

of years, these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been

unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes

they are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge

which they have." Aristotle in his Constitutions had made a study of one

hundred and fifty-eight constitutions of the states of his day, and the

fruits of that study are seen in the continual reference to concrete

political experience, which makes the Politics in some respects a

critical history of the workings of the institutions of the Greek city

state. In Books IV., V., and VI. the ideal state seems far away, and

we find a dispassionate survey of imperfect states, the best ways of

preserving them, and an analysis of the causes of their instability.

It is as though Aristotle were saying: "I have shown you the proper and

normal type of constitution, but if you will not have it and insist on

living under a perverted form, you may as well know how to make the best

of it." In this way the Politics, though it defines the state in the

light of its ideal, discusses states and institutions as they are.

Ostensibly it is merely a continuation of the Ethics, but it comes to

treat political questions from a purely political standpoint.

This combination of idealism and respect for the teachings of experience

constitutes in some ways the strength and value of the Politics, but it

also makes it harder to follow. The large nation states to which we are

accustomed make it difficult for us to think that the state could be

constructed and modelled to express the good life. We can appreciate

Aristotle's critical analysis of constitutions, but find it hard to take

seriously his advice to the legislator. Moreover, the idealism and the

empiricism of the Politics are never really reconciled by Aristotle

himself.

It may help to an understanding of the Politics if something is said on

those two points.

We are accustomed since the growth of the historical method to the

belief that states are "not made but grow," and are apt to be impatient

with the belief which Aristotle and Plato show in the powers of the

lawgiver. But however true the maxim may be of the modern nation state,

it was not true of the much smaller and more self-conscious Greek city.

When Aristotle talks of the legislator, he is not talking in the

air. Students of the Academy had been actually called on to give new

constitutions to Greek states. For the Greeks the constitution was not

merely as it is so often with us, a matter of political machinery. It

was regarded as a way of life. Further, the constitution within the

framework of which the ordinary process of administration and passing

of decrees went on, was always regarded as the work of a special man or

body of men, the lawgivers. If we study Greek history, we find that the

position of the legislator corresponds to that assigned to him by

Plato and Aristotle. All Greek states, except those perversions

which Aristotle criticises as being "above law," worked under rigid

constitutions, and the constitution was only changed when the whole

people gave a commission to a lawgiver to draw up a new one. Such was

the position of the AEsumnetes, whom Aristotle describes in Book III.

chap, xiv., in earlier times, and of the pupils of the Academy in the

fourth century. The lawgiver was not an ordinary politician. He was

a state doctor, called in to prescribe for an ailing constitution. So

Herodotus recounts that when the people of Cyrene asked the oracle of

Delphi to help them in their dissensions, the oracle told them to go to

Mantinea, and the Mantineans lent them Demonax, who acted as a "setter

straight" and drew up a new constitution for Cyrene. So again the

Milesians, Herodotus tells us, were long troubled by civil discord, till

they asked help from Paros, and the Parians sent ten commissioners

who gave Miletus a new constitution. So the Athenians, when they were

founding their model new colony at Thurii, employed Hippodamus of

Miletus, whom Aristotle mentions in Book II, as the best expert in

town-planning, to plan the streets of the city, and Protagoras as the

best expert in law-making, to give the city its laws. In the Laws Plato

represents one of the persons of the dialogue as having been asked

by the people of Gortyna to draw up laws for a colony which they were

founding. The situation described must have occurred frequently in

actual life. The Greeks thought administration should be democratic and

law-making the work of experts. We think more naturally of law-making

as the special right of the people and administration as necessarily

confined to experts.

Aristotle's Politics, then, is a handbook for the legislator, the expert

who is to be called in when a state wants help. We have called him a

state doctor. It is one of the most marked characteristics of Greek

political theory that Plato and Aristotle think of the statesman as one

who has knowledge of what ought to be done, and can help those who call

him in to prescribe for them, rather than one who has power to control

the forces of society. The desire of society for the statesman's

advice is taken for granted, Plato in the Republic says that a good

constitution is only possible when the ruler does not want to rule;

where men contend for power, where they have not learnt to distinguish

between the art of getting hold of the helm of state and the art of

steering, which alone is statesmanship, true politics is impossible.

With this position much that Aristotle has to say about government is in

agreement. He assumes the characteristic Platonic view that all men seek

the good, and go wrong through ignorance, not through evil will, and so

he naturally regards the state as a community which exists for the sake

of the good life. It is in the state that that common seeking after

the good which is the profoundest truth about men and nature becomes

explicit and knows itself. The state is for Aristotle prior to the

family and the village, although it succeeds them in time, for only when

the state with its conscious organisation is reached can man understand

the secret of his past struggles after something he knew not what. If

primitive society is understood in the light of the state, the state is

understood in the light of its most perfect form, when the good after

which all societies are seeking is realised in its perfection. Hence for

Aristotle as for Plato, the natural state or the state as such is the

ideal state, and the ideal state is the starting-point of political

inquiry.

In accordance with the same line of thought, imperfect states, although

called perversions, are regarded by Aristotle as the result rather of

misconception and ignorance than of perverse will. They all represent,

he says, some kind of justice. Oligarchs and democrats go wrong in

their conception of the good. They have come short of the perfect state

through misunderstanding of the end or through ignorance of the proper

means to the end. But if they are states at all, they embody some common

conception of the good, some common aspirations of all their members.

The Greek doctrine that the essence of the state consists in community

of purpose is the counterpart of the notion often held in modern times

that the essence of the state is force. The existence of force is for

Plato and Aristotle a sign not of the state but of the state's failure.

It comes from the struggle between conflicting misconceptions of the

good. In so far as men conceive the good rightly they are united. The

state represents their common agreement, force their failure to make

that agreement complete. The cure, therefore, of political ills is

knowledge of the good life, and the statesman is he who has such

knowledge, for that alone can give men what they are always seeking.

If the state is the organisation of men seeking a common good, power and

political position must be given to those who can forward this end. This

is the principle expressed in Aristotle's account of political justice,

the principle of "tools to those who can use them." As the aim of the

state is differently conceived, the qualifications for government

will vary. In the ideal state power will be given to the man with most

knowledge of the good; in other states to the men who are most truly

capable of achieving that end which the citizens have set themselves

to pursue. The justest distribution of political power is that in which

there is least waste of political ability.

Further, the belief that the constitution of a state is only the

outward expression of the common aspirations and beliefs of its members,

explains the paramount political importance which Aristotle assigns to

education. It is the great instrument by which the legislator can ensure

that the future citizens of his state will share those common beliefs

which make the state possible. The Greeks with their small states had

a far clearer apprehension than we can have of the dependence of a

constitution upon the people who have to work it.

Such is in brief the attitude in which Aristotle approaches political

problems, but in working out its application to men and institutions

as they are, Aristotle admits certain compromises which are not really

consistent with it.

1. Aristotle thinks of membership of a state as community in pursuit of

the good. He wishes to confine membership in it to those who are capable

of that pursuit in the highest and most explicit manner. His citizens,

therefore, must be men of leisure, capable of rational thought upon

the end of life. He does not recognise the significance of that less

conscious but deep-seated membership of the state which finds its

expression in loyalty and patriotism. His definition of citizen includes

only a small part of the population of any Greek city. He is forced to

admit that the state is not possible without the co-operation of men

whom he will not admit to membership in it, either because they are not

capable of sufficient rational appreciation of political ends, like the

barbarians whom he thought were natural slaves, or because the leisure

necessary for citizenship can only be gained by the work of the artisans

who by that very work make themselves incapable of the life which

they make possible for others. "The artisan only attains excellence

in proportion as he becomes a slave," and the slave is only a living

instrument of the good life. He exists for the state, but the state does

not exist for him.

2. Aristotle in his account of the ideal state seems to waver between

two ideals. There is the ideal of an aristocracy and the ideal of what

he calls constitutional government, a mixed constitution. The principle

of "tools to those who can use them" ought to lead him, as it does

Plato, to an aristocracy. Those who have complete knowledge of the good

must be few, and therefore Plato gave entire power in his state into

the hands of the small minority of philosopher guardians. It is in

accordance with this principle that Aristotle holds that kingship is

the proper form of government when there is in the state one man of

transcendent virtue. At the same time, Aristotle always holds that

absolute government is not properly political, that government is not

like the rule of a shepherd over his sheep, but the rule of equals

over equals. He admits that the democrats are right in insisting that

equality is a necessary element in the state, though he thinks they do

not admit the importance of other equally necessary elements. Hence he

comes to say that ruling and being ruled over by turns is an essential

feature of constitutional government, which he admits as an alternative

to aristocracy. The end of the state, which is to be the standard of the

distribution of political power, is conceived sometimes as a good for

the apprehension and attainment of which "virtue" is necessary and

sufficient (this is the principle of aristocracy), and sometimes as a

more complex good, which needs for its attainment not only "virtue" but

wealth and equality. This latter conception is the principle on which

the mixed constitution is based. This in its distribution of political

power gives some weight to "virtue," some to wealth, and some to mere

number. But the principle of "ruling and being ruled by turns" is not

really compatible with an unmodified principle of "tools to those who

can use them." Aristotle is right in seeing that political government

demands equality, not in the sense that all members of the state should

be equal in ability or should have equal power, but in the sense that

none of them can properly be regarded simply as tools with which the

legislator works, that each has a right to say what will be made of his

own life. The analogy between the legislator and the craftsman on which

Plato insists, breaks down because the legislator is dealing with men

like himself, men who can to some extent conceive their own end in life

and cannot be treated merely as means to the end of the legislator. The

sense of the value of "ruling and being ruled in turn" is derived from

the experience that the ruler may use his power to subordinate the

lives of the citizens of the state not to the common good but to his

own private purposes. In modern terms, it is a simple, rough-and-ready

attempt to solve that constant problem of politics, how efficient

government is to be combined with popular control. This problem arises

from the imperfection of human nature, apparent in rulers as well as in

ruled, and if the principle which attempts to solve it be admitted as a

principle of importance in the formation of the best constitution, then

the starting-point of politics will be man's actual imperfection, not

his ideal nature. Instead, then, of beginning with a state which would

express man's ideal nature, and adapting it as well as may be to man's

actual shortcomings from that ideal, we must recognise that the state

and all political machinery are as much the expression of man's weakness

as of his ideal possibilities. The state is possible only because

men have common aspirations, but government, and political power, the

existence of officials who are given authority to act in the name of the

whole state, are necessary because men's community is imperfect, because

man's social nature expresses itself in conflicting ways, in the clash

of interests, the rivalry of parties, and the struggle of classes,

instead of in the united seeking after a common good. Plato and

Aristotle were familiar with the legislator who was called in by the

whole people, and they tended therefore to take the general will or

common consent of the people for granted. Most political questions are

concerned with the construction and expression of the general will, and

with attempts to ensure that the political machinery made to express the

general will shall not be exploited for private or sectional ends.

Aristotle's mixed constitution springs from a recognition of sectional

interests in the state. For the proper relation between the claims of

"virtue," wealth, and numbers is to be based not upon their relative

importance in the good life, but upon the strength of the parties which

they represent. The mixed constitution is practicable in a state where

the middle class is strong, as only the middle class can mediate between

the rich and the poor. The mixed constitution will be stable if it

represents the actual balance of power between different classes in the

state. When we come to Aristotle's analysis of existing constitutions,

we find that while he regards them as imperfect approximations to the

ideal, he also thinks of them as the result of the struggle between

classes. Democracy, he explains, is the government not of the many but

of the poor; oligarchy a government not of the few but of the rich.

And each class is thought of, not as trying to express an ideal, but as

struggling to acquire power or maintain its position. If ever the class

existed in unredeemed nakedness, it was in the Greek cities of the

fourth century, and its existence is abundantly recognised by Aristotle.

His account of the causes of revolutions in Book V. shows how far were

the existing states of Greece from the ideal with which he starts.

His analysis of the facts forces him to look upon them as the scene

of struggling factions. The causes of revolutions are not described as

primarily changes in the conception of the common good, but changes in

the military or economic power of the several classes in the state. The

aim which he sets before oligarchs or democracies is not the good life,

but simple stability or permanence of the existing constitution.

With this spirit of realism which pervades Books IV., V., and VI.

the idealism of Books I., II., VII., and VIII. is never reconciled.

Aristotle is content to call existing constitutions perversions of

the true form. But we cannot read the Politics without recognising

and profiting from the insight into the nature of the state which is

revealed throughout. Aristotle's failure does not lie in this, that he

is both idealist and realist, but that he keeps these two tendencies

too far apart. He thinks too much of his ideal state, as something to

be reached once for all by knowledge, as a fixed type to which actual

states approximate or from which they are perversions. But if we are to

think of actual politics as intelligible in the light of the ideal, we

must think of that ideal as progressively revealed in history, not as

something to be discovered by turning our back on experience and having

recourse to abstract reasoning. If we stretch forward from what exists

to an ideal, it is to a better which may be in its turn transcended, not

to a single immutable best. Aristotle found in the society of his

time men who were not capable of political reflection, and who, as he

thought, did their best work under superintendence. He therefore called

them natural slaves. For, according to Aristotle, that is a man's

natural condition in which he does his best work. But Aristotle also

thinks of nature as something fixed and immutable; and therefore

sanctions the institution of slavery, which assumes that what men are

that they will always be, and sets up an artificial barrier to their

ever becoming anything else. We see in Aristotle's defence of slavery

how the conception of nature as the ideal can have a debasing influence

upon views of practical politics. His high ideal of citizenship offers

to those who can satisfy its claims the prospect of a fair life;

those who fall short are deemed to be different in nature and shut out

entirely from approach to the ideal.

A. D. LINDSAY.

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De Republics, Atheniensium: Text and facsimile of Papyrus, F. G. Kenyon,

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A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER I

As we see that every city is a society, and every society Ed. is

established for some good purpose; for an apparent [Bekker 1252a] good

is the spring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the

principle upon which they are every one founded, and this is more

especially true of that which has for its object the best possible, and

is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now this is

called a city, and the society thereof a political society; for those

who think that the principles of a political, a regal, a family, and

a herile government are the same are mistaken, while they suppose that

each of these differ in the numbers to whom their power extends, but

not in their constitution: so that with them a herile government is one

composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil and a regal of still

more, as if there was no difference between a large family and a small

city, or that a regal government and a political one are the same, only

that in the one a single person is continually at the head of public

affairs; in the other, that each member of the state has in his turn a

share in the government, and is at one time a magistrate, at another

a private person, according to the rules of political science. But now

this is not true, as will be evident to any one who will consider this

question in the most approved method. As, in an inquiry into every other

subject, it is necessary to separate the different parts of which it is

compounded, till we arrive at their first elements, which are the most

minute parts thereof; so by the same proceeding we shall acquire a

knowledge of the primary parts of a city and see wherein they differ

from each other, and whether the rules of art will give us any

assistance in examining into each of these things which are mentioned.

CHAPTER II

Now if in this particular science any one would attend to its original

seeds, and their first shoot, he would then as in others have the

subject perfectly before him; and perceive, in the first place, that it

is requisite that those should be joined together whose species cannot

exist without each other, as the male and the female, for the business

of propagation; and this not through choice, but by that natural impulse

which acts both upon plants and animals also, for the purpose of their

leaving behind them others like themselves. It is also from natural

causes that some beings command and others obey, that each may obtain

their mutual safety; for a being who is endowed with a mind capable

of reflection and forethought is by nature the superior and governor,

whereas he whose excellence is merely corporeal is formect to be a

slave; whence it follows that the different state of master [1252b] and

slave is equally advantageous to both. But there is a natural difference

between a female and a slave: for nature is not like the artists

who make the Delphic swords for the use of the poor, but for every

particular purpose she has her separate instruments, and thus her ends

are most complete, for whatsoever is employed on one subject only,

brings that one to much greater perfection than when employed on many;

and yet among the barbarians, a female and a slave are upon a level in

the community, the reason for which is, that amongst them there are none

qualified by nature to govern, therefore their society can be nothing

but between slaves of different sexes. For which reason the poets say,

it is proper for the Greeks to govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian

and a slave were by nature one. Now of these two societies the domestic

is the first, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First a house, then

a wife, then an ox for the plough," for the poor man has always an ox

before a household slave. That society then which nature has established

for daily support is the domestic, and those who compose it are called

by Charondas _homosipuoi_, and by Epimenides the Cretan _homokapnoi_;

but the society of many families, which was first instituted for their

lasting, mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most

naturally composed of the descendants of one family, whom some persons

call homogalaktes, the children and the children's children thereof: for

which reason cities were originally governed by kings, as the barbarian

states now are, which are composed of those who had before submitted to

kingly government; for every family is governed by the elder, as are the

branches thereof, on account of their relationship thereunto, which

is what Homer says, "Each one ruled his wife and child;" and in this

scattered manner they formerly lived. And the opinion which universally

prevails, that the gods themselves are subject to kingly government,

arises from hence, that all men formerly were, and many are so now; and

as they imagined themselves to be made in the likeness of the gods, so

they supposed their manner of life must needs be the same. And when many

villages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to

form but one society, that society is a city, and contains in itself, if

I may so speak, the end and perfection of government: first founded that

we might live, but continued that we may live happily. For which reason

every city must be allowed to be the work of nature, if we admit that

the original society between male and female is; for to this as their

end all subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is the

nature of it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that

certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or

a house: besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which

we [1253a] desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is

that final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a city is

a natural production, and that man is naturally a political animal, and

that whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for society, must

be either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in Homer, who is

reviled for being "without society, without law, without family." Such

a one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition, and as solitary as

the birds. The gift of speech also evidently proves that man is a more

social animal than the bees, or any of the herding cattle: for nature,

as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who enjoys

it. Voice indeed, as being the token of pleasure and pain, is imparted

to others also, and thus much their nature is capable of, to perceive

pleasure and pain, and to impart these sensations to others; but it is

by speech that we are enabled to express what is useful for us, and what

is hurtful, and of course what is just and what is unjust: for in

this particular man differs from other animals, that he alone has

a perception of good and evil, of just and unjust, and it is a

participation of these common sentiments which forms a family and a

city. Besides, the notion of a city naturally precedes that of a family

or an individual, for the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts,

for if you take away the whole man, you cannot say a foot or a hand

remains, unless by equivocation, as supposing a hand of stone to be

made, but that would only be a dead one; but everything is understood to

be this or that by its energic qualities and powers, so that when these

no longer remain, neither can that be said to be the same, but something

of the same name. That a city then precedes an individual is plain,

for if an individual is not in himself sufficient to compose a perfect

government, he is to a city as other parts are to a whole; but he that

is incapable of society, or so complete in himself as not to want it,

makes no part of a city, as a beast or a god. There is then in all

persons a natural impetus to associate with each other in this manner,

and he who first founded civil society was the cause of the greatest

good; for as by the completion of it man is the most excellent of all

living beings, so without law and justice he would be the worst of all,

for nothing is so difficult to subdue as injustice in arms: but these

arms man is born with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may apply

to the most opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be the most

wicked, the most cruel, the most lustful, and most gluttonous being

imaginable; for justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the

state is regulated, and these rules are the criterion of what is right.

CHAPTER III

SINCE it is now evident of what parts a city is composed, it will be

necessary to treat first of family government, for every city is made

up of families, and every family [1253b] has again its separate parts of

which it is composed. When a family is complete, it consists of freemen

and slaves; but as in every subject we should begin with examining into

the smallest parts of which it consists, and as the first and smallest

parts of a family are the master and slave, the husband and wife, the

father and child, let us first inquire into these three, what each of

them may be, and what they ought to be; that is to say, the herile, the

nuptial, and the paternal. Let these then be considered as the three

distinct parts of a family: some think that the providing what is

necessary for the family is something different from the government of

it, others that this is the greatest part of it; it shall be considered

separately; but we will first speak of a master and a slave, that we

may both understand the nature of those things which are absolutely

necessary, and also try if we can learn anything better on this subject

than what is already known. Some persons have thought that the power of

the master over his slave originates from his superior knowledge, and

that this knowledge is the same in the master, the magistrate, and the

king, as we have already said; but others think that herile government

is contrary to nature, and that it is the law which makes one man a

slave and another free, but that in nature there is no difference; for

which reason that power cannot be founded in justice, but in force.

CHAPTER IV

Since then a subsistence is necessary in every family, the means of

procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family, for

without necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. As

in all arts which are brought to perfection it is necessary that they

should have their proper instruments if they would complete their works,

so is it in the art of managing a family: now of instruments some of

them are alive, others inanimate; thus with respect to the pilot of the

ship, the tiller is without life, the sailor is alive; for a servant

is as an instrument in many arts. Thus property is as an instrument

to living; an estate is a multitude of instruments; so a slave is an

animated instrument, but every one that can minister of himself is more

valuable than any other instrument; for if every instrument, at command,

or from a preconception of its master's will, could accomplish its work

(as the story goes of the statues of Daedalus; or what the poet tells us

of the tripods of Vulcan, "that they moved of their own accord into the

assembly of the gods "), the shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play

of itself; nor would the architect want servants, or the [1254a] master

slaves. Now what are generally called instruments are the efficients

of something else, but possessions are what we simply use: thus with a

shuttle we make something else for our use; but we only use a coat, or a

bed: since then making and using differ from each other in species, and

they both require their instruments, it is necessary that these should

be different from each other. Now life is itself what we use, and not

what we employ as the efficient of something else; for which reason the

services of a slave are for use. A possession may be considered in the

same nature as a part of anything; now a part is not only a part of

something, but also is nothing else; so is a possession; therefore a

master is only the master of the slave, but no part of him; but the

slave is not only the slave of the master, but nothing else but that.

This fully explains what is the nature of a slave, and what are his

capacities; for that being who by nature is nothing of himself, but

totally another's, and is a man, is a slave by nature; and that man who

is the property of another, is his mere chattel, though he continues a

man; but a chattel is an instrument for use, separate from the body.

CHAPTER V

But whether any person is such by nature, and whether it is advantageous

and just for any one to be a slave or no, or whether all slavery is

contrary to nature, shall be considered hereafter; not that it is

difficult to determine it upon general principles, or to understand

it from matters of fact; for that some should govern, and others be

governed, is not only necessary but useful, and from the hour of their

birth some are marked out for those purposes, and others for the other,

and there are many species of both sorts. And the better those are who

are governed the better also is the government, as for instance of man,

rather than the brute creation: for the more excellent the materials

are with which the work is finished, the more excellent certainly is the

work; and wherever there is a governor and a governed, there certainly

is some work produced; for whatsoever is composed of many parts, which

jointly become one, whether conjunct or separate, evidently show the

marks of governing and governed; and this is true of every living thing

in all nature; nay, even in some things which partake not of life, as

in music; but this probably would be a disquisition too foreign to our

present purpose. Every living thing in the first place is composed of

soul and body, of these the one is by nature the governor, the other the

governed; now if we would know what is natural, we ought to search for

it in those subjects in which nature appears most perfect, and not in

those which are corrupted; we should therefore examine into a man who

is most perfectly formed both in soul and body, in whom this is evident,

for in the depraved and vicious the body seems [1254b] to rule rather

than the soul, on account of their being corrupt and contrary to nature.

We may then, as we affirm, perceive in an animal the first principles

of herile and political government; for the soul governs the body as the

master governs his slave; the mind governs the appetite with a political

or a kingly power, which shows that it is both natural and advantageous

that the body should be governed by the soul, and the pathetic part by

the mind, and that part which is possessed of reason; but to have no

ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to all; and this holds

true not only of man, but of other animals also, for tame animals are

naturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous that both should

be under subjection to man; for this is productive of their common

safety: so is it naturally with the male and the female; the one is

superior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is governed;

and the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to all

mankind. Those men therefore who are as much inferior to others as the

body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use of

them is their bodies, in which their excellence consists; and if what I

have said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is advantageous to

them to be always under government. He then is by nature formed a slave

who is qualified to become the chattel of another person, and on that

account is so, and who has just reason enough to know that there is such

a faculty, without being indued with the use of it; for other animals

have no perception of reason, but are entirely guided by appetite,

and indeed they vary very little in their use from each other; for the

advantage which we receive, both from slaves and tame animals, arises

from their bodily strength administering to our necessities; for it

is the intention of nature to make the bodies of slaves and freemen

different from each other, that the one should be robust for their

necessary purposes, the others erect, useless indeed for what slaves are

employed in, but fit for civil life, which is divided into the duties of

war and peace; though these rules do not always take place, for slaves

have sometimes the bodies of freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it

is evident that if some bodies are as much more excellent than others as

the statues of the gods excel the human form, every one will allow that

the inferior ought to be slaves to the superior; and if this is true

with respect to the body, it is still juster to determine in the same

manner, when we consider the soul; though it is not so easy to perceive

the beauty of [1255a] the soul as it is of the body. Since then some

men are slaves by nature, and others are freemen, it is clear that where

slavery is advantageous to any one, then it is just to make him a slave.

CHAPTER VI

But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the contrary

opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become a slave two

different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law is a certain

compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is adjudged to be the

property of the conquerors: but many persons who are conversant in law

call in question this pretended right, and say that it would be hard

that a man should be compelled by violence to be the slave and subject

of another who had the power to compel him, and was his superior in

strength; and upon this subject, even of those who are wise, some think

one way and some another; but the cause of this doubt and variety of

opinions arises from hence, that great abilities, when accompanied with

proper means, are generally able to succeed by force: for victory is

always owing to a superiority in some advantageous circumstances; so

that it seems that force never prevails but in consequence of great

abilities. But still the dispute concerning the justice of it remains;

for some persons think, that justice consists in benevolence, others

think it just that the powerful should govern: in the midst of these

contrary opinions, there are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that

the right of being master and governor ought not to be placed with those

who have the greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the

right which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects

just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that

they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon

which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that a

man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so, men of

the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the descendants of

slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in war and sold: to

avoid this difficulty they say that such persons should not be called

slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they say this, they do

nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature, which was what we

at first said; for we must acknowledge that there are some persons

who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves, but others in no

situation; thus also it is with those of noble descent: it is not only

in their own country that they are Esteemed as such, but everywhere,

but the barbarians are respected on this account at home only; as if

nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one universal, the other not

so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:

"Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the

immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage."

Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they distinguish

the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from each other

by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it reasonable,

that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a good man, a

good man should be descended; and this is what nature desires to do, but

frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then that this doubt

has some reason in it, and that these persons are not slaves, and those

freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that in some instances

it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to both parties for

this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and that it is right

and just, that some should be governed, and others govern, in the manner

that nature intended; of which sort of government is that which a master

exercises over a slave. But to govern ill is disadvantageous to both;

for the same thing is useful to the part and to the whole, to the body

and to the soul; but the slave is as it were a part of the master, as if

he were an animated part of his body, though separate. For which reason

a mutual utility and friendship may subsist between the master and the

slave, I mean when they are placed by nature in that relation to each

other, for the contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to

slavery by the law, or by conquest.

CHAPTER VII

It is evident from what has been said, that a herile and a political

government are not the same, or that all governments are alike to each

other, as some affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of freemen, the

other to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for that is

what prevails in every house; but a political state is the government of

free men and equals. The master is not so called from his knowing how to

manage his slave, but because he is so; for the same reason a slave and

a freeman have their respective appellations. There is also one sort of

knowledge proper for a master, another for a slave; the slave's is of

the nature of that which was taught by a slave at Syracuse; for he for

a stipulated sum instructed the boys in all the business of a household

slave, of which there are various sorts to be learnt, as the art of

cookery, and other such-like services, of which some are allotted to

some, and others to others; some employments being more honourable,

others more necessary; according to the proverb, "One slave excels

another, one master excels another:" in such-like things the knowledge

of a slave consists. The knowledge of the master is to be able properly

to employ his slaves, for the mastership of slaves is the employment,

not the mere possession of them; not that this knowledge contains

anything great or respectable; for what a slave ought to know how to do,

that a master ought to know how to order; for which reason, those who

have it in their power to be free from these low attentions, employ a

steward for this business, and apply themselves either to public affairs

or philosophy: the knowledge of procuring what is necessary for a family

is different from that which belongs either to the master or the slave:

and to do this justly must be either by war or hunting. And thus much of

the difference between a master and a slave.

CHAPTER VIII

[1256a] As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by

all means inquire into the nature of property in general, and the

acquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the

first place then, some one may doubt whether the getting of money is

the same thing as economy, or whether it is a part of it, or something

subservient to it; and if so, whether it is as the art of making

shuttles is to the art of weaving, or the art of making brass to that

of statue founding, for they are not of the same service; for the one

supplies the tools, the other the matter: by the matter I mean the

subject out of which the work is finished, as wool for the cloth and

brass for the statue. It is evident then that the getting of money is

not the same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to furnish

the means of the other to use them; and what art is there employed in

the management of a family but economy, but whether this is a part of

it, or something of a different species, is a doubt; for if it is

the business of him who is to get money to find out how riches and

possessions may be procured, and both these arise from various

causes, we must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is part of

money-getting or something different, and in general, whether the same

is not true of every acquisition and every attention which relates to

provision. But as there are many sorts of provision, so are the methods

of living both of man and the brute creation very various; and as it is

impossible to live without food, the difference in that particular makes

the lives of animals so different from each other. Of beasts, some

live in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for procuring

themselves food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on fruit, and

others on whatsoever they light on, nature having so distinguished

their course of life, that they can very easily procure themselves

subsistence; and as the same things are not agreeable to all, but one

animal likes one thing and another another, it follows that the lives

of those beasts who live upon flesh must be different from the lives of

those who live on fruits; so is it with men, their lives differ greatly

from each other; and of all these the shepherd's is the idlest, for they

live upon the flesh of tame animals, without any trouble, while they are

obliged to change their habitations on account of their flocks, which

they are compelled to follow, cultivating, as it were, a living farm.

Others live exercising violence over living creatures, one pursuing this

thing, another that, these preying upon men; those who live near lakes

and marshes and rivers, or the sea itself, on fishing, while others are

fowlers, or hunters of wild beasts; but the greater part of mankind live

upon the produce of the earth and its cultivated fruits; and the manner

in which all those live who follow the direction of nature, and labour

for their own subsistence, is nearly the same, without ever thinking

to procure any provision by way of exchange or merchandise, such are

shepherds, husband-men, [1256b] robbers, fishermen, and hunters: some

join different employments together, and thus live very agreeably;

supplying those deficiencies which were wanting to make their

subsistence depend upon themselves only: thus, for instance, the same

person shall be a shepherd and a robber, or a husbandman and a hunter;

and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life which

necessity points out. This provision then nature herself seems to have

furnished all animals with, as well immediately upon their first origin

as also when they are arrived at a state of maturity; for at the first

of these periods some of them are provided in the womb with proper

nourishment, which continues till that which is born can get food for

itself, as is the case with worms and birds; and as to those which bring

forth their young alive, they have the means for their subsistence for a

certain time within themselves, namely milk. It is evident then that we

may conclude of those things that are, that plants are created for the

sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men; the tame for our use

and provision; the wild, at least the greater part, for our provision

also, or for some other advantageous purpose, as furnishing us with

clothes, and the like. As nature therefore makes nothing either

imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these

things for men: for which reason what we gain in war is in a certain

degree a natural acquisition; for hunting is a part of it, which it is

necessary for us to employ against wild beasts; and those men who being

intended by nature for slavery are unwilling to submit to it, on which

occasion such a. war is by nature just: that species of acquisition then

only which is according to nature is part of economy; and this ought to

be at hand, or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is necessary

to be kept in store to live upon, and which are useful as well for the

state as the family. And true riches seem to consist in these; and the

acquisition of those possessions which are necessary for a happy life is

not infinite; though Solon says otherwise in this verse:

"No bounds to riches can be fixed for man;"

for they may be fixed as in other arts; for the instruments of no art

whatsoever are infinite, either in their number or their magnitude; but

riches are a number of instruments in domestic and civil economy; it is

therefore evident that the acquisition of certain things according

to nature is a part both of domestic and civil economy, and for what

reason.

CHAPTER IX

There is also another species of acquisition which they [1257a]

particularly call pecuniary, and with great propriety; and by this

indeed it seems that there are no bounds to riches and wealth. Now many

persons suppose, from their near relation to each other, that this is

one and the same with that we have just mentioned, but it is not the

same as that, though not very different; one of these is natural, the

other is not, but rather owing to some art and skill; we will enter into

a particular examination of this subject. The uses of every possession

are two, both dependent upon the thing itself, but not in the same

manner, the one supposing an inseparable connection with it, the other

not; as a shoe, for instance, which may be either worn, or exchanged

for something else, both these are the uses of the shoe; for he who

exchanges a shoe with some man who wants one, for money or provisions,

uses the shoe as a shoe, but not according to the original intention,

for shoes were not at first made to be exchanged. The same thing holds

true of all other possessions; for barter, in general, had its original

beginning in nature, some men having a surplus, others too little of

what was necessary for them: hence it is evident, that the selling

provisions for money is not according to the natural use of things; for

they were obliged to use barter for those things which they wanted; but

it is plain that barter could have no place in the first, that is to

say, in family society; but must have begun when the number of those

who composed the community was enlarged: for the first of these had all

things in common; but when they came to be separated they were obliged

to exchange with each other many different things which both parties

wanted. Which custom of barter is still preserved amongst many barbarous

nations, who procure one necessary with another, but never sell

anything; as giving and receiving wine for corn and the like. This

sort of barter is not contradictory to nature, nor is it any species of

money-getting; but is necessary in procuring that subsistence which is

so consonant thereunto. But this barter introduced the use of money, as

might be expected; for a convenient place from whence to import what you

wanted, or to export what you had a surplus of, being often at a great

distance, money necessarily made its way into commerce; for it is not

everything which is naturally most useful that is easiest of carriage;

for which reason they invented something to exchange with each other

which they should mutually give and take, that being really valuable

itself, should have the additional advantage of being of easy

conveyance, for the purposes of life, as iron and silver, or anything

else of the same nature: and this at first passed in value simply

according to its weight or size; but in process of time it had a certain

stamp, to save the trouble of weighing, which stamp expressed its value.

[1257b]

Money then being established as the necessary medium of exchange,

another species of money-getting soon took place, namely, by buying

and selling, at probably first in a simple manner, afterwards with more

skill and experience, where and how the greatest profits might be made.

For which reason the art of money-getting seems to be chiefly conversant

about trade, and the business of it to be able to tell where the

greatest profits can be made, being the means of procuring abundance

of wealth and possessions: and thus wealth is very often supposed to

consist in the quantity of money which any one possesses, as this is the

medium by which all trade is conducted and a fortune made, others again

regard it as of no value, as being of none by nature, but arbitrarily

made so by compact; so that if those who use it should alter their

sentiments, it would be worth nothing, as being of no service for

any necessary purpose. Besides, he who abounds in money often wants

necessary food; and it is impossible to say that any person is in good

circumstances when with all his possessions he may perish with hunger.

Like Midas in the fable, who from his insatiable wish had everything he

touched turned into gold. For which reason others endeavour to procure

other riches and other property, and rightly, for there are other riches

and property in nature; and these are the proper objects of economy:

while trade only procures money, not by all means, but by the exchange

of it, and for that purpose it is this which it is chiefly employed

about, for money is the first principle and the end of trade; nor are

there any bounds to be set to what is thereby acquired. Thus also there

are no limits to the art of medicine, with respect to the health which

it attempts to procure; the same also is true of all other arts; no line

can be drawn to terminate their bounds, the several professors of them

being desirous to extend them as far as possible. (But still the means

to be employed for that purpose are limited; and these are the limits

beyond which the art cannot proceed.) Thus in the art of acquiring

riches there are no limits, for the object of that is money and

possessions; but economy has a boundary, though this has not: for

acquiring riches is not the business of that, for which reason it should

seem that some boundary should be set to riches, though we see the

contrary to this is what is practised; for all those who get riches add

to their money without end; the cause of which is the near connection

of these two arts with each other, which sometimes occasions the one to

change employments with the other, as getting of money is their common

object: for economy requires the possession of wealth, but not on

its own account but with another view, to purchase things necessary

therewith; but the other procures it merely to increase it: so that some

persons are confirmed in their belief, that this is the proper object

of economy, and think that for this purpose money should be saved and

hoarded up without end; the reason for which disposition is, that they

are intent upon living, but not upon living well; and this desire being

boundless in its extent, the means which they aim at for that purpose

are boundless also; and those who propose to live well, often confine

that to the enjoyment of the pleasures of sense; so that as this also

seems to depend upon what a man has, all their care is to get money,

and hence arises the other cause for this art; for as this enjoyment is

excessive in its degree, they endeavour to procure means proportionate

to supply it; and if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing in

money, they will endeavour to do it by other ways, and apply all their

powers to a purpose they were not by nature intended for. Thus, for

instance, courage was intended to inspire fortitude, not to get money

by; neither is this the end of the soldier's or the physician's art,

but victory and health. But such persons make everything subservient to

money-getting, as if this was the only end; and to the end everything

ought to refer.

We have now considered that art of money-getting which is not necessary,

and have seen in what manner we became in want of it; and also that

which is necessary, which is different from it; for that economy which

is natural, and whose object is to provide food, is not like this

unlimited in its extent, but has its bounds.

CHAPTER X

We have now determined what was before doubtful, whether or no the art

of getting money is his business who is at the head of a family or a

state, and though not strictly so, it is however very necessary; for

as a politician does not make men, but receiving them from the hand of

nature employs them to proper purposes; thus the earth, or the sea, or

something else ought to supply them with provisions, and this it is the

business of the master of the family to manage properly; for it is not

the weaver's business to make yarn, but to use it, and to distinguish

what is good and useful from what is bad and of no service; and indeed

some one may inquire why getting money should be a part of economy when

the art of healing is not, as it is as requisite that the family should

be in health as that they should eat, or have anything else which is

necessary; and as it is indeed in some particulars the business both of

the master of the family, and he to whom the government of the state

is entrusted, to see after the health of those under their care, but in

others not, but the physician's; so also as to money; in some respects

it is the business of the master of the family, in others not, but of

the servant; but as we have already said, it is chiefly nature's, for

it is her part to supply her offspring with food; for everything finds

nourishment left for it in what produced it; for which reason

the natural riches of all men arise from fruits and animals. Now

money-making, as we say, being twofold, it may be applied to two

purposes, the service of the house or retail trade; of which the first

is necessary and commendable, the other justly censurable; for it has

not its origin in [1258b] nature, but by it men gain from each other;

for usury is most reasonably detested, as it is increasing our fortune

by money itself, and not employing it for the purpose it was originally

intended, namely exchange.

And this is the explanation of the name (TOKOS), which means the

breeding of money. For as offspring resemble their parents, so usury

is money bred of money. Whence of all forms of money-making it is most

against nature.

CHAPTER XI

Having already sufficiently considered the general principles of this

subject, let us now go into the practical part thereof; the one is a

liberal employment for the mind, the other necessary. These things are

useful in the management of one's affairs; to be skilful in the nature

of cattle, which are most profitable, and where, and how; as for

instance, what advantage will arise from keeping horses, or oxen, or

sheep, or any other live stock; it is also necessary to be acquainted

with the comparative value of these things, and which of them in

particular places are worth most; for some do better in one place, some

in another. Agriculture also should be understood, and the management

of arable grounds and orchards; and also the care of bees, and fish, and

birds, from whence any profit may arise; these are the first and most

proper parts of domestic management.

With respect to gaining money by exchange, the principal method of doing

this is by merchandise, which is carried on in three different ways,

either by sending the commodity for sale by sea or by land, or else

selling it on the place where it grows; and these differ from each other

in this, that the one is more profitable, the other safer. The second

method is by usury. The third by receiving wages for work done, and

this either by being employed in some mean art, or else in mere bodily

labour. There is also a third species of improving a fortune, that is

something between this and the first; for it partly depends upon

nature, partly upon exchange; the subject of which is, things that are

immediately from the earth, or their produce, which, though they bear

no fruit, are yet useful, such as selling of timber and the whole art of

metallurgy, which includes many different species, for there are various

sorts of things dug out of the earth.

These we have now mentioned in general, but to enter into particulars

concerning each of them, though it might be useful to the artist, would

be tiresome to dwell on. Now of all the works of art, those are the most

excellent wherein chance has the least to do, and those are the meanest

which deprave the body, those the most servile in which bodily strength

alone is chiefly wanted, those most illiberal which require least skill;

but as there are books written on these subjects by some persons, as

by Chares the Panian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, upon husbandry and

planting; and by others on other matters, [1259b] let those who have

occasion consult them thereon; besides, every person should collect

together whatsoever he hears occasionally mentioned, by means of which

many of those who aimed at making a fortune have succeeded in their

intentions; for all these are useful to those who make a point of

getting money, as in the contrivance of Thales the Milesian (which was

certainly a gainful one, but as it was his it was attributed to

his wisdom, though the method he used was a general one, and would

universally succeed), when they reviled him for his poverty, as if the

study of philosophy was useless: for they say that he, perceiving by his

skill in astrology that there would be great plenty of olives that year,

while it was yet winter, having got a little money, he gave earnest for

all the oil works that were in Miletus and Chios, which he hired at a

low price, there being no one to bid against him; but when the season

came for making oil, many persons wanting them, he all at once let them

upon what terms he pleased; and raising a large sum of money by that

means, convinced them that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if

they chose it, but that that was not what they aimed at; in this manner

is Thales said to have shown his wisdom. It indeed is, as we have

said, generally gainful for a person to contrive to make a monopoly of

anything; for which reason some cities also take this method when they

want money, and monopolise their commodities. There was a certain person

in Sicily who laid out a sum of money which was deposited in his hand in

buying up all the iron from the iron merchants; so that when the dealers

came from the markets to purchase, there was no one had any to sell but

himself; and though he put no great advance upon it, yet by laying out

fifty talents he made an hundred. When Dionysius heard this he permitted

him to take his money with him, but forbid him to continue any longer in

Sicily, as being one who contrived means for getting money inconsistent

with his affairs. This man's view and Thales's was exactly the same;

both of them contrived to procure a monopoly for themselves: it is

useful also for politicians to understand these things, for many states

want to raise money and by such means, as well as private families,

nay more so; for which reason some persons who are employed in the

management of public affairs confine themselves to this province only.

CHAPTER XII

There are then three parts of domestic government, the masters, of

which we have already treated, the fathers, and the husbands; now the

government of the wife and children should both be that of free persons,

but not the [I259b] same; for the wife should be treated as a citizen of

a free state, the children should be under kingly power; for the male is

by nature superior to the female, except when something happens contrary

to the usual course of nature, as is the elder and perfect to the

younger and imperfect. Now in the generality of free states, the

governors and the governed alternately change place; for an equality

without any preference is what nature chooses; however, when one

governs and another is governed, she endeavours that there should be a

distinction between them in forms, expressions, and honours; according

to what Amasis said of his laver. This then should be the established

rule between the man and the woman. The government of children should

be kingly; for the power of the father over the child is founded in

affection and seniority, which is a species of kingly government; for

which reason Homer very properly calls Jupiter "the father of gods and

men," who was king of both these; for nature requires that a king should

be of the same species with those whom he governs, though superior in

some particulars, as is the case between the elder and the younger, the

father and the son.

CHAPTER XIII

It is evident then that in the due government of a family, greater

attention should be paid to the several members of it and their virtues

than to the possessions or riches of it; and greater to the freemen

than the slaves: but here some one may doubt whether there is any other

virtue in a slave than his organic services, and of higher estimation

than these, as temperance, fortitude, justice, and such-like habits, or

whether they possess only bodily qualities: each side of the question

has its difficulties; for if they possess these virtues, wherein do

they differ from freemen? and that they do not, since they are men,

and partakers of reason, is absurd. Nearly the same inquiry may be made

concerning a woman and a child, whether these also have their proper

virtues; whether a woman ought to be temperate, brave, and just, and

whether a child is temperate or no; and indeed this inquiry ought to be

general, whether the virtues of those who, by nature, either govern or

are governed, are the same or different; for if it is necessary that

both of them should partake of the fair and good, why is it also

necessary that, without exception, the one should govern, the other

always be governed? for this cannot arise from their possessing these

qualities in different degrees; for to govern, and to be governed, are

things different in species, but more or less are not. And yet it is

wonderful that one party ought to have them, and the other not; for if

he who is to govern should not be temperate and just, how can he govern

well? or if he is to be governed, how can he be governed well? for he

who is intemperate [1260a] and a coward will never do what he ought: it

is evident then that both parties ought to be virtuous; but there is a

difference between them, as there is between those who by nature command

and who by nature obey, and this originates in the soul; for in this

nature has planted the governing and submitting principle, the virtues

of which we say are different, as are those of a rational and an

irrational being. It is plain then that the same principle may be

extended farther, and that there are in nature a variety of things which

govern and are governed; for a freeman is governed in a different manner

from a slave, a male from a female, and a man from a child: and all

these have parts of mind within them, but in a different manner. Thus

a slave can have no power of determination, a woman but a weak one, a

child an imperfect one. Thus also must it necessarily be with respect to

moral virtues; all must be supposed to possess them, but not in the

same manner, but as is best suited to every one's employment; on which

account he who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue, for his

business is entirely that of an architect, and reason is the architect;

while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for

their station; from whence it is evident, that although moral virtue is

common to all those we have spoken of, yet the temperance of a man and

a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, though

Socrates thought otherwise; for the courage of the man consists in

commanding, the woman's in obeying; and the same is true in other

particulars: and this will be evident to those who will examine

different virtues separately; for those who use general terms deceive

themselves when they say, that virtue consists in a good disposition of

mind, or doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much

better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those

who thus define them; and as Sophocles speaks of a woman, we think

of all persons, that their 'virtues should be applicable to their

characters, for says he,

"Silence is a woman's ornament,"

but it is not a man's; and as a child is incomplete, it is evident that

his virtue is not to be referred to himself in his present situation,

but to that in which he will be complete, and his preceptor. In like

manner the virtue of a slave is to be referred to his master; for we

laid it down as a maxim, that the use of a slave was to employ him in

what you wanted; so that it is clear enough that few virtues are wanted

in his station, only that he may not neglect his work through idleness

or fear: some person may question if what I have said is true, whether

virtue is not necessary for artificers in their calling, for they often

through idleness neglect their work, but the difference between them

is very great; for a slave is connected with you for life, but the

artificer not so nearly: as near therefore as the artificer approaches

to the situation of a slave, just so much ought he to have of the

virtues of one; for a mean artificer is to a certain point a slave; but

then a slave is one of those things which are by nature what they are,

but this is not true [1260b] of a shoemaker, or any other artist. It is

evident then that a slave ought to be trained to those virtues which are

proper for his situation by his master; and not by him who has the power

of a master, to teach him any particular art. Those therefore are in the

wrong who would deprive slaves of reason, and say that they have only to

follow their orders; for slaves want more instruction than children, and

thus we determine this matter. It is necessary, I am sensible, for every

one who treats upon government, to enter particularly into the relations

of husband and wife, and of parent and child, and to show what are the

virtues of each and their respective connections with each other; what

is right and what is wrong; and how the one ought to be followed, and

the other avoided. Since then every family is part of a city, and each

of those individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts

ought to correspond to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary, that

both the wives and children of the community should be instructed

correspondent to the nature thereof, if it is of consequence to the

virtue of the state, that the wives and children therein should be

virtuous, and of consequence it certainly is, for the wives are one half

of the free persons; and of the children the succeeding citizens are to

be formed. As then we have determined these points, we will leave

the rest to be spoken to in another place, as if the subject was now

finished; and beginning again anew, first consider the sentiments of

those who have treated of the most perfect forms of government.

CHAPTER I

Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others

best for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they wish,

it is necessary to examine into the polity of those states which are

allowed to be well governed; and if there should be any others which

some persons have described, and which appear properly regulated, to

note what is right and useful in them; and when we point out wherein

they have failed, let not this be imputed to an affectation of wisdom,

for it is because there are great defects in all those which are already

established, that I have been induced to undertake this work. We will

begin with that part of the subject which naturally presents itself

first to our consideration. The members of every state must of necessity

have all things in common, or some things common, and not others,

or nothing at all common. To have nothing in common is evidently

impossible, for society itself is one species of [1261a] community; and

the first thing necessary thereunto is a common place of habitation,

namely the city, which must be one, and this every citizen must have a

share in. But in a government which is to be well founded, will it be

best to admit of a community in everything which is capable thereof, or

only in some particulars, but in others not? for it is possible that the

citizens may have their wives, and children, and goods in common, as

in Plato's Commonwealth; for in that Socrates affirms that all these

particulars ought to be so. Which then shall we prefer? the custom which

is already established, or the laws which are proposed in that treatise?

CHAPTER II

Now as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties, so

neither does the cause for which he would frame his government in this

manner seem agreeable to reason, nor is it capable of producing that end

which he has proposed, and for which he says it ought to take place; nor

has he given any particular directions for putting it in practice. Now

I also am willing to agree with Socrates in the principle which he

proceeds upon, and admit that the city ought to be one as much as

possible; and yet it is evident that if it is contracted too much, it

will be no longer a city, for that necessarily supposes a multitude; so

that if we proceed in this manner, we shall reduce a city to a family,

and a family to a single person: for we admit that a family is one in a

greater degree than a city, and a single person than a family; so that

if this end could be obtained, it should never be put in practice, as it

would annihilate the city; for a city does not only consist of a large

number of inhabitants, but there must also be different sorts; for were

they all alike, there could be no city; for a confederacy and a city are

two different things; for a confederacy is valuable from its numbers,

although all those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this

is entered into for the sake of mutual defence, as we add an additional

weight to make the scale go down. The same distinction prevails between

a city and a nation when the people are not collected into separate

villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now those things in which a city

should be one are of different sorts, and in preserving an alternate

reciprocation of power between these, the safety thereof consists (as

I have already mentioned in my treatise on Morals), for amongst freemen

and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern at the

same time, but either by the year, or according to some other regulation

or time, by which means every one in his turn will be in office; as

if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and not

always be employed in the same calling. But as it is evidently better,

that these should continue to exercise their respective trades; so also

in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that the

government should continue in the same hands; but where it [1261b] is

not (as nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is just, be the

administration good or bad, that all should partake of it), there it is

best to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns

submit to those who are at that time magistrates, as they will, in their

turns, alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different

men: by the same method different persons will execute different

offices. From hence it is evident, that a city cannot be one in the

manner that some persons propose; and that what has been said to be the

greatest good which it could enjoy, is absolutely its destruction, which

cannot be: for the good of anything is that which preserves it.

For another reason also it is clear, that it is not for the best

to endeavour to make a city too much one, because a family is more

sufficient in itself than a single person, a city than a family; and

indeed Plato supposes that a city owes its existence to that sufficiency

in themselves which the members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is

so desirable, the less the city is one the better.

CHAPTER III

But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as much

as possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place by

permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine (though

this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is entirely one),

for the word All is used in two senses; if it means each individual,

what Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for each person will

say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his own property, and

of everything else that may happen to belong to him, that it is his own.

But those who have their wives and children in common will not say so,

but all will say so, though not as individuals; therefore, to use the

word all is evidently a fallacious mode of speech; for this word is

sometimes used distributively, and sometimes collectively, on account

of its double meaning, and is the cause of inconclusive syllogisms in

reasoning. Therefore for all persons to say the same thing was their

own, using the word all in its distributive sense, would be well, but is

impossible: in its collective sense it would by no means contribute to

the concord of the state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience

attending this proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care

of; for all men regard more what is their own than what others share

with them in, to which they pay less attention than is incumbent on

every one: let me add also, that every one is more negligent of what

another is to see to, as well as himself, than of his own private

business; as in a family one is often worse served by many servants than

by a few. Let each citizen then in the state have a thousand children,

but let none of them be considered as the children of that individual,

but let the relation of father and child be common to them all, and they

will all be neglected. Besides, in consequence of this, [1262a] whenever

any citizen behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it

would, might say, this is my son, or this man's or that; and in

this manner would they speak, and thus would they doubt of the whole

thousand, or of whatever number the city consisted; and it would be

uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was to

take care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to say

this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand or ten

thousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms of government,

where one man calls another his son, another calls that same person

his brother, another nephew, or some other relation, either by blood

or marriage, and first extends his care to him and his, while another

regards him as one of the same parish and the same tribe; and it is

better for any one to be a nephew in his private capacity than a son

after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible to prevent some

persons from suspecting that they are brothers and sisters, fathers and

mothers to each other; for, from the mutual likeness there is between

the sire and the offspring, they will necessarily conclude in what

relation they stand to each other, which circumstance, we are informed

by those writers who describe different parts of the world, does

sometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there are wives in common who

yet deliver their children to their respective fathers, being guided

by their likeness to them. There are also some mares and cows which

naturally bring forth their young so like the male, that we can easily

distinguish by which of them they were impregnated: such was the mare

called Just, in Pharsalia.

CHAPTER IV

Besides, those who contrive this plan of community cannot easily avoid

the following evils; namely, blows, murders involuntary or voluntary,

quarrels, and reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be

guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly

related to us; though not to those who are not connected to us by any

tie of affinity: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen

oftener amongst those who do not know how they are connected to each

other than those who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the

first of these, they admit of a legal expiation, but amongst the latter

that cannot be done. It is also absurd for those who promote a

community of children to forbid those who love each other from indulging

themselves in the last excesses of that passion, while they do not

restrain them from the passion itself, or those intercourses which are

of all things most improper, between a Father and a son, a brother and

a brother, and indeed the thing itself is most absurd. It is also

ridiculous to prevent this intercourse between the nearest relations,

for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, while they think

that the relation of father and daughter, the brother and sister, is of

no consequence at all. It seems also more advantageous for the state,

that the husbandmen should have their wives and children in common than

the military, for there will be less affection [1262b] among them

in that case than when otherwise; for such persons ought to be under

subjection, that they may obey the laws, and not seek after innovations.

Upon the whole, the consequences of such a law as this would be directly

contrary to those things which good laws ought to establish, and which

Socrates endeavoured to establish by his regulations concerning women

and children: for we think that friendship is the greatest good which

can happen to any city, as nothing so much prevents seditions: and amity

in a city is what Socrates commends above all things, which appears

to be, as indeed he says, the effect of friendship; as we learn from

Aristophanes in the Erotics, who says, that those who love one another

from the excess of that passion, desire to breathe the same soul, and

from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would necessarily

follow, that both or one of them must be destroyed. But now in a city

which admits of this community, the tie of friendship must, from that

very cause, be extremely weak, when no father can say, this is my son;

or son, this is my father; for as a very little of what is sweet, being

mixed with a great deal of water is imperceptible after the mixture, so

must all family connections, and the names they go by, be necessarily

disregarded in such a community, it being then by no means necessary

that the father should have any regard for him he called a son, or

the brothers for those they call brothers. There are two things which

principally inspire mankind with care and love of their offspring,

knowing it is their own, and what ought to be the object of their

affection, neither of which can take place in this sort of community. As

for exchanging the children of the artificers and husbandmen with those

of the military, and theirs reciprocally with these, it will occasion

great confusion in whatever manner it shall be done; for of necessity,

those who carry the children must know from whom they took and to whom

they gave them; and by this means those evils which I have already

mentioned will necessarily be the more likely to happen, as blows,

incestuous love, murders, and the like; for those who are given from

their own parents to other citizens, the military, for instance, will

not call them brothers, sons, fathers, or mothers. The same thing

would happen to those of the military who were placed among the other

citizens; so that by this means every one would be in fear how to act

in consequence of consanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a

community of wives and children.

CHAPTER V

We proceed next to consider in what manner property should be regulated

in a state which is formed after the most perfect mode of government,

whether it should be common or not; for this may be considered as a

separate question from what had been determined concerning [1263a] wives

and children; I mean, whether it is better that these should be held

separate, as they now everywhere are, or that not only possessions but

also the usufruct of them should be in common; or that the soil should

have a particular owner, but that the produce should be brought together

and used as one common stock, as some nations at present do; or on the

contrary, should the soil be common, and should it also be cultivated in

common, while the produce is divided amongst the individuals for their

particular use, which is said to be practised by some barbarians; or

shall both the soil and the fruit be common? When the business of

the husbandman devolves not on the citizen, the matter is much easier

settled; but when those labour together who have a common right of

possession, this may occasion several difficulties; for there may not

be an equal proportion between their labour and what they consume; and

those who labour hard and have but a small proportion of the produce,

will certainly complain of those who take a large share of it and do but

little for that. Upon the whole, as a community between man and man so

entire as to include everything possible, and thus to have all things

that man can possess in common, is very difficult, so is it particularly

so with respect to property; and this is evident from that community

which takes place between those who go out to settle a colony; for they

frequently have disputes with each other upon the most common occasions,

and come to blows upon trifles: we find, too, that we oftenest correct

those slaves who are generally employed in the common offices of the

family: a community of property then has these and other inconveniences

attending it.

But the manner of life which is now established, more particularly when

embellished with good morals and a system of equal laws, is far superior

to it, for it will have the advantage of both; by both I mean properties

being common, and divided also; for in some respects it ought to be in

a manner common, but upon the whole private: for every man's attention

being employed on his own particular concerns, will prevent mutual

complaints against each other; nay, by this means industry will be

increased, as each person will labour to improve his own private

property; and it will then be, that from a principle of virtue they will

mutually perform good offices to each other, according to the proverb,

"All things are common amongst friends;" and in some cities there are

traces of this custom to be seen, so that it is not impracticable, and

particularly in those which are best governed; some things are by this

means in a manner common, and others might be so; for there, every

person enjoying his own private property, some things he assists his

friend with, others are considered as in common; as in Lacedaemon, where

they use each other's slaves, as if they were, so to speak, their own,

as they do their horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in

a journey.

It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to make

the use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to it is

the particular [1263b] business of the legislator. And also with respect

to pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is, that a man should

think he has something which he may call his own; for it is by no means

to no purpose, that each person should have an affection for himself,

for that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover is justly censured; for

we mean by that, not one that simply loves himself, but one that loves

himself more than he ought; in like manner we blame a money-lover,

and yet both money and self is what all men love. Besides, it is very

pleasing to us to oblige and assist our friends and companions, as well

as those whom we are connected with by the rights of hospitality; and

this cannot be done without the establishment of private property, which

cannot take place with those who make a city too much one; besides, they

prevent every opportunity of exercising two principal virtues, modesty

and liberality. Modesty with respect to the female sex, for this virtue

requires you to abstain from her who is another's; liberality, which

depends upon private property, for without that no one can appear

liberal, or do any generous action; for liberality consists in imparting

to others what is our own.

This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good

appearance and specious pretences to humanity; and when first proposed

to any one, must give him great pleasure, as he will conclude it to be

a wonderful bond of friendship, connecting all to all; particularly

when any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society,

as arising from properties not being common, I mean the disputes which

happen between man and man, upon their different contracts with each

other; those judgments which are passed in court in consequence of

fraud, and perjury, and flattering the rich, none of which arise from

properties being private, but from the vices of mankind. Besides,

those who live in one general community, and have all things in common,

oftener dispute with each other than those who have their property

separate; from the very small number indeed of those who have their

property in common, compared with those where it is appropriated,

the instances of their quarrels are but few. It is also but right to

mention, not only the inconveniences they are preserved from who live in

a communion of goods, but also the advantages they are deprived of; for

when the whole comes to be considered, this manner of life will be found

impracticable.

We must suppose, then, that Socrates's mistake arose from the principle

he set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a family and a

city ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely; for there

is a point beyond which if a city proceeds in reducing itself to one, it

will be no longer a city.

There is also another point at which it will still continue to be a

city, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be

worse than none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who

sing in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to

be made one, and a community, as I have already said, by education;

as property at Lacedaemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made

common by their legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any

education, and think thereby to make his city excellent and respectable,

will be absurd, while he expects to form it by such regulations, and not

by manners, philosophy, and laws. And whoever [1264a] would establish

a government upon a community of goods, ought to know that he should

consult the experience of many years, which would plainly enough inform

him whether such a scheme is useful; for almost all things have already

been found out, but some have been neglected, and others which have been

known have not been put in practice. But this would be most evident, if

any one could see such a government really established: for it would be

impossible to frame such a city without dividing and separating it into

its distinct parts, as public tables, wards, and tribes; so that here

the laws will do nothing more than forbid the military to engage

in agriculture, which is what the Lacedaemonians are at present

endeavouring to do.

Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of government

should be pursued with respect to the individuals in the state where

there is a community of goods established; for though the majority

of his citizens will in general consist of a multitude of persons of

different occupations, of those he has determined nothing; whether the

property of the husbandman ought to be in common, or whether each person

should have his share to himself; and also, whether their wives and

children ought to be in common: for if all things are to be alike common

to all, where will be the difference between them and the military, or

what would they get by submitting to their government? and upon what

principles would they do it, unless they should establish the wise

practice of the Cretans? for they, allowing everything else to their

slaves, forbid them only gymnastic exercises and the use of arms. And if

they are not, but these should be in the same situation with respect to

their property which they are in other cities, what sort of a community

will there be? in one city there must of necessity be two, and those

contrary to each other; for he makes the military the guardians of the

state, and the husbandman, artisans, and others, citizens; and all those

quarrels, accusations, and things of the like sort, which he says are

the bane of other cities, will be found in his also: notwithstanding

Socrates says they will not want many laws in consequence of their

education, but such only as may be necessary for regulating the streets,

the markets, and the like, while at the same time it is the education of

the military only that he has taken any care of. Besides, he makes the

husbandmen masters of property upon paying a tribute; but this would

be likely to make them far more troublesome and high-spirited than the

Helots, the Penestise, or the slaves which others employ; nor has he

ever determined whether it is necessary to give any attention to them

in these particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith,

their polity, their education, their laws; besides, it is of no little

consequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be framed so

as to preserve the community of the military.

Besides, if he makes the wives common, while the property [1264b]

continues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the same

care which the man bestows upon his fields? nor will the inconvenience

be remedied by making property as well as wives common; and it is absurd

to draw a comparison from the brute creation, and say, that the same

principle should regulate the connection of a man and a woman which

regulates theirs amongst whom there is no family association.

It is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has

done; for he would have persons of the same rank always in office, which

becomes the cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no account,

but more particularly amongst those who are of a courageous and warlike

disposition; it is indeed evidently necessary that he should frame his

community in this manner; for that golden particle which God has mixed

up in the soul of man flies not from one to the other, but always

continues with the same; for he says, that some of our species have

gold, and others silver, blended in their composition from the moment of

their birth: but those who are to be husbandmen and artists, brass and

iron; besides, though he deprives the military of happiness, he says,

that the legislator ought to make all the citizens happy; but it

is impossible that the whole city can be happy, without all, or the

greater, or some part of it be happy. For happiness is not like

that numerical equality which arises from certain numbers when added

together, although neither of them may separately contain it; for

happiness cannot be thus added together, but must exist in every

individual, as some properties belong to every integral; and if the

military are not happy, who else are so? for the artisans are not, nor

the multitude of those who are employed in inferior offices. The state

which Socrates has described has all these defects, and others which are

not of less consequence.

CHAPTER VI

It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ

afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to consider

briefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates has

thoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in what

manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated, how

property should be established, and government conducted.

Now he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and soldiers,

and from these he select a third part who are to be senators and govern

the city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman and artificer

shall have any or what share in the government, or whether they shall

have arms, and join with the others in war, or not. He thinks also

that the women ought to go to war, and have the same education as the

soldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his treatise with

matter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to education, he has

only said what that of the guards ought to be.

[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which that

contains, for he has there said but little concerning government; and

this government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a manner as

to impart to its members a more entire community of goods than is to be

found in other cities, he almost brings round again to be the same

as that other government which he had first proposed; for except the

community of wives and goods, he has framed both his governments alike,

for the education of the citizens is to be the same in both; they are in

both to live without any servile employ, and their common tables are to

be the same, excepting that in that he says the women should have common

tables, and that there should be a thousand men-at-arms, in this, that

there should be five thousand.

All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and

inquisitive; but that they are all true it may probably be too much

to say. For now with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be

acknowledged that he would want the country of Babylonia for them, or

some one like it, of an immeasurable extent, to support five thousand

idle persons, besides a much greater number of women and servants. Every

one, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet it ought

to be possible. It has been said, that a legislator should have two

things in view when he frames his laws, the country and the people. He

will also do well, if he has some regard to the neighbouring states, if

he intends that his community should maintain any political intercourse

with them, for it is not only necessary that they should understand that

practice of war which is adapted to their own country, but to others

also; for admitting that any one chooses not this life either in

public or private, yet there is not the less occasion for their being

formidable to their enemies, not only when they invade their country,

but also when they retire out of it.

It may also be considered whether the quantity of each person's property

may not be settled in a different manner from what he has done it in,

by making it more determinate; for he says, that every one ought to have

enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had said to live well,

which is the most comprehensive expression. Besides, a man may live

moderately and miserably at the same time; he had therefore better

have proposed, that they should live both moderately and liberally;

for unless these two conspire, luxury will come in on the one hand, or

wretchedness on the other, since these two modes of living are the only

ones applicable to the employment of our substance; for we cannot say

with respect to a man's fortune, that he is mild or courageous, but we

may say that he is prudent and liberal, which are the only qualities

connected therewith.

It is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for

the increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance

uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of

women who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it

would because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case

would not be the same in such a state which he proposes and those which

now actually unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the property

is divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers what they will;

but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries, whether they

were many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is more necessary

than even to regulate property, to take care that the increase of the

people should not exceed a certain number; and in determining that,

to take into consideration those children who will die, and also those

women who will be barren; and to neglect this, as is done in several

cities, is to bring certain poverty on the citizens; and poverty is the

cause of sedition and evil. Now Phidon the Corinthian, one of the oldest

legislators, thought the families and the number of the citizens should

continue the same; although it should happen that all should have

allotments at the first, disproportionate to their numbers.

In Plato's Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter what

we think would be best in these particulars. He has also neglected in

that treatise to point out how the governors are to be distinguished

from the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of wool the warp

ought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought some to govern, and

others to be governed. But since he admits, that all their property may

be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the same increase to the

country? he ought also to consider whether his allotment of the houses

will be useful to the community, for he appoints two houses to each

person, separate from each other; but it is inconvenient for a person

to inhabit two houses. Now he is desirous to have his whole plan of

government neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but something between

both, which he calls a polity, for it is to be composed of men-at-arms.

If Plato intended to frame a state in which more than in any other

everything should be common, he has certainly given it a right name;

but if he intended it to be the next in perfection to that which he had

already framed, it is not so; for perhaps some persons will give the

preference to the Lacedaemonian form of government, or some other which

may more completely have attained to the aristocratic form.

Some persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed

of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that

of Lacedaemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy,

a monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical

part, the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be found

the democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some say, that

in the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common meal and

daily course of life, in which the democratical form is represented.

It is also said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that the best form of

government must, be one composed of a democracy and a tyranny; though

such a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any government at all,

or if it is, the worst possible; those propose what is much better who

blend many governments together; for the most perfect is that which is

formed of many parts. But now in this government of Plato's there are

no traces of a monarchy, only of an oligarchy and democracy; though he

seems to choose that it should rather incline to an oligarchy, as is

evident from the appointment of the magistrates; for to choose them by

lot is common to both; but that a man of fortune must necessarily be a

member of the assembly, or to elect the magistrates, or take part in the

management of public affairs, while others are passed over, makes the

state incline to an oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the

greater part of the rich may be in office, and that the rank of their

appointments may correspond with their fortunes.

The same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the

manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all

are obliged to vote for those who are senators of the first class,

afterwards they vote for the same number out of the second, and then out

of the third; but this compulsion to vote at the election of senators

does not extend to the third and fourth classes and the first and second

class only are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this means he says

he shall necessarily have an equal number of each rank, but he is

mistaken--for the majority will always consist of those of the first

rank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason, that

many of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend the

elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not consist

of a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be further proved by

what we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form of

government.

There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the

senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect

others; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine

together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall

according to their pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes

concerning government in his book of Laws.

CHAPTER VII

There are also some other forms of government, which have been proposed

either by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians, all of which

come much nearer to those which have been really established, or now

exist, than these two of Plato's; for neither have they introduced the

innovation of a community of wives and children, and public tables for

the women, but have been contented to set out with establishing such

rules as are absolutely necessary.

There are some persons who think, that the first object of government

should be to regulate well everything relating to private property;

for they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions

whatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed,

that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought was

not difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled, but

that it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long

established; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of

circumstances introduced by these means, that the rich should give

marriage portions, but never receive any, while the poor should always

receive, but never give.

But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in

circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no

citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as the

lowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who

would establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to

consider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which each

individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number of his

children; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of provision, the

law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of the repeal, it

will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth to poverty, so

difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such mistakes. That an

equality of goods was in some degree serviceable to strengthen the bands

of society, seems to have been known to some of the ancients; for Solon

made a law, as did some others also, to restrain persons from possessing

as much land as they pleased. And upon the same principle there are laws

which forbid men to sell their property, as among the Locrians, unless

they can prove that some notorious misfortune has befallen them. They

were also to preserve their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken

through by the Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for

by that means it was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain

fortune to be qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods

is established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people

to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live

hard. Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator

to establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium.

Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a

manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would

be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should

entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of circumstances;

but this can never be attained unless they are properly educated under

the direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say, that this in

what he himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality of property

and one plan of education in his city. But he should have said

particularly what education he intended, nor is it of any service to

have this to much one; for this education may be one, and yet such as

will make the citizens over-greedy, to grasp after honours, or riches,

or both. Besides, not only an inequality of possessions, but also

of honours, will occasion [1267a] seditions, but this upon contrary

grounds; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an inequality of

goods, by those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of

honours.

"When good and bad do equal honours share."

For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he

thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they would

then have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they may enjoy

what they desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their desire extend

beyond the common necessaries of life, they were be wicked to gratify

them; and not only so, but if their wishes point that way, they will do

the same to enjoy those pleasures which are free from the alloy of pain.

What remedy then shall we find for these three disorders? And first,

to prevent stealing from necessity, let every one be supplied with a

moderate subsistence, which may make the addition of his own industry

necessary; second to prevent stealing to procure the luxuries of life,

temperance be enjoined; and thirdly, let those who wish for pleasure in

itself seek for it only in philosophy, all others want the assistance of

men.

Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not

from necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to keep him

from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not a thief,

but tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would only be

salutary to prevent little crimes. He has also been very desirous to

establish such rules as will conduce to perfect the internal policy of

his state, and he ought also to have done the same with respect to

its neighbours and all foreign nations; for the considerations of the

military establishment should take place in planning every government,

that it may not be unprovided in case of a war, of which he has said

nothing; so also with respect to property, it ought not only to be

adapted to the exigencies of the state, but also to such dangers as may

arise from without.

Thus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more

powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to drive

out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be able to

go to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of this he has

determined nothing; it must indeed be allowed that it is advantageous to

a community to be rather rich than poor; probably the proper boundary is

this, not to possess enough to make it worth while for a more powerful

neighbour to attack you, any more than he would those who had not so

much as yourself; thus when Autophradatus proposed to besiege Atarneus,

Eubulus advised him to consider what time it would require to take the

city, and then would have him determine whether it would answer, for

that he should choose, if it would even take less than he proposed,

to quit the place; his saying this made Autophradatus reflect upon the

business and give over the siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an

equality of goods amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet,

to say truth, no very great one; for men of great abilities will stomach

their being put upon a level with the rest of the community. For

which reason they will very often appear ready for every commotion and

sedition; for the wickedness of mankind is insatiable. For though

at first two oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become

customary, they continually want something more, until they set no

limits to their expectations; for it is the nature of our desires to be

boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose the

first object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune, as

to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more than

their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to acquire it;

and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior station, and not

exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the equality of goods, for

he has extended his regulation only to land; whereas a man's substance

consists not only in this, but also in slaves, cattle, money, and all

that variety of things which fall under the name of chattels; now there

must be either an equality established in all these, or some certain

rule, or they must be left entirely at large. It appears too by his

laws, that he intends to establish only a small state, as all the

artificers are to belong to the public, and add nothing to the

complement of citizens; but if all those who are to be employed in

public works are to be the slaves of the public, it should be done

in the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as Diophantus formerly

regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any one may nearly judge

whether Phaleas's community is well or ill established.

CHAPTER VIII

Hippodamus, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived the art of laying

out towns, and separated the Pireus. This man was in other respects

too eager after notice, and seemed to many to live in a very affected

manner, with his flowing locks and his expensive ornaments, and a coarse

warm vest which he wore, not only in the winter, but also in the

hot weather. As he was very desirous of the character of a universal

scholar, he was the first who, not being actually engaged in the

management of public affairs, sat himself to inquire what sort of

government was best; and he planned a state, consisting of ten thousand

persons, divided into three parts, one consisting of artisans, another

of husbandmen, and the third of soldiers; he also divided the lands into

three parts, and allotted one to sacred purposes, another to the public,

and the third to individuals. The first of these was to supply what was

necessary for the established worship of the gods; the second was to

be allotted to the support of the soldiery; and the third was to be

the property of the husbandman. He thought also that there need only be

three sorts of laws, corresponding to the three sorts of actions which

can be brought, namely, for assault, trespasses, or death. He ordered

also that there should be a particular court of appeal, into which

all causes might be removed which were supposed to have been unjustly

determined elsewhere; which court should be composed of old men chosen

for that purpose. He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass

sentence by votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on

which he should write, that he found the party guilty, if it was so, but

if not, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one

part of the indictment but not of the other, he should express that

also on the tablet; for he disapproved of that general custom already

established, as it obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they

determined positively either on the one side or the other. He also made

a law, that those should be rewarded who found out anything for the good

of the city, and that the children of those who fell in battle should be

educated at the public expense; which law had never been proposed by any

other legislator, though it is at present in use at Athens as well as in

other cities, he would have the magistrates chosen out of the people

in general, by whom he meant the three parts before spoken of; and that

those who were so elected should be the particular guardians of what

belonged to the public, to strangers, and to orphans.

These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in Hippodamus's

plan. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his division of the

citizens into three parts; for the artisans, the husbandmen, and the

soldiers are to compose one community, where the husbandmen are to have

no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, which would in a manner

render them slaves to the soldiery. It is also impossible that the whole

community should partake of all the honourable employments in it--for

the generals and the guardians of the state must necessarily be

appointed out of the soldiery, and indeed the most honourable

magistrates; but as the two other parts will not have their share in the

government, how can they be expected to have any affection for it? But

it is necessary that the soldiery should be superior to the other two

parts, and this superiority will not be easily gained without they are

very numerous; and if they are so, why should the community consist

of any other members? why should any others have a right to elect the

magistrates? Besides, of what use are the husbandmen to this community?

Artisans, 'tis true, are necessary, for these every city wants, and they

can live upon their business. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the

soldiers with provisions, they would be properly part of the community;

but these are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate

it for their own use. Moreover, if the soldiers themselves are to

cultivate that common land which is appropriated for their support,

there will be no distinction between the soldier and the husbandman,

which the legislator intended there should be; and if there should be

any others who are to cultivate the private property of the husbandman

and the common lands of the military, there will be a fourth order in

the state which will have no share in it, and always entertain hostile

sentiments towards it. If any one should propose that the same persons

should cultivate their own lands and the public ones also, then there

would be a deficiency [1268b] of provisions to supply two families,

as the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the

soldiers also; and all these things would occasion great confusion.

Nor do I approve of his method of determining causes, when he would

have the judge split the case which comes simply before him; and thus,

instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now when any matter

is brought to arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer

together upon the business that is before them; but when a cause is

brought before judges it is not so; and many legislators take care

that the judges shall not have it in their power to communicate their

sentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion on the

bench when one judge thinks a fine should be different from what another

has set it at; one proposing twenty minae, another ten, or be it more

or less, another four, and another five; and it is evident, that in this

manner they will differ from each other, while some will give the whole

damages sued for, and others nothing; in this situation, how shall their

determinations be settled? Besides, a judge cannot be obliged to perjure

himself who simply acquits or condemns, if the action is fairly and

justly brought; for he who acquits the party does not say that he ought

not to pay any fine at all, but that he ought not to pay a fine of

twenty minae. But he that condemns him is guilty of perjury if he

sentences him to pay twenty minae while he believes the damages ought

not to be so much.

Now with respect to these honours which he proposes to bestow on those

who can give any information useful to the community, this, though very

pleasing in speculation, is what the legislator should not settle, for

it would encourage informers, and probably occasion commotions in the

state. And this proposal of his gives rise also to further conjectures

and inquiries; for some persons have doubted whether it is useful or

hurtful to alter the established law of any country, if even for the

better; for which reason one cannot immediately determine upon what he

here says, whether it is advantageous to alter the law or not. We know,

indeed, that it is possible to propose to new model both the laws and

government as a common good; and since we have mentioned this subject,

it may be very proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for

it contains some difficulties, as I have already said, and it may appear

better to alter them, since it has been found useful in other sciences.

Thus the science of physic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so is

the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and powers; so that one may lay

it down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold good in

the art of government. And it may also be affirmed, that experience

itself gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too simple and

barbarous; which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the city, and to

buy their wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all the remains of

old laws which we have are very simple; for instance, a law in Cuma

relative to murder. If any person who prosecutes another for murder can

produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own relations, the

accused person shall be held guilty. Upon the whole, all persons ought

to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what is established; and

it is probable that the first men, whether they sprung out of the earth,

or were saved from some general calamity, had very little understanding

or knowledge, as is affirmed of these aborigines; so that it would be

absurd to continue in the practice of their rules. Nor is it, moreover,

right to permit written laws always to remain without alteration; for

as in all other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible to express

everything in writing with perfect exactness; for when we commit

anything to writing we must use general terms, but in every action there

is something particular to itself, which these may not comprehend; from

whence it is evident, that certain laws will at certain times admit of

alterations. But if we consider this matter in another point of view, it

will appear to require great caution; for when the advantage proposed is

trifling, as the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws

is of bad consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some faults

which either the legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for

the alterations will not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying

the magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought

from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the

one as the other. For a law derives all its strength from custom, and

this requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy matter

to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the

power of laws. Besides, here is another question; if the laws are to be

altered, are they all to be altered, and in every government or not, and

whether at the pleasure of one person or many? all which particulars

will make a great difference; for which reason we will at present drop

the inquiry, to pursue it at some other time.

CHAPTER IX

There are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to the

government established at Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in almost all

other states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do not promote

the best establishment possible? the other is whether there is anything,

if we consider either the principles upon which it is founded or the

executive part of it, which prevents the form of government that they

had proposed to follow from being observed; now it is allowed that in

every well-regulated state the members of it should be free from servile

labour; but in what manner this shall be effected is not so easy to

determine; for the Penestse have very often attacked the Thessalians,

and the Helots the Lacedaemonians, for they in a manner continually

watch an opportunity for some misfortune befalling them. But no such

thing has ever happened to the Cretans; the [1269b] reason for which

probably is, that although they are engaged in frequent wars with the

neighbouring cities, yet none of these would enter into an alliance with

the revolters, as it would be disadvantageous for them, who themselves

also have their villains. But now there is perpetual enmity between the

Lacedaemonians and all their neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians,

and the Arcadians. Their slaves also first revolted from the Thessalians

while they were engaged in wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the

Perrabeans, and the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else,

yet something very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with them;

for if you are remiss in your discipline they grow insolent, and think

themselves upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly

used they are continually plotting against you and hate you. It is

evident, then, that those who employ slaves have not as yet hit upon the

right way of managing them.

As to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is hurtful

to the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for as a man

and his wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a city to be

divided into two parts, we must allow that the number of men and women

will be equal.

In whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we must

look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it

there happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city

a collection of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently

accomplished his design; but in the meantime the women were quite

neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper indulgence

and luxury. So that in such a state riches will necessarily be in

general esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their wives,

which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people except

the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who openly

practise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem not improperly to

have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of this character

are greatly addicted either to the love of women or of boys, for which

reason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in their state were

done by the authority of the women. For what is the difference, if the

power is in the hands of the women, or in the hands of those whom they

themselves govern? it must turn to the same account. As this boldness of

the women can be of no use in any common occurrences, if it was ever so,

it must be in war; but even here we find that the Lacedaemonian women

were of the greatest disservice, as was proved at the time of the Theban

invasion, when they were of no use at all, as they are in other cities,

but made more disturbance than even the enemy.

The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is

easily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home

upon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards the

Arcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end, their

military life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them to obey

the precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when Lycurgus

endeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his laws, upon

their refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that the women were

the causes of these things, and of course all the fault was theirs. But

we are not now considering where the fault lies, or where it does not

lie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when the manners of the

women are not well regulated, as I have already said, it must not only

occasion faults which are disgraceful to the state, but also increase

the love of money. In the next place, fault may be found with his

unequal division of property, for some will have far too much, others

too little; by which means the land will come into few hands, which

business is badly regulated by his laws. For he made it infamous for any

one either to buy or sell their possessions, in which he did right; but

he permitted any one that chose it to give them away, or bequeath them,

although nearly the same consequences will arise from one practice as

from the other. It is supposed that near two parts in five of the whole

country is the property of women, owing to their being so often sole

heirs, and having such large fortunes in marriage; though it would

be better to allow them none, or a little, or a certain regulated

proportion. Now every one is permitted to make a woman his heir if he

pleases; and if he dies intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives

it to whom he pleases. From whence it happens that although the country

is able to support fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the

number does not amount to one thousand.

And from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly

regulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined for

want of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient kings

they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city, to

prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars; it is

also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten thousand; but

be that as it will, an equality of property conduces much to increase

the number of the people. The law, too, which he made to encourage

population was by no means calculated to correct this inequality;

for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous as [1270b]

possible, to make them desirous of having large families he ordered that

he who had three children should be excused the night-watch, and that he

who had four should pay no taxes: though it is very evident, that while

the land was divided in this manner, that if the people increased there

must many of them be very poor.

Nor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the

ephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last

importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so

that it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that office,

who, from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been many

instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at Andros. And

these men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they could to ruin

the city: and, because their power was too great and nearly tyrannical,

their kings were obliged to natter them, which contributed greatly to

hurt the state; so that it altered from an aristocracy to a democracy.

This magistracy is indeed the great support of the state; for the people

are easy, knowing that they are eligible to the first office in it;

so that, whether it took place by the intention of the legislator,

or whether it happened by chance, this is of great service to their

affairs; for it is necessary that every member of the state should

endeavour that each part of the government should be preserved, and

continue the same. And upon this principle their kings have always

acted, out of regard to their honour; the wise and good from their

attachment to the senate, a seat wherein they consider as the reward of

virtue; and the common people, that they may support the ephori, of whom

they consist. And it is proper that these magistrates should be chosen

out of the whole community, not as the custom is at present, which is

very ridiculous. The ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the last

consequence; but as it is quite accidental what sort of persons they may

be, it is not right that they should determine according to their own

opinion, but by a written law or established custom. Their way of life

also is not consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too

indulgent; whereas that of others is too severe; so that they cannot

support it, but are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they

may enjoy some of the pleasures of sense. There are also great defects

in the institution of their senators. If indeed they were fitly trained

to the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit

that they would be useful to the government; but still it might be

debated whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine

points of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well

as the body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the

legislator could not depend upon them as good men, their power must

be inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the

members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality in

many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if they

had been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not. But it

may be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the magistrates.

They have indeed in this particular very great power; but I affirm that

they should not be entrusted with this control in the manner they are.

Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of at the election of

their senators is very childish. Nor is it right for any one to solicit

for a place he is desirous of; for every person, whether he chooses it

or not, ought to execute any office he is fit for. But his intention was

evidently the same in this as in the other parts of his government.

For making his citizens ambitious after honours, with men of that

disposition he has filled his senate, since no others will solicit for

that office; and yet the principal part of those crimes which men are

deliberately guilty of arise from ambition and avarice.

We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful

to the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a

consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the

legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable

and completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them as

not being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that were at

variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of the kings

the safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common meals at

first well established: for these should rather have been provided at

the public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon, every one was

obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very poor, and could by

no means bear the expense, by which means the contrary happened to what

the legislator desired: for he intended that those public meals should

strengthen the democratic part of his government: but this regulation

had quite the contrary effect, for those who were very poor could not

take part in them; and it was an observation of their forefathers, that

the not allowing those who could not contribute their proportion to the

common tables to partake of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other

persons have censured his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without

reason, as it gave rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is

in a manner set up in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the

army for life.

[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure,

which Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution

was calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to

make them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state

depended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their victories:

for they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other employment

than war. In this particular also they were mistaken, that though they

rightly thought, that those things which are the objects of contention

amongst mankind are better procured by virtue than vice, yet they

wrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor was the public

revenue well managed at Sparta, for the state was worth nothing while

they were obliged to carry on the most extensive wars, and the subsidies

were very badly raised; for as the Spartans possessed a large extent of

country, they were not exact upon each other as to what they paid in.

And thus an event contrary to the legislator's intention took place;

for the state was poor, the individuals avaricious. Enough of the

Lacedaemonian government; for these seem the chief defects in it.

CHAPTER X

The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few

particulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its

contrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the

constitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete;

and in general most new things are an improvement upon the old. For they

say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles he

went abroad and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for the

Lycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first settled

there adopted that body of laws which they found already established by

the inhabitants; in like manner also those who now live near them have

the very laws which Minos first drew up.

This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for it

is entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all the

maritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one side

from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from Triopium

and Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the empire of

the sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others planted

colonies: at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking Sicily.

There is this analogy between the customs of the Lacedaemonians and

the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds [1272a] for the one, the

domestic slaves for the other. Both states have their common meals, and

the Lacedaemonians called these formerly not _psiditia_ but _andpia_,

as the Cretans do; which proves from whence the custom arose. In this

particular their governments are also alike: the ephori have the same

power with those of Crete, who are called _kosmoi_; with this difference

only, that the number of the one is five, of the other ten. The senators

are the same as those whom the Cretans call the council. There was

formerly also a kingly power in Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved,

and the command of their armies was given to the _kosmoi_. Every one

also has a vote in their public assembly; but this has only the power of

confirming what has already passed the council and the _kosmoi_.

The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the Lacedaemonians,

for at Lacedaemon each individual was obliged to furnish what was

assessed upon him; which if he could not do, there was a law which

deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been already mentioned:

but in Crete they were furnished by the community; for all the corn and

cattle, taxes and contributions, which the domestic slaves were obliged

to furnish, were divided into parts and allotted to the gods, the

exigencies of the state, and these public meals; so that all the men,

women, and children were maintained from a common stock. The legislator

gave great attention to encourage a habit of eating sparingly, as very

useful to the citizens. He also endeavoured, that his community might

not be too populous, to lessen the connection with women, by introducing

the love of boys: whether in this he did well or ill we shall have some

other opportunity of considering. But that the public meals were better

ordered at Crete than at Lacedaemon is very evident.

The institution of the _kosmoi_, was still worse than that of the

ephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy and

some peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who will be

elected: but the Lacedaemonians have this advantage which the others

have not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a share

in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the state:

whereas among the Cretans the _kosmoi_ are not chosen out of the people

in general, but out of some certain families, and the senate out of the

_kosmoi_. And the same observations which may be made on the senate at

Lacedaemon may be applied to these; for their being under no control,

and their continuing for life, is an honour greater than they merit; and

to have their proceedings not regulated by a written law, but left to

their own discretion, is dangerous. (As to there being no insurrections,

although the people share not in the management of public affairs, this

is no proof of a well-constituted government, as the _kosmoi_ have no

opportunity of being bribed like the ephori, as they live in an [1272b]

island far from those who would corrupt them.) But the method they take

to correct that fault is absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very

often either their fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire

together and turn out the _kosmoi_. They are also permitted to resign

their office before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by

law it would be well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which

is a bad rule to follow. But what is worst of all is, that general

confusion which those who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary

course of justice; which sufficiently shows what is the nature of the

government, or rather lawless force: for it is usual with the principal

persons amongst them to collect together some of the common people and

their friends, and then revolt and set up for themselves, and come

to blows with each other. And what is the difference, if a state is

dissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually so alters in

process of time as to be no longer the same constitution? A state like

this would ever be exposed to the invasions of those who were powerful

and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already mentioned, its

situation preserves it, as it is free from the inroads of foreigners;

and for this reason the family slaves still remain quiet at Crete, while

the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the Cretans take no part in

foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any foreign troops have

made an attack upon the island; and their ravages soon proved the

ineffectualness of their laws. And thus much for the government of

Crete.

CHAPTER XI

The government of Carthage seems well established, and in many respects

superior to others; in some particulars it bears a near resemblance

to the Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the Cretans, the

Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things very like

each other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many excellent

constitutions this may show how well their government is framed, that

although the people are admitted to a share in the administration, the

form of it remains unaltered, without any popular insurrections, worth

notice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a tyranny on the

other. Now the Carthaginians have these things in common with the

Lacedaemonians: public tables for those who are connected together by

the tie of mutual friendship, after the manner of their Phiditia; they

have also a magistracy, consisting of an hundred and four persons,

similar to the ephori, or rather selected with more judgment; for

amongst the Lacedaemonians, all the citizens are eligible, but amongst

the Carthaginians, they are chosen out of those of the better sort:

there is also some analogy between the king and the senate in both these

governments, though the Carthaginian method of appointing their kings

is best, for they do not confine themselves to one family; nor do

they permit the election to be at large, nor have they any regard to

seniority; for if amongst the candidates there are any of greater merit

than the rest, these they prefer to those who may be older; for as their

power is very extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account,

they may be very hurtful to the state, as they have always been to

the Lacedaemonians; also the greater part of those things which become

reprehensible by their excess are common to all those governments which

we have described.

Now of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established

their mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and

democracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy: for

instance, if the kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point in

debate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the people or

no; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not

only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but are finally

to determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a right to speak

against any matter whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not

permitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other, have very

great and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred, who are

magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues longer than

any other magistrates, for it commences before they come into office,

and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this particular the

state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not elected by lot, but

by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money, they are the greatest

supporters imaginable of an aristocracy.

The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in one

court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same influence.

The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an

oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained

by many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to

be persons of family only, but of fortune also; as it is impossible

for those who are in bad circumstances to support the dignity of their

office, or to be at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men

of fortune to be magistrates make a state incline to an oligarchy,

and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of

proceeding which took place in the polity of Carthage; for they have

an eye to these two particulars when they elect their officers,

particularly those of the highest rank, their kings and their generals.

It must be admitted, that it was a great fault in their legislator not

to guard against the constitution's degenerating from an aristocracy;

for this is a most necessary thing to provide for at first, that those

citizens who have the best abilities should never be obliged to do

anything unworthy their character, but be always at leisure to serve the

public, not only when in office, but also when private persons; for if

once you are obliged to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at

leisure to serve you, your greatest offices, of king and general,

will soon become venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more

honourable than virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in

the city-for what those who have the chief power regard as honourable

will necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general

will aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue,

there the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it

is reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their places should

generally make an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as

it is absurd to suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be

desirous of gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the

same, especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy

should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy.

It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the

poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured

them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.

It seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices,

which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one

person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not

make the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state

is not small it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons

to have a share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not

only more usual, but everything is better and sooner done, when one

thing only is allotted to one person: and this is evident both in the

army and navy, where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and

is under command. But as their government inclines to an oligarchy, they

avoid the ill effects of it by always appointing some of the popular

party to the government of cities to make their fortunes. Thus they

consult this fault in their constitution and render it stable; but

this is depending on chance; whereas the legislator ought to frame his

government, that there the no room for insurrections. But now, if there

should be any general calamity, and the people should revolt from their

rulers, there is no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws.

And these are the particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the

Carthaginian governments which seem worthy of commendation.

CHAPTER XII

Some of those persons who have written upon government had never any

share in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything

worthy of notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others

were legislators, some in their own cities, others were employed in

regulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them only composed

a body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus; and

Solon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been already mentioned.

Some persons think that Solon was an excellent legislator, who could

dissolve a pure oligarchy, and save the people from that slavery which

hung over them, and establish the ancient democratic form of government

in his country; wherein every part of it was so framed as to be well

adapted to the whole. In the senate of Areopagus an oligarchy was

preserved; by the manner of electing their [1274a] magistrates, an

aristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a democracy.

Solon seems not to have altered the established form of government,

either with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their

magistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in the

state by allotting the supreme judicial department to them; and for this

some persons blame him, as having done what would soon overturn that

balance of power he intended to establish; for by trying all causes

whatsoever before the people, who were chosen by lot to determine them,

it was necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace who had got this

power; which contributed to bring the government to that pure democracy

it now is.

Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the

latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended

the courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular

proceeded increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. But

it is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that it arose

from accident; for the people being the cause of the naval victory

over the Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted themselves

under factious demagogues, although opposed by the better part of the

citizens. He thought it indeed most necessary to entrust the people

with the choice of their magistrates and the power of calling them to

account; for without that they must have been slaves and enemies to the

other citizens: but he ordered them to elect those only who were persons

of good account and property, either out of those who were worth five

hundred medimns, or those who were called xeugitai, or those of the

third census, who were called horsemen.

As for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were

incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western

Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those

also in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some persons

endeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the first person

of note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in that business

while he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the

prophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion; and that

Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and Charondas of

Zaleucus; but those who advance this, advance what is repugnant to

chronology. Philolaus also, of the family of the Bacchiades, was a

Theban legislator. This man was very fond of Diocles, a victor in

the Olympic games, and when he left his country from a disgust at an

improper passion which his mother Alithoe had entertained for him, and

settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where they both died, and

where they still show their tombs placed in view of each other, but so

disposed, that one of them looks towards Corinth, the other does not;

the reason they give for this is, that Diodes, from his detestation of

his mother's passion, would have his tomb so placed that no one could

see Corinth from it; but Philolaus chose that it might be seen from his:

and this was the cause of their living at Thebes. [1274b]

As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he upon

adoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in particular did

to preserve the number of families. Charondas did nothing new, except

in actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took into

particular consideration. He also drew up his laws with greater elegance

and accuracy than even any of our present legislators. Philolaus

introduced the law for the equal distribution of goods; Plato that for

the community of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables

for the women; and one concerning drunkenness, that they might observe

sobriety in their symposiums. He also made a law concerning their

warlike exercises; that they should acquire a habit of using both hands

alike, as it was necessary that one hand should be as useful as the

other.

As for Draco's laws, they were published when the government was already

established, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning,

except their severity on account of the enormity of their punishments.

Pittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up any form of

government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man beat any person

he should be punished more than if he did it when sober; for as

people are more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober, he paid no

consideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded

only the common benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a lawgiver to the

Thracian talcidians. There are some laws of his concerning murders and

heiresses extant, but these contain nothing that any one can say is new

and his own. And thus much for different sorts of governments, as well

those which really exist as those which different persons have proposed.

CHAPTER I

Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its

different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a

city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city

did this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy,

or the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the

politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government

is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a

collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is

evident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a

certain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to

call citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one

will not allow that this character is applicable to the same person; for

that man who would be a citizen in a republic would very often not be

one in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry many of those who

acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as honorary persons,

for instance, but those only who have a natural right to it.

Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this

sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be

sufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws,

and may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different nations,

between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose, are allowed;

although it very often happens, that sojourners have not a perfect right

therein without the protection of a patron, to whom they are obliged to

apply, which shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In

like manner, with respect to boys who are not yet enrolled, or old men

who are past war, we admit that they are in some respects citizens,

but not completely so, but with some exceptions, for these are not yet

arrived to years of maturity, and those are past service; nor is

there any difference between them. But what we mean is sufficiently

intelligible and clear, we want a complete citizen, one in whom there

is no deficiency to be corrected to make him so. As to those who are

banished, or infamous, there may be the same objections made and the

same answer given. There is nothing that more characterises a complete

citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the

government.

With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that

no person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else

not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as a

juryman's, and a member of the general assembly: but probably some one

may say these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these capacities

any share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous to say that

those who have the principal power in the state bear no office in it.

But this objection is of no weight, for it is only a dispute about

words; as there is no general term which can be applied both to the

office of a juryman and a member of the assembly. For the sake of

distinction, suppose we call it an indeterminate office: but I lay it

down as a maxim, that those are citizens who could exercise it. Such

then is the description of a citizen who comes nearest to what all those

who are called citizens are. Every one also should know, that of the

component parts of those things which differ from each other in species,

after the first or second remove, those which follow have either nothing

at all or very little common to each.

Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form,

and that some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as

possible: for it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies

and degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are without

such faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter explained.

Hence it is clear that the office of a citizen must differ as

governments do from each other: for which reason he who is called

a citizen has, in a democracy, every privilege which that station

supposes. In other forms of government he may enjoy them; but not

necessarily: for in some states the people have no power; nor have they

any general assembly, but a few select men.

The trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons; as

at Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before some

of the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and so on;

some being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another: and thus

at Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our former

description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some

governments the office of a juryman and a member of the general assembly

is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons appointed

for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being appointed jurymen

or members of the general assembly, and this either for all causes and

all public business whatsoever, or else for some particular one: and

this may be sufficient to show what a citizen is; for he who has a right

to a share in the judicial and executive part of government in any

city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a city, in one word, is

a collective body of such persons sufficient in themselves to all the

purposes of life.

CHAPTER II

In common use they define a citizen to be one who is sprung from

citizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only. Others

carry the matter still further, and inquire how many of his ancestors

have been citizens, as his grandfather, great-grandfather, etc., but

some persons have questioned how the first of the family could prove

themselves citizens, according to this popular and careless definition.

Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same doubt, and partly in

jest, says, that as a mortar is made by a mortar-maker, so a citizen is

made by a citizen-maker, and a Larisssean by a Larisssean-maker. This

is indeed a very simple account of the matter; for if citizens are so,

according to this definition, it will be impossible to apply it to the

first founders or first inhabitants of states, who cannot possibly claim

in right either of their father or mother. It is probably a matter of

still more difficulty to determine their rights as citizens who are

admitted to their freedom after any revolution in the state. As, for

instance, at Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Clisthenes

enrolled many foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes; and the

doubt with respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no,

but whether they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may

have this further [1276a] doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen

when he is illegally made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is

no citizen at all, were in the same predicament: but since we see some

persons govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to govern, though not justly,

and the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices,

for such a one we have defined a citizen to be, it is evident, that a

citizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen, but whether

justly or unjustly so belongs to the former inquiry.

CHAPTER III

It has also been doubted what was and what was not the act of the city;

as, for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy or a

tyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts; as if

the right to receive the money was in the tyrant and not in the state,

and many other things of the same nature; as if any covenant was founded

for violence and not for the common good. So in like manner, if anything

is done by those who have the management of public affairs where a

democracy is established, their actions are to be considered as the

actions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or tyranny.

And here it seems very proper to consider this question, When shall we

say that a city is the same, and when shall we say that it is different?

It is but a superficial mode of examining into this question to begin

with the place and the people; for it may happen that these may be

divided from that, or that some one of them may live in one place, and

some in another (but this question may be regarded as no very knotty

one; for, as a city may acquire that appellation on many accounts,

it may be solved many ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one

common place, when shall we say that they inhabit the same city, or that

the city is the same? for it does not depend upon the walls; for I can

suppose Peloponnesus itself surrounded with a wall, as Babylon was, and

every other place, which rather encircles many nations than one city,

and that they say was taken three days when some of the inhabitants

knew nothing of it: but we shall find a proper time to determine this

question; for the extent of a city, how large it should be, and whether

it should consist of more than one people, these are particulars that

the politician should by no means be unacquainted with. This, too, is a

matter of inquiry, whether we shall say that a city is the same while

it is inhabited by the same race of men, though some of them are

perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as we say that a river

or a fountain is the same, though the waters are continually changing;

or when a revolution takes place shall we [1276b] say the men are the

same, but the city is different: for if a city is a community, it is a

community of citizens; but if the mode of government should alter, and

become of another sort, it would seem a necessary consequence that the

city is not the same; as we regard the tragic chorus as different from

the comic, though it may probably consist of the same performers: thus

every other community or composition is said to be different if the

species of composition is different; as in music the same hands produce

different harmony, as the Doric and Phrygian. If this is true, it is

evident, that when we speak of a city as being the same we refer to the

government there established; and this, whether it is called by the

same name or any other, or inhabited by the same men or different.

But whether or no it is right to dissolve the community when the

constitution is altered is another question.

CHAPTER IV

What has been said, it follows that we should consider whether the

same virtues which constitute a good man make a valuable citizen, or

different; and if a particular inquiry is necessary for this matter we

must first give a general description of the virtues of a good citizen;

for as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, so is a

citizen, although the province of one sailor may be different from

another's (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a boatswain,

and so on, each having their several appointments), it is evident that

the most accurate description of any one good sailor must refer to

his peculiar abilities, yet there are some things in which the same

description may be applied to the whole crew, as the safety of the ship

is the common business of all of them, for this is the general centre of

all their cares: so also with respect to citizens, although they may

in a few particulars be very different, yet there is one care common to

them all, the safety of the community, for the community of the citizens

composes the state; for which reason the virtue of a citizen has

necessarily a reference to the state. But if there are different sorts

of governments, it is evident that those actions which constitute the

virtue of an excellent citizen in one community will not constitute it

in another; wherefore the virtue of such a one cannot be perfect: but we

say, a man is good when his virtues are perfect; from whence it follows,

that an excellent citizen does not possess that virtue which constitutes

a good man. Those who are any ways doubtful concerning this question

may be convinced of the truth of it by examining into the best formed

states: for, if it is impossible that a city should consist entirely of

excellent citizens (while it is necessary that every one should do well

in his calling, in which consists his excellence, as it is impossible

that all the citizens should have the same [1277a] qualifications) it

is impossible that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the

same; for all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen: for

from hence necessarily arise the perfection of the city: but that every

one should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible without

all the citizens in a well-regulated state were necessarily virtuous.

Besides, as a city is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of

life and body; the soul of reason and appetite; a family of a man and

his wife--property of a master and a slave; in the same manner, as a

city is composed of all these and many other very different parts, it

necessarily follows that the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the

same; as the business of him who leads the band is different from the

other dancers. From all which proofs it is evident that the virtues of

a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those virtues

united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen? for we say,

such a one is an excellent magistrate and a prudent and good man; but

prudence is a necessary qualification for all those who engage in public

affairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education of those who are

intended to command should, from the beginning, be different from other

citizens, as the children of kings are generally instructed in riding

and warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says:

"... No showy arts Be mine, but teach me what the state requires."

As if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to

themselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a

good magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the

magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be

the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some

particular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different

from the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason declared that

was he deprived of his kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not

knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to

know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things well

is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a good

man consists only in being able to command, but the virtue of a good

citizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other, the

commendation of both of them is not the same. It appears, then, that

both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn their

separate business: but that the citizen should be master of and

take part in both these, as any one may easily perceive; in a family

government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform

the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for to

do the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common family

business of the slave.

There are many sorts of slaves; for their employments are various: of

these the handicraftsmen are one, who, as their name imports, get their

living by the labour of their hands, and amongst these all mechanics are

included; [1277b] for which reasons such workmen, in some states, were

not formerly admitted into any share in the government; till at length

democracies were established: it is not therefore proper for any man

of honour, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to

learn these servile employments without they have occasion for them for

their own use; for without this was observed the distinction between a

master and a slave would be lost. But there is a government of another

sort, in which men govern those who are their equals in rank, and

freemen, which we call a political government, in which men learn to

command by first submitting to obey, as a good general of horse, or a

commander-in-chief, must acquire a knowledge of their duty by

having been long under the command of another, and the like in every

appointment in the army: for well is it said, no one knows how to

command who has not himself been under command of another. The virtues

of those are indeed different, but a good citizen must necessarily be

endowed with them; he ought also to know in what manner freemen ought

to govern, as well as be governed: and this, too, is the duty of a good

man. And if the temperance and justice of him who commands is different

from his who, though a freeman, is under command, it is evident that the

virtues of a good citizen cannot be the same as justice, for instance

but must be of a different species in these two different situations, as

the temperance and courage of a man and a woman are different from each

other; for a man would appear a coward who had only that courage which

would be graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a talker who

should take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of

consequence.

The domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the

man's business to acquire subsistence, the woman's to take care of it.

But direction and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to

those who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for both

parties; but with this the governed have no concern, it is theirs to

entertain just notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while those

who govern are the musicians who play on them. And thus much to show

whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same,

or if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how far

different.

CHAPTER V

But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those

only are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or whether

the mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those who are

not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is impossible

that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for these also

are citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be citizens, where

shall they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a] sojourners nor

foreigners? or shall we say that there will no inconvenience arise from

their not being citizens, as they are neither slaves nor freedmen:

for this is certainly true, that all those are not citizens who are

necessary to the existence of a city, as boys are not citizens in the

same manner that men are, for those are perfectly so, the others under

some conditions; for they are citizens, though imperfect ones: for

in former times among some people the mechanics were either slaves or

foreigners, for which reason many of them are so now: and indeed the

best regulated states will not permit a mechanic to be a citizen; but

if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute the virtue we have

described to every citizen or freeman, but to those only who are

disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are employed by one

person in them are slaves; those who do them for money are mechanics

and hired servants: hence it is evident on the least reflection what is

their situation, for what I have said is fully explained by appearances.

Since the number of communities is very great, it follows necessarily

that there will be many different sorts of citizens, particularly

of those who are governed by others, so that in one state it may be

necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants to be citizens, but in

others it may be impossible; as particularly in an aristocracy, where

honours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for it is impossible for

one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired servant to acquire the

practice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired servants are not admitted

to be citizens; because there a man's right to bear any office is

regulated by his fortune; but mechanics are, for many citizens are very

rich.

There was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the

government till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the

law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some

democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also

observed in many others with respect to natural children; but it is

through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such: for these

laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of inhabitants; so,

as their numbers increase, they first deprive the children of a male or

female slave of this privilege, next the child of a free-woman, and last

of all they will admit none but those whose fathers and mothers were

both free.

That there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be as

completely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from what

has been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of Agamemnon's

treating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger or sojourner is

one who does not partake of the honours of the state: and whenever the

right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it is for the sake of

the inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it is plain whether the

virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the same or different:

and we find that in some states it is the same, in others not; and also

that this is not true of each citizen, but of those only who take the

lead, or are capable of taking the lead, in public affairs, either alone

or in conjunction with others.

CHAPTER VI

Having established these points, we proceed next to consider whether one

form of government only should be established, or more than one; and if

more, how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences between

them. The form of government is the ordering and regulating of the city,

and all the offices in it, particularly those wherein the supreme power

is lodged; and this power is always possessed by the administration; but

the administration itself is that particular form of government which

is established in any state: thus in a democracy the supreme power is

lodged in the whole people; on the contrary, in an oligarchy it is in

the hands of a few. We say then, that the form of government in these

states is different, and we shall find the same thing hold good in

others. Let us first determine for whose sake a city is established;

and point out the different species of rule which man may submit to in

social life.

I have already mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family,

and the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally formed

for society, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign

assistance, he will of his own accord desire to live with others; not

but that mutual advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables each

person to live more agreeably; and this is indeed the great object

not only to all in general, but also to each individual: but it is not

merely matter of choice, but they join in society also, even that they

may be able to live, which probably is not without some share of merit,

and they also support civil society, even for the sake of preserving

life, without they are grievously overwhelmed with the miseries of it:

for it is very evident that men will endure many calamities for the sake

of living, as being something naturally sweet and desirable. It is easy

to point out the different modes of government, and we have already

settled them in our exoteric discourses. The power of the master, though

by nature equally serviceable, both to the master and to the slave, yet

nevertheless has for its object the benefit of the master, while the

benefit of the slave arises accidentally; for if the slave is destroyed,

the power of the master is at an end: but the authority which a man

has over his wife, and children, and his family, which we call domestic

government, is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection,

or else for the common benefit of the whole: but its particular object

is the benefit of the governed, as we see in other arts; in physic, for

instance, and the gymnastic exercises, wherein, if any benefit [1279a]

arise to the master, it is accidental; for nothing forbids the master of

the exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who exercises,

as the steersman is always one of the sailors; but both the master of

the exercises and the steersman consider the good of those who are under

their government. Whatever good may happen to the steersman when he is

a sailor, or to the master of the exercises when he himself makes one at

the games, is not intentional, or the object of their power; thus in all

political governments which are established to preserve and defend the

equality of the citizens it is held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as

was natural, every one expected that each of his fellow-citizens should

in his turn serve the public, and thus administer to his private good,

as he himself when in office had done for others; but now every one is

desirous of being continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage

which he makes of public business and being in office; as if places were

a never-failing remedy for every complaint, and were on that account so

eagerly sought after.

It is evident, then, that all those governments which have a common good

in view are rightly established and strictly just, but those who have

in view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong principles,

and are widely different from what a government ought to be, for they

are tyranny over slaves, whereas a city is a community of freemen.

CHAPTER VII

Having established these particulars, we come to consider next the

different number of governments which there are, and what they are; and

first, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined this,

their defects will be evident enough.

It is evident that every form of government or administration, for the

words are of the same import, must contain a supreme power over the

whole state, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands

of one person, or a few, or many; and when either of these apply their

power for the common good, such states are well governed; but when the

interest of the one, the few, or the many who enjoy this power is alone

consulted, then ill; for you must either affirm that those who make

up the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the

advantages of government. We usually call a state which is governed by

one person for the common good, a kingdom; one that is governed by

more than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy; either because the

government is in the hands of the most worthy citizens, or because it

is the best form for the city and its inhabitants. When the citizens at

large govern for the public good, it is called a state; which is also

a common name for all other governments, and these distinctions are

consonant to reason; for it will not be difficult to find one person,

or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but almost impossible to

meet with the majority [1279b] of a people eminent for every virtue;

but if there is one common to a whole nation it is valour; for this is

created and supported by numbers: for which reason in such a state

the profession of arms will always have the greatest share in the

government.

Now the corruptions attending each of these governments are these; a

kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy,

and a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy where the good

of one man only is the object of government, an oligarchy considers

only the rich, and a democracy only the poor; but neither of them have a

common good in view.

CHAPTER VIII

It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each

of these states, which is not without some difficulty, for he who would

enter into a philosophical inquiry into the principles of them, and not

content himself with a superficial view of their outward conduct, must

pass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit of each of them.

A tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy, where one person has

an absolute and despotic power over the whole community and every member

therein: an oligarchy, where the supreme power of the state is lodged

with the rich: a democracy, on the contrary, is where those have it who

are worth little or nothing. But the first difficulty that arises from

the distinctions which we have laid down is this, should it happen that

the majority of the inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for

this is a democracy) should be rich, the question is, how does this

agree with what we have said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever

happen that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich,

but from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is

what they call an oligarchy; it should seem then that our definition

of the different states was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one

suppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority

rich, and then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy

was a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the

supreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor, being

many in number, possessed it, still there will be another difficulty;

for what name shall we give to those states we have been describing? I

mean, that in which the greater number are rich, and that in which the

lesser number are poor (where each of these possess the supreme power),

if there are no other states than those we have described. It seems

therefore evident to reason, that whether the supreme power is vested

in the hands of many or few may be a matter of accident; but that it

is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of the few, it will be

a government of the rich; when in the hands of the many, it will be a

government of the poor; since in all countries there are many poor and

few rich: it is not therefore the cause that has been already assigned

(namely, the number of people in power) that makes the difference

between the two governments; but an oligarchy and democracy differ in

this from each other, in the poverty of those who govern in the one,

and the riches I28oa of those who govern in the other; for when the

government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it

is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy:

but, as we have already said, the one will be always few, the other

numerous, but both will enjoy liberty; and from the claims of wealth and

liberty will arise continual disputes with each other for the lead in

public affairs.

CHAPTER IX

Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and

a democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men have

some natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein only to

a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely

just; as, for instance, what is equal appears just, and is so; but not

to all; only among those who are equals: and what is unequal appears

just, and is so; but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals;

which circumstance some people neglect, and therefore judge ill; the

reason for which is, they judge for themselves, and every one almost is

the worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to

persons, the same distinctions must be made with respect to persons

which are made with respect to things, in the manner that I have already

described in my Ethics.

As to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their dispute

is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the reason

above assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and also

because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in some

particulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for instance,

if some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them unequal in the

whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in liberty, they suppose

them equal in the whole: but what is absolutely just they omit; for

if civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing

property, every one's right in the city would be equal to his fortune;

and then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be

valid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should

have an equal share in the hundred along with him who brought in all the

rest, either of the original money or what was afterwards acquired.

Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its

members; but that they might live well: for otherwise a state might

be composed of slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for

these have no share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after their

own choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from

injuries, or for a commercial intercourse: for then the Tyrrhenians and

Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce

subsist, would be citizens of one city; for they have articles

to regulate their exports and imports, and engagements for mutual

protection, and alliances for mutual defence; but [1280b] yet they

have not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are

different among the different people; nor does the one take any care,

that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of

those who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or

in any degree vicious, only that they do not injure any member of the

confederacy. But whosoever endeavours to establish wholesome laws in

a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who

composes it; from whence it is evident, that the first care of him who

would found a city, truly deserving that name, and not nominally so,

must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an

alliance for self-defence; differing from those of the same cast which

are made between different people only in place: for law is an agreement

and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron says, between the citizens of

their intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to

make all the citizens just and good: and that this is fact is evident,

for could any one bring different places together, as, for instance,

enclose Megara and Corinth in a wall, yet they would not be one city,

not even if the inhabitants intermarried with each other, though this

inter-community contributes much to make a place one city. Besides,

could we suppose a set of people to live separate from each other, but

within such a distance as would admit of an intercourse, and that there

were laws subsisting between each party, to prevent their injuring one

another in their mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another

a husbandman, shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten

thousand, still all that they would have together in common would be a

tariff for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same

city. And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough,

for even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one

should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should be

alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and prevent

any injury being done to the other, still they would not be admitted

to be a city by those who think correctly, if they preserved the same

customs when they were together as when they were separate.

It is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor

established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other;

but that these things are the necessary consequences of a city, although

they may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a society of

people joining together with their families and their children to live

agreeably for the sake of having their lives as happy and as independent

as possible: and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live

in one place and intermarry with each other: hence in all cities there

are family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to

promote friendship; for a love of sociability is friendship itself;

so that the end then for which a city is established is, that the

inhabitants of it may live happy, and these things are conducive to that

end: for it is a community of families and villages for the sake of a

perfect independent life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake

of living well and happily. It is not therefore founded for the purpose

of men's merely [1281a] living together, but for their living as men

ought; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to

have greater power in the city than those who are their equals in family

and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel

them in wealth but are below them in worth. It is evident from what

has been said, that in all disputes upon government each party says

something that is just.

CHAPTER X

It may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to be lodged.

Shall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper

persons, or one better than the rest, or with a tyrant? But whichever

of these we prefer some difficulty will arise. For what? shall the

poor have it because they are the majority? they may then divide among

themselves, what belongs to the rich: nor is this unjust; because truly

it has been so judged by the supreme power. But what avails it to point

out what is the height of injustice if this is not? Again, if the many

seize into their own hands everything which belongs to the few, it is

evident that the city will be at an end. But virtue will never destroy

what is virtuous; nor can what is right be the ruin of the state:

therefore such a law can never be right, nor can the acts of a tyrant

ever be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just; for he, from his

unlimited power, compels every one to obey his command, as the multitude

oppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich, the few, should have

the supreme power? and what if they be guilty of the same rapine and

plunder the possessions of the majority, that will be as right as the

other: but that all things of this sort are wrong and unjust is evident.

Well then, these of the better sort shall have it: but must not then all

the other citizens live unhonoured, without sharing the offices of the

city; for the offices of a city are its honours, and if one set of men

are always in power, it is evident that the rest must be without honour.

Well then, let it be with one person of all others the fittest for it:

but by this means the power will be still more contracted, and a greater

number than before continue unhonoured. But some one may say, that it is

wrong to let man have the supreme power and not the law, as his soul is

subject to so many passions. But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or

a democracy, how will it help us in our present doubts? for those things

will happen which we have already mentioned.

CHAPTER XI

Other particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to

prove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather

than with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain

what doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one

individual of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet

when these many are joined together, it does not follow but they may be

better qualified for it than those; and this not separately, but as a

collective body; as the public suppers exceed those which are given at

one person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person brings

in his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together, they are

like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many hands,

and many intelligences: thus is it with respect to the manners and

understandings of the multitude taken together; for which reason the

public are the best judges of music and poetry; for some understand

one part, some another, and all collectively the whole; and in this

particular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as they

say those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and as fine

pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the several beautiful

parts which were dispersed among different originals into one, although

the separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be handsomer than in

the picture.

But if this distinction is to be made between every people and every

general assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful

whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a few,

it is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to brutes:

and indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but that nothing

prevents what I have said being true of the people in some states. The

doubt then which we have lately proposed, with all its consequences, may

be settled in this manner; it is necessary that the freemen who compose

the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but as

they are neither men of property, nor act uniformly upon principles

of virtue, it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the

state, both on account of their iniquity and their ignorance; from

the one of which they will do what is wrong, from the other they will

mistake: and yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the

government; for when there are many poor people who are incapable of

acquiring the honours of their country, the state must necessarily have

many enemies in it; let them then be permitted to vote in the public

assemblies and to determine causes; for which reason Socrates, and some

other legislators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the

state, and also of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of

office, and only prevented their being magistrates by themselves;

for the multitude when they are collected together have all of them

sufficient understanding for these purposes, and, mixing among those of

higher rank, are serviceable to the city, as some things, which alone

are improper for food, when mixed with others make the whole more

wholesome than a few of them would be.

But there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it

seems, that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who

was then sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician; but

such a one must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in every

other practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give an

account of his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other arts:

those whose business is physic may be divided into three sorts, the

first of these is he who makes up the medicines; the second prescribes,

and is to the other as the architect is to the mason; the third is he

who understands the science, but never practises it: now these three

distinctions may be found in those who understand all other arts; nor

have we less opinion of their judgment who are only instructed in the

principles of the art than of those who practise it: and with respect

to elections the same method of proceeding seems right; for to elect a

proper person in any science is the business of those who are skilful

therein; as in geometry, of geometricians; in steering, of steersmen:

but if some individuals should know something of particular arts and

works, they do not know more than the professors of them: so that even

upon this principle neither the election of magistrates, nor the censure

of their conduct, should be entrusted to the many.

But probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to

resume the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal

indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these

affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet when

they come together they will know them better, or at least not worse;

besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who is the

best judge; namely, in those the works of which are understood by those

who do not profess them: thus he who builds a house is not the only

judge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is a better;

thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he who made

it; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has been said

seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is another

that follows: for it seems absurd that the power of the state should be

lodged with those who are but of indifferent morals, instead of those

who are of excellent characters. Now the power of election and censure

are of the utmost consequence, and this, as has been said, in some

states they entrust to the people; for the general assembly is the

supreme court of all, and they have a voice in this, and deliberate in

all public affairs, and try all causes, without any objection to the

meanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but their treasurers,

generals, and other great officers of state are taken from men of great

fortune and worth. This difficulty also may be solved upon the same

principle; and here too they may be right, for the power is not in the

man who is member of the assembly, or council, but the assembly itself,

and the council, and the people, of which each individual of the whole

community are the parts, I mean as senator, adviser, or judge; for which

reason it is very right, that the many should have the greatest powers

in their own hands; for the people, the council, and the judges are

composed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more

than the property of any person or a few who fill the great offices of

the state: and thus I determine these points.

The first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme

power should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or

magistrates, either one or more, should be authorised to determine those

cases which the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is impossible

for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon everything

that may arise: but what these laws are which are established upon the

best foundations has not been yet explained, but still remains a matter

of some question: but the laws of every state will necessarily be like

every state, either trifling or excellent, just or unjust; for it is

evident, that the laws must be framed correspondent to the constitution

of the government; and, if so, it is plain, that a well-formed

government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones.

CHAPTER XII

Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so

particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding

of civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this

which is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that

justice is a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers

are agreed when they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and to

whom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we should know how

we are to determine what things are equal and what unequal; and in

this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the

politician. Some persons will probably say, that the employments of the

state ought to be given according to every particular excellence of each

citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the rest of

the community, but they are in every respect else alike: for justice

attributes different things to persons differing from each other in

their character, according to their respective merits. But if this is

admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such advantage will

be a claim for a greater share of the public rights. But that this is

evidently absurd is clear from other arts and sciences; for with respect

to musicians who play on the flute together, the best flute is not given

to him who is of the best family, for he will play never the better for

that, but the best instrument ought to be given to him who is the best

artist.

If what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still

further: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the

flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them are

more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art in a

higher degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes ought

to be given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and fortune

should have a reference to the business in hand; but these have none.

Moreover, according to this reasoning, every possible excellence might

come in comparison with every other; for if bodily strength might

dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any bodily strength might

do it; so that if one person excelled in size more than another did in

virtue, and his size was to qualify him to take place of the other's

virtue, everything must then admit of a comparison with each other; for

if such a size is greater than virtue by so much, it is evident another

must be equal to it: but, since this is impossible, it is plain that it

would be contrary to common sense to dispute a right to any office in

the state from every superiority whatsoever: for if one person is slow

and the other swift, neither is the one better qualified nor the other

worse on that account, though in the gymnastic races a difference in

these particulars would gain the prize; but a pretension to the offices

of the state should be founded on a superiority in those qualifications

which are useful to it: for which reason those of family, independency,

and fortune, with great propriety, contend with each other for them; for

these are the fit persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist

of all poor men than it can of all slaves But if such persons are

requisite, it is evident that those also who are just and valiant are

equally so; for without justice and valour no state can be supported,

the former being necessary for its existence, the latter for its

happiness.

CHAPTER XIII

It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all, or

at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and inquired

into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the right of

being considered as the necessary means of making the citizens happy, as

we have already said. As those who are equal in one particular are not

therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular

are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all those governments

which are established upon a principle which supposes they are, are

erroneous.

We have already said, that all the members of the community will dispute

with each other for the offices of the state; and in some particulars

justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they

have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right to the soil is

vested in the community; and also because their fidelity is in general

most to be depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the

point with each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have

a right to a higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, for

honourable descent is everywhere of great esteem: nor is it an improper

conclusion, that the descendants of men of worth will be men of worth

themselves; for noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family:

for the same reason also we justly say, that virtue has a right to put

in her pretensions. Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary

to society, that all others must yield her the precedence.

Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few;

and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared

with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they are. But

should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the [1283b] same

city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as

usually make up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason to

dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every

community which we have mentioned there is no dispute where the supreme

power should be placed; for as these differ from each other, so do those

in whom that is placed; for in one state the rich enjoy it, in others

the meritorious, and thus each according to their separate manners. Let

us however consider what is to be done when all these happen at the same

time to inhabit the same city. If the virtuous should be very few in

number, how then shall we act? shall we prefer the virtuous on account

of their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city? or should

they be so many as almost entirely to compose the state?

There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim

the honours of government: for those who found them either on fortune or

family have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since

it is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found

richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be

justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is

of the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon

family merit: and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might

arise on the score of virtue, if there is one man better than all the

other men of worth who are in the same community; it seems just, by the

same reasoning, that he should enjoy the supreme power. And upon this

principle also, while the many suppose they ought to have the supreme

command, as being more powerful than the few, if one or more than one,

though a small number should be found stronger than themselves, these

ought rather to have it than they.

All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles

are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right to

the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:

for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their

fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing

hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better

or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective

capacity.

As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may

answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would

establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for

the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the

circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything

consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will be

advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common.

Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government and

also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition, it is

true, is different in different states: the best is that in which a man

is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of virtue during his

whole life, both in his public and private state. But should there be

one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue,

though not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue of the

many, or their political abilities, should be too inferior to come in

comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if but one, with his only;

such are not to be considered as part of the city; for it would be doing

them injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their

inferiors in virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them

like a god amongst men. From whence it is evident, that a system of laws

must be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and

power. Such men, therefore, are not the object of law; for they are

themselves a law: and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to

include them in the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what

Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to

be admitted to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on

this account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for

an equality seems the principal object of their government. For which

reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power, their

fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too

great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism, and leave

the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the

Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them in the

ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason those who

hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to

Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be said in its defence;

for the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger in

answer to the business he was consulted about, but striking off those

ears of corn which were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to

a level; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what was

done, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood by it that he must

take off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to

tyrants only; nor is it tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is

practised both in oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in

a manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banishing those who

are too great; and what is done in one city is done also by those who

have the supreme power in separate states; as the Athenians with respect

to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly

acquired the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states

into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them.

The King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians

when they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a

principle which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those

which are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it;

these for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.

The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for

a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally

large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the

shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than it

ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings

louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is

therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with

free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the

benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when there

is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the reason

upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just; but it is

better for the legislator so to establish his state at the beginning as

not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an inconvenience

should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. Not that

this was the use it was put to: for many did not regard the benefit of

their respective communities, but made the ostracism a weapon in the

hand of sedition.

It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and

useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is not

entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts

about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may

have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is

virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out and

banish such a one; neither does it seem right to govern him, for that

would be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter and to govern

him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is for

all persons quietly to submit to the government of those who are thus

eminently virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate

states.

CHAPTER XIV

What has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to

inquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted them

to be one of those species of government which are properly founded. And

here let us consider whether a kingly government is proper for a city or

a country whose principal object is the happiness of the inhabitants,

or rather some other. But let us first determine whether this is of one

kind only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to know that it consists of

many different species, and that the forms of government are not the

same in all: for at Sparta the kingly power seems chiefly regulated by

the laws; for it is not supreme in all circumstances; but when the king

quits the territories of the state he is their general in war; and all

religious affairs are entrusted to him: indeed the kingly power with

them is chiefly that of a general who cannot be called to an account for

his conduct, and whose command is for life: for he has not the power

of life and death, except as a general; as they frequently had in

their expeditions by martial law, which we learn from Homer; for when

Agamemnon is affronted in council, he restrains his resentment, but when

he is in the field and armed with this power, he tells the Greeks:

"Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight,

To dogs and vultures soon shall be a prey; For death is mine...."

This, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the kingly

power is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary, sometimes

elective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met with among

some of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested with powers

nearly equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects, bound by the laws

and the customs of their country; for as the barbarians are by nature

more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and those in Asia more than those

in Europe, they endure without murmuring a despotic government; for

this reason their governments are tyrannies; but yet not liable to be

overthrown, as being customary and according to law. Their guards also

are such as are used in a kingly government, not a despotic one; for the

guards of their kings are his citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners.

The one commands, in the manner the law directs, those who willingly

obey; the other, arbitrarily, those who consent not. The one, therefore,

is guarded by the citizens, the other against them.

These, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and

another is that which in ancient Greece they called _aesumnetes_; which

is nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference from that

which is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in its not

being according to law, but only in its not being according to the

ancient customs of the country. Some persons possessed this power for

life, others only for a particular time or particular purpose, as the

people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the exiles, who were

headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we learn from a poem

of his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having chosen Pittacus for

their tyrant, and with one [1285b] voice extolling him to the skies who

was the ruin of a rash and devoted people. These sorts of government

then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of their being tyrannies;

but inasmuch as they are elective, and over a free people, they are also

kingly.

A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the

heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government,

according to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were

at first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by collecting

them into civil society, or procuring them an establishment, became the

kings of a willing people, and established an hereditary monarchy.

They were particularly their generals in war, and presided over their

sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to the priests: they were

also the supreme judges over the people; and in this case some of them

took an oath, others did not; they did, the form of swearing was by

their sceptre held out.

In ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything

whatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they

relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed, so

that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of presiding

over the sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while to call

by that name had only the right of being commander-in-chief in their

foreign wars.

These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms: the first is that of the

heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its rights

in some particulars marked out; for the king was their general, their

judge, and their high priest. The second, that of the barbarians; which

is an hereditary despotic government regulated by laws: the third is

that which they call aesumnetic, which is an elective tyranny. The

fourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few words, is nothing more

than an hereditary generalship: and in these particulars they differ

from each other. There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is

when one person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in

the manner that every state and every city has over those things which

belong to the public: for as the master of a family is king in his own

house, so such a king is master of a family in his own city or state.

CHAPTER XV

But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say,

be reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last

spoken of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are placed

between these, which are as it were at the extremities, they having less

power than an absolute government, and yet more than the Lacedaemonians;

so that the whole matter in question may be reduced to these two points;

the one is, whether it is advantageous to the citizens to have the

office of general continue in one person for life, and whether it should

be confined to any particular families or whether every one should be

eligible: the other, whether [1286a] it is advantageous for one person

to have the supreme power over everything or not. But to enter into the

particulars concerning the office of a Lacedaemonian general would be

rather to frame laws for a state than to consider the nature and utility

of its constitution, since we know that the appointing of a general is

what is done in every state. Passing over this question then, we will

proceed to consider the other part of their government, which is

the polity of the state; and this it will be necessary to examine

particularly into, and to go through such questions as may arise.

Now the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is this,

whether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good laws? Those

who prefer a kingly government think that laws can only speak a general

language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular circumstances; for

which reason it is absurd in any science to follow written rule; and

even in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the mode of cure which

the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day; but if he did it sooner

it was at his own peril: from whence it is evident, on the very same

account, that a government of written laws is not the best; and yet

general reasoning is necessary to all those who are to govern, and it

will be much more perfect in those who are entirely free from passions

than in those to whom they are natural. But now this is a quality which

laws possess; while the other is natural to the human soul. But some

one will say in answer to this, that man will be a better judge of

particulars. It will be necessary, then, for a king to be a lawgiver,

and that his laws should be published, but that those should have no

authority which are absurd, as those which are not, should. But whether

is it better for the community that those things which cannot possibly

come under the cognisance of the law either at all or properly should be

under the government of every worthy citizen, as the present method is,

when the public community, in their general assemblies, act as judges

and counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular

cases, for one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon

comparison, inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this

is what a city is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's

portion: for this reason the multitude judge of many things better than

any one single person. They are also less liable to corruption from

their numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of

an individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger

or any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community

should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they

will do nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those cases

which the law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to propose may

not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state should happen

to be good men, should they prefer one uncorrupt governor or many

equally good, is it not evident that they should choose the many? But

there may be divisions among [1286b] these which cannot happen when

there is but one. In answer to this it may be replied that all their

souls will be as much animated with virtue as this one man's.

If then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an

aristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident

that the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this

whether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike

can be met with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first

governments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to find

a number of persons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the world

was then divided into small communities; besides, kings were appointed

in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind; but such

actions are peculiar to good men: but when many persons equal in virtue

appeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, but sought after

an equality and established a free state; but after this, when they

degenerated, they made a property of the public; which probably gave

rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious, and the honours

of government were reserved for the rich: and these afterwards turned

to tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to democracies; for

the power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on account of their

rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to frame and

establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to increase,

probably it was not easy for them to be under any other government than

a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly government in a state,

what is to be done with the king's children? Is the family also to

reign? But should they have such children as some persons usually have,

it will be very detrimental. It may be said, that then the king who

has it in his power will never permit such children to succeed to his

kingdom. But it is not easy to trust to that; for it is very hard and

requires greater virtue than is to be met with in human nature. There is

also a doubt concerning the power with which a king should be entrusted:

whether he should be allowed force sufficient to compel those who do

not choose to be obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his

government? for if he is to govern according to law and do nothing of

his own will which is contrary thereunto, at the same time it will

be necessary to protect that power with which he guards the law, This

matter however may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to

have a proper power, and such a one is that which will be sufficient

to make the king superior to any one person or even a large part of the

community, but inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed

guards for that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some

one advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow

him such.

CHAPTER XVI

[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just

mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king

governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does

not of himself create any particular species of government, as we have

already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or

democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many

who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is

the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an

absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state

is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems

to many that it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule

over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature

requires that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take

place amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be

hurtful to the body for those who are of different constitutions to

observe the same regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with

respect to the honours of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal

in merit should be unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much

a man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this also by

rotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that

law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle,

if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular

persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants

of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they

say, that it is unjust that where all are equal one person should

continually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to

adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the

law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and

application of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides,

it allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better

established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind,

would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it,

gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for

passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men:

for which reason law is reason without desire.

The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to

be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it

would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic;

for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship

but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the

management of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour.

And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that

whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by

his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession,

he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure: and not only this

[1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are ill call in other

physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises,

exercise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from

self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves.

From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek

for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the moral law is far superior

and conversant with far superior objects than the written law; for the

supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the one, though he is

inferior to the other. But as it is impossible that one person should

have an eye to everything himself, it will be necessary that the supreme

magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then

should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in

this manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the

man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are

certainly better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together

go:" and also Agamemnon's wish; "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!"

Not but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested

with supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law

cannot, as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its

jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then laws

comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire and

consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the best

law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come under the

deliberation of man into a law is impossible.

No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some

person to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of

a written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one;

for though every one who decides according to the principles of the law

decides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person

can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do

better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for we

see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes and

ears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to

them and their government with part of their power; for if they are not

friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they

are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a

friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such

should govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are

nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power.

CHAPTER XVII

Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of

others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of

a master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free state,

just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor the other

perverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it. But it

is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither

advantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord over all

where there are no established laws, but his will is the law; or where

there are; nor is it right that one who is good should have it over

those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are not good;

nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular

manner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been already

mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qualified

for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a

democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who are

accustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves to a

family eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are naturally

framed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue makes them

worthy of the management of others: for a free state, a war-like people,

formed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws which admit the

poorest citizen to share the honours of the commonwealth according

to his worth. But whenever a whole family or any one of another shall

happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed all other persons in the

community, then it is right that the kingly power should be in them, or

if it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of

all; for this, as we have just mentioned, is not only correspondent

to that principle of right which all founders of all states, whether

aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard to (for

in placing the supreme power they all think it right to fix it to

excellence, though not the same); but it is also agreeable to what

has been already said; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or

ostracise such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper

to let him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to

nature that what is highest should ever be lowest: but this would be

the case should such a one ever be governed by others. So that there can

nothing else be done but to submit, and permit him continually to

enjoy the supreme power. And thus much with respect to kingly power in

different states, and whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and

to what, and in what manner.

CHAPTER XVIII

Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular

governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is

administered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to

have one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the

rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner

as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the

virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government

will be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner, and for those

very qualities which would procure a man the character of good, any

one would say, that the government of a state was a well-established

aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to be education and

[1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man,

and the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.

These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider

what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it

is established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry concerning

this.

CHAPTER I

In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some

one genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art alone

to determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular

exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits it best: for

that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and superior to

others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of what one kind

that must be which will suit the generality; and this is the business of

the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not desire to acquire

an exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that

account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master and

instruct the youth in them should be perfect therein: and we see that

this is what equally befalls the healing, shipbuilding, cloth-making,

and indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art

to find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be

most correspondent to our wish, while it received no molestation from

without: and what particular species of it is adapted to particular

persons; for there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the

best form: so that the legislator, and he who is truly a politician,

ought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect

imaginable, but also that which is the best suited to any given

circumstances. There is, moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and

he ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be

able to discern what sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when

once established, what would be the proper means to preserve it a long

time. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the

best form of government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not

receive every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all

this, it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting

for all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject,

however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in

describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to

perceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It

should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek only

the most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing [1289a]

rather to treat of what is common, censure those under which they live,

and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedaemonian,

or some other: but every legislator ought to establish such a form of

government as from the present state and disposition of the people who

are to receive it they will most readily submit to and persuade the

community to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to

correct the mistakes of an established government than to form a new

one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot as to learn

anything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the character of a

legislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to be able to

correct the mistakes of a government already established, as we have

before mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him who does

not know how many different forms of government there are: some persons

think that there is only one species both of democracy and oligarchy;

but this is not true: so that every one should be acquainted with the

difference of these governments, how great they are, and whence they

arise; and should have equal knowledge to perceive what laws are best,

and what are most suitable to each particular government: for all

laws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is to be

governed by them, and not the state to the laws: for government is a

certain ordering in a state which particularly respects the magistrates

in what manner they shall be regulated, and where the supreme power

shall be placed; and what shall be the final object which each community

shall have in view; but the laws are something different from what

regulates and expresses the form of the constitution-it is their office

to direct the conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his office

and the punishment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the

founders of laws should attend both to the number and the different

sorts of government; for it is impossible that the same laws should be

calculated for all sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies,

for of both these governments there are many species, not one only.

CHAPTER II

Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the different

forms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three

sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states, and shown

the three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of becoming

tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free state,

democratical: and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and

kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best

is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of

them desires to be established upon the principles of virtue: and as,

moreover, we have already determined wherein a kingly power and an

aristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be

governed by a king, it now remains that we examine into a free state,

and also these other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a

[1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of these three excesses which must be

the worst of all, and which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of

the best and most holy must be the worst; for it must necessarily happen

either that the name of king only will remain, or else that the king

will assume more power than belongs to him, from whence tyranny will

arise, the worst excess imaginable, a government the most contrary

possible to a free state. The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for

an aristocracy differs much from this sort of government: that which is

least so is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one

of those writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not

the same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions,

as a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all

bad ones, the best.

Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen into

excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy was

better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this question

we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire how many

different sorts of free states there are; since there are many

species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most

comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government; or

if there is any other like an aristocracy, well established; and also

which of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is

preferable for particular persons: for, probably, some may suit better

with an oligarchy than a democracy, and others better with a democracy

than an oligarchy; and afterwards in what manner any one ought to

proceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean every

species of democracy, and also of oligarchy. And to conclude, when we

shall have briefly gone through everything that is necessary, we will

endeavour to point out the sources of corruption, and stability, in

government, as well those which are common to all as those which are

peculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly arise.

CHAPTER III

The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this,

that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the first

place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and again, of

the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the

middle station; and that, both of the rich and poor, some will be used

to arms, others not. We see also, that some of the common people are

husbandmen, others attend the market, and others are artificers. There

is also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity

in which they live: for instance, in the number of horses they breed;

for this cannot be supported without a large fortune: for which reason,

in former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse became

by that means oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions

against the neighbouring cities; as the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the

Magnetians, who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia.

Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises

from family and merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a]

which make part of the city, they have been already mentioned in

treating of an aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each

city must necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a

share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more.

It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government,

differing from each other in their particular constitution: for the

parts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For

government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these

the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them

by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst

them, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of. There

must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as

there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority

of some over others, and their different situations. And these seem

chiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely, the north and

the south; and all the others are declinations from these. And thus in

politics, there is the government of the many and the government of

the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an aristocracy may be

considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also a government of the

few; and what we call a free state may be considered as a democracy: as

in the winds they consider the west as part of the north, and the east

as part of the south: and thus it is in music, according to some, who

say there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and

all other species of composition they call after one of these names; and

many people are accustomed to consider the nature of government in the

same light; but it is both more convenient and more correspondent to

truth to distinguish governments as I have done, into two species: one,

of those which are established upon proper principles; of which there

may be one or two sorts: the other, which includes all the different

excesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of government to

the most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the

more violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.

CHAPTER IV

We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it

is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for

even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should

they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the

hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen

hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit

the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although

they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one would say,

that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when

few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than

themselves, no one would say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when

the rest who are rich have no share in the administration. We should

rather say, that a democracy is when the supreme power is in the [1290b]

hands of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich:

it happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in

the other the few; because there are many poor and few rich. And if the

power of the state was to be distributed according to the size of the

citizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty,

it would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are large and

beautiful is small.

Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient

to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a

democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration;

as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the

supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is a

democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these

cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular families,

who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are

superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for

there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a

democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority,

are invested with the power of the state. An oligarchy is a state where

the rich and those of noble families, being few, possess it.

We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have

assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are

even more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the

principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists

not of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend

the different species of animals we should first of all note those parts

which every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also what is

necessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly; besides

certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If, then, these

are the only parts of an animal and there are differences between them;

namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and sensoriums: to

which we must add their motive powers; the number of the combinations of

all these must necessarily make up the different species of animals.

For it is not possible that the same kind of animal should have any

very great difference in its mouth or ears; so that when all these are

collected, who happen to have these things similar in all, they make up

a species of animals of which there are as many as there are of these

general combinations of necessary parts.

The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not made

of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of which is

those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen, another called

mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual arts, without which

the city could not be inhabited; of these some are busied about what is

absolutely necessary, others in what contribute to the elegancies and

pleasures of life; the third sort are your exchange-men, I mean by these

your buyers, sellers, merchants, and victuallers; the fourth are your

hired labourers or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms, a rank not

less useful than the other, without you would have the community slaves

to every invader; but what cannot defend itself is unworthy of the name

of a city; for a city is self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when

Socrates, in Plato's Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed

of four sorts of people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and

these are, according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and

builders; he then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths,

herdsmen for what cattle are necessary, and also merchants and

victuallers, and these are by way of appendix to his first list; as if

a city was established for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a

shoe-maker and a husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the

military a part before the increase of territory and joining to the

borders of the neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even

amongst them who compose his four divisions, or whoever have any

connection with each other, it will be necessary to have some one to

distribute justice, and determine between man and man. If, then, the

mind is a more valuable part of man than the body, every one would

wish to have those things more regarded in his city which tend to the

advantage of these than common matters, such are war and justice; to

which may be added council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor

is it of any consequence whether these different employments are filled

by different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a

soldier and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are

parts of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be

so also. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive

employments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth

are those who execute the different offices of the state, and without

these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that

there should be some persons capable of governing and filling the places

in the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the office of

senator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently treated, are

the only ones remaining. If, then, these things are necessary for a

state, that it may be happy and just, it follows that the citizens who

engage in public affairs should be men of abilities therein. [1291b]

Several persons think, that different employments may be allotted to the

same person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an artificer's; as also

that others may be both senators and judges.

Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and

that he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the

same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most

obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich;

moreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many, they

seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so that as

the one or the other prevail they form different states; and these are

the democracy and the oligarchy.

But that there are many different states, and from what causes they

arise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different

species both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though

this indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also

many different sorts of common people, and also of those who are

called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen,

artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling,

seamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in

carrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing,

and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum and

Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and Chios,

those who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these those who

live by their manual labour and have but little property; so that they

cannot live without some employ: and also those who are not free-born

on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people there may be.

As for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished either by their

fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any

such-like excellence which is attributed to them.

The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from that

equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state

directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich;

nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of these, but

that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as some persons

suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must be most so

by every department of government being alike open to all; but as the

people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it follows that such

a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one species thereof. Another

is, when the magistrates are elected by a certain census; but this

should be but small, and every one who was included in it should be

eligible, but as soon as he was below it should lose that right. [1292a]

Another sort is, in which every citizen who is not infamous has a share

in the government, but where the government is in the laws. Another,

where every citizen without exception has this right. Another is like

these in other particulars, but there the people govern, and not the

law: and this takes place when everything is determined by a majority of

votes, and not by a law; which happens when the people are influenced by

the demagogues: for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there

is no room for them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the

state: but where the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues

abound: for there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing

one body; for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their

collective capacity.

Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means this

we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power separately,

is uncertain. When the people possess this power they desire to be

altogether absolute, that they may not be under the control of the law,

and this is the time when flatterers are held in repute. Nor is there

any difference between such a people and monarchs in a tyranny: for

their manners are the same, and they both hold a despotic power over

better persons than themselves. For their decrees are like the others'

edicts; their demagogues like the others' flatterers: but their greatest

resemblance consists in the mutual support they give to each other, the

flatterer to the tyrant, the demagogue to the people: and to them it is

owing that the supreme power is lodged in the votes of the people,

and not in the laws; for they bring everything before them, as their

influence is owing to their being supreme whose opinions they entirely

direct; for these are they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who

accuse the magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on

their conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as

the means of destroying all their offices.

Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as

being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is

not in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be

supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should be

determined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a

democracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such

establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people cannot,

properly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be general

in their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several species of

democracies.

CHAPTER V

Of the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the

offices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although the

majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included therein

take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort is, when

[1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who upon any

vacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of the

community at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out of

any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another sort of

oligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary nobility. The fourth is,

when the power is in the same hands as the other, but not under the

control of law; and this sort of oligarchy exactly corresponds to a

tyranny in monarchies, and to that particular species of democracies

which I last mentioned in treating of that state: this has the

particular name of a dynasty. These are the different sorts of

oligarchies and democracies.

It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state, where

the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet in

consequence of the established manners and customs of the people, may

be governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws may

countenance a more democratic form of government, these may make the

state inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when there

has been any alteration in the government; for the people do not easily

change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees

only that one thing takes place of another; so that the ancient laws

will remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have

brought about a revolution in the state.

CHAPTER VI

It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many different

sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up: for, of

necessity, either all ranks of the people which I have enumerated must

have a share in the government, or some only, and others not; for when

the husbandmen, and those only who possess moderate fortunes, have the

supreme power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get

their livings by their employs, they have but little leisure for public

business: they will therefore establish proper laws, and never call

public assemblies but when there is a necessity for them; and they will

readily let every one partake with them in the administration of public

affairs as soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires for

their qualification: every one, therefore, who is qualified will have

his share in the government: for to exclude any would be to make the

government an oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend

without they had a subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons,

therefore, this government is a species of democracy. Another species is

distinguished by the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every

one is eligible, to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is

supposed to have leisure to attend: for which reason in such a democracy

the supreme power will be vested in the laws, as there will be nothing

paid to those who go to the public assemblies. A third species is where

every freeman has a right to a share in the government, which he will

not accept for the cause already assigned; for which reason here also

the supreme power will be in the law. The fourth species [1293a] of

democracy, the last which was established in order of time, arose when

cities were greatly enlarged to what they were at first, and when the

public revenue became something considerable; for then the populace, on

account of their numbers, were admitted to share in the management of

public affairs, for then even the poorest people were at leisure to

attend to them, as they received wages for so doing; nay, they were more

so than others, as they were not hindered by having anything of their

own to mind, as the rich had; for which reason these last very often did

not frequent the public assemblies and the courts of justice: thus the

supreme power was lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are

the different sorts of democracies, and such are the causes which

necessarily gave birth to them.

The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state are

men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them leisure

for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body,

it necessarily follows that the supreme power must be in the laws, and

not in men; for as they are far removed from a monarchical government,

and have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while

they are too many to be supported by the public, they will of course

determine to be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if the

men of property in the state are but few, and their property is large,

then an oligarchy of the second sort will take place; for those who have

most power will think that they have a right to lord it over the others;

and, to accomplish this, they will associate to themselves some who have

an inclination for public affairs, and as they are not powerful enough

to govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if

those few who have large fortunes should acquire still greater power,

the oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort; for they will

get all the offices of the state into their own hands by a law which

directs the son to succeed upon the death of his father; and,

after that, when, by means of their increasing wealth and powerful

connections, they extend still further their oppression, a monarchical

dynasty will directly succeed wherein men will be supreme, and not the

law; and this is the fourth species of an oligarchy correspondent to the

last-mentioned class of democracies.

CHAPTER VII

There are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one

of which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the

four sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a

democracy, and this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is

also a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other four,

namely, a state: but as this is seldom to be met with, it has escaped

those who have endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of

governments, which [1293b] they fix at four only, as does Plato in his

Republic.

An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is

rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most

virtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men

may propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is

there only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while in

other states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover, there

are some other states which are called by the same name, that differ

both from oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the rich but

also the virtuous have a share in the administration; and have therefore

acquired the name of aristocracies; for in those governments wherein

virtue is not their common care, there are still men of worth and

approved goodness. Whatever state, then, like the Carthaginians,

favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort

of aristocracy: when only the two latter are held in esteem, as at

Lacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous

democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies after the first,

which is the best of all governments. There is also a third, which is,

whenever a free state inclines to the dominion of a few.

CHAPTER VIII

It now remains for us to treat of that government which is particularly

called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the reason for my

choosing to place that free state here is, because this, as well

as those aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not seem

excesses, yet, to speak true, they have all departed from what a perfect

government is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally from other

forms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention a tyranny the

last of all governments, for it is of all others the least like one:

but as my intention is to treat of all governments in general, for this

reason that also, as I have said, will be taken into consideration in

its proper place.

I shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we shall

the better understand its positive nature as we have already described

an oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed nothing more

than a mixture of them, and it has been usual to call those which

incline most to a democracy, a free state; those which incline most to

an oligarchy, an aristocracy, because those who are rich are generally

men of family and education; besides, they enjoy those things which

others are often guilty of crimes to procure: for which reason they are

regarded as men of worth and honour and note.

Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger

part of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that

an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and

honourable: now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government

is in the hands of the good, there the laws should not be good, but bad;

or, on the contrary, that where the government is in the hands of the

bad, there the laws should be good; nor is a government well constituted

because the laws are, without at the same time care is taken that they

are observed; for to enforce obedience to the laws which it makes is one

proof of a good constitution in the state-another is, to have laws well

calculated for those who are to abide by them; for if they are improper

they must be obeyed: and this may be done two ways, either by their

being the best relative to the particular state, or the best absolutely.

An aristocracy seems most likely to confer the honours of the state on

the virtuous; for virtue is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an

oligarchy, and liberty of a democracy; for what is approved of by the

majority will prevail in all or in each of these three different states;

and that which seems good to most of those who compose the community

will prevail: for what is called a state prevails in many communities,

which aim at a mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for

the rich, they are usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and

honourable. As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the

state, freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is

an attendant on two of the others, for virtue and riches are the origin

of family), it is evident, that the conjuncture of the rich and the poor

make up a free state; but that all three tend to an aristocracy more

than any other, except that which is truly so, which holds the first

rank.

We have already seen that there are governments different from a

monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and wherein

they differ from each other; and also aristocracies and states properly

so called, which are derived from them; and it is evident that these are

not much unlike each other.

CHAPTER IX

We shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly

called a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it

ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are

the proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out

wherein they differ from one another, and then from both these compose

a state of such parts of each of them as will show from whence they were

taken.

There are three different ways in which two states may be blended and

joined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be adopted

which the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance in the

judicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if they do

not come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid for their

attendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are not fined

for their neglect. Now these things, as being common to both, are fit

to be observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed of both. This,

then, is one way in which they may be joined together. In the second

place, a medium may be taken between the different methods which each

state observes; for instance, in a democracy the right to vote in the

public assembly is either confined by no census at all, or limited by a

very small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it but those whose census is

high: therefore, as these two practices are contrary to each other, a

census between each may be established in such a state. In the third

place, different laws of each community may be adopted; as, for

instance, as it seems correspondent to the nature of a democracy, that

the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an aristocracy by vote, and

in the one state according to a census, but not in the other: let, then,

an aristocracy and a free state copy something from each of them; let

them follow an oligarchy in choosing their magistrates by vote, but a

democracy in not admitting of any census, and thus blend together the

different customs of the two governments. But the best proof of a happy

mixture of a democracy and an oligarchy is this, when a person may

properly call the same state a democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident

that those who speak of it in this manner are induced to it because both

these governments are there well blended together: and indeed this

is common to all mediums, that the extremes of each side should be

discerned therein, as at Lacedaemon; for many affirm that it is a

democracy from the many particulars in which it follows that form of

government; as for instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of

their children, for the rich and poor are brought up in the same manner;

and their education is such that the children of the poor may partake of

it; and the same rules are observed when they are youths and men, there

is no distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and in their

public tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear

only such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, with

respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a right

to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori.

Others consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows

in many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by

lot; in there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on

capital causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of

two others ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state ought

to have its means of preservation in itself, and not without; and when I

say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the forbearance

of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad government, but to

every member of the community's not being willing that there should be

the least alteration in their constitution. Such is the method in which

a free state or aristocracy ought to be established.

CHAPTER X

It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much

to be said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since

we enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the

beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly government,

and entered into a particular examination of what was most properly

called so, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not, and what

it should be, and how established; and we divided a tyranny into two

pieces when we were upon this subject, because there is something

analogous between this and a kingly government, for they are both of

them established by law; for among some of the barbarians they elect a

monarch with absolute power, and formerly among the Greeks there were

some such, whom they called sesumnetes. Now these differ from each

other; for some possess only kingly power regulated by law, and

rule those who voluntarily submit to their government; others rule

despotically according to their own will. There is a third species of

tyranny, most properly so called, which is the very opposite to kingly

power; for this is the government of one who rules over his equals and

superiors without being accountable for his conduct, and whose object is

his own advantage, and not the advantage of those he governs; for which

reason he rules by compulsion, for no freemen will ever willingly submit

to such a government. These are the different species of tyrannies,

their principles, and their causes.

CHAPTER XI

We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner

of life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that

superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that

education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish,

nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to

that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to,

and that government which most cities may establish: for as to those

aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect

for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state we now

going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.

The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one

common principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is

true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue;

and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must

certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by

every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also

necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of

government is the life of the city. In every city the people are divided

into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who are

between them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is best, it

is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred;

for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who are very

handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the

contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with

difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious,

the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising from their

different excesses: nor will they go through the different offices

of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who excel in

strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how nor are

willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when they are

boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to

obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general and excessive

want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too mean: so that

the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as slaves, the

others know not how to submit to any command, nor to command themselves

but with despotic power.

A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and

masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other

despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or political

community: for community supposes affection; for we do not even on the

road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be

composed as much as possible of equals; which will be most so when the

inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it follows, that that

city must be best framed which is composed of those whom we say are

naturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who will be

best assured of safety and protection; for they will neither covet what

belongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs,

as the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting

against any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live

free from danger: for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the

middle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain, then,

that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are

in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these

are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the

other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate;

so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from

preponderating.

It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to

possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too

much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be

in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from

the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong

democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the

community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a

reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different

states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as

being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb

the community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least

liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are

very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two

extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the

one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is that

democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance than

oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper number

of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses

arise, and the government is soon at an end.

We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best

lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom

was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not

a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will

show us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies,

others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle

state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the

rich or the poor, always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the

administration of public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy

or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and

quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or

the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state;

but, as the record of their victory, one which inclines to their own

principles, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy.

Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the

respective forms of government in their own cities, established either

democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the

state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government

has never been established where the supreme power has been placed

amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few,

one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded

to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an

established custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an

equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to

submit.

Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be

difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have

seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies,

to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in

the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular

excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the best

possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst

which is most distant from the medium, without any one has a particular

plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen,

that although one form of government may be better than another, yet

there is no reason to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in

particular circumstances and for particular purposes.

CHAPTER XII

After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what

particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons;

first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which desires

to support the actual administration of the state ought always to be

superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of quality

and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and family,

and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may happen that

quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city is composed,

and quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble may be greater

than the number of those of family, the number of the poor than that of

the rich; but not so that the quantity of the one shall overbalance the

quality of the other; those must be properly adjusted to each other; for

where the number of the poor exceeds the proportion we have mentioned,

there a democracy will rise up, and if the husbandry should have

more power than others, it will be a democracy of husbandmen; and the

democracy will be a particular species according to that class of

men which may happen to be most numerous: thus, should these be the

husbandmen, it will be of these, and the best; if of mechanics and those

who hire themselves out, the worst possible: in the same manner it may

be of any other set between these two. But when the rich and the noble

prevail more by their quality than they are deficient in quantity, there

an oligarchy ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species,

according to the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in

framing his constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in

the middle rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should

be the object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be

entrusted; and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or

at least one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution;

for there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire

together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the

other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest

basis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is

what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their

hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is the

most proper person for both parties to trust to; now this arbitrator is

the middle rank.

Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not

only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the

common people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must feel

a real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more destructive to

the state than those of the poor.

CHAPTER XIII

There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich

craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are

their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of

justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With

respect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in

fining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with

respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not

granting this indulgence to those who are within the census;

with respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for

non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and

these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some

places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public

assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy

fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might avoid

being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one nor the

other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect to their

bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are excused if

they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method takes place

if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is no penalty on

one, but there is on the other: the consequence of which is, that the

fear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and attend the

other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful contrivances

of oligarchical legislators.

The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a

proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give

the rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one

would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the

pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one

would share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free

state ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with respect

to their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it ought to be,

but the rule that should direct upon this subject should be to make it

as extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled in it make up

a greater part of the people than those who are not; for those who are

poor, although they partake not of the offices of the state, are willing

to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them in their property: but

this is not an easy matter; for it may not always happen, that those who

are at the head of public affairs are of a humane behaviour. In time

of war the poor are accustomed to show no alacrity without they have

provisions found them; when they have, then indeed they are willing to

fight.

In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear arms,

but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the state was

composed of these latter only, for all the officers were soldiers who

had served their time. And the first states in Greece which succeeded

those where kingly power was established, were governed by the military.

First of all the horse, for at that time the strength and excellence of

the army depended on the horse, for as to the heavy-armed foot they were

useless without proper discipline; but the art of tactics was not known

to the ancients, for which reason their strength lay in their horse: but

when cities grew larger, and they depended more on their foot, greater

numbers partook of the freedom of the city; for which reason what we

call republics were formerly called democracies. The ancient governments

were properly oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons

in each state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient

number of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to

subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.

We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others

different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of

democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what are

their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others

which is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for

particular people.

CHAPTER XIV

We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the

governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in

particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each: now

there are three things in all states which a careful legislator ought

well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and which

properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and according

to the variation of which the one will differ from the other. The first

of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second the officers of the

state, that is, who they ought to be, and with what power they should be

entrusted, and in what manner they should be appointed; the third, the

judicial department.

Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine

concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact

laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and to

call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office. Now

these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in general,

or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or some to

one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some: to entrust

all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people aim at

equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to the

citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by turn, and

not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in his state. In

others the supreme council is composed of the different magistrates,

and they succeed to the offices of the community by proper divisions of

tribes, wards, and other very small proportions, till every one in his

turn goes through them: nor does the whole community ever meet together,

without it is when new laws are enacted, or some national affair is

debated, or to hear what the magistrates have to propose to them.

Another method is for the people to meet in a collective body, but

only for the purpose of holding the comitia, making laws, determining

concerning war or peace, and inquiring into the conduct of their

magistrates, while the remaining part of the public business is

conducted by the magistrates, who have their separate departments, and

are chosen out of the whole community either by vote or ballot. Another

method is for the people in general to meet for the choice of the

magistrates, and to examine into their conduct; and also to deliberate

concerning war and alliances, and to leave other things to the

magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose particular employments

are such as necessarily require persons well skilled therein. A fourth

method is for every person to deliberate upon every subject in public

assembly, where the magistrates can determine nothing of themselves, and

have only the privilege of giving their opinions first; and this is the

method of the most pure democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings

in a dynastic oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.

These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in a

democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community

only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs; for

whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who have a

moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many, and

when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down, but

carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible,

certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of

government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do

not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for

that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first,

is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each

other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede

the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When

some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and

peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and

other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or

lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some

are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people

in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if

both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an

aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different

methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states,

all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous to

a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a state

wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the laws, to

hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this particular

to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of justice; for

they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they do not attend,

so should they reward the poor for coming to the public assemblies:

and their counsels will be best when all advise with each other, the

citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It is also

advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the citizens, to

elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both ranks. It is also

proper, if the common people in the state are very numerous, either not

to pay every one for his attendance, but such a number only as will make

them equal to the nobles, or to reject many of them by lot.

In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people to

the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other states,

whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose business

should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact. By this

means the people would have a place in the administration of public

affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any disorder in

the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to have a vote

in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose anything

contrary thereto; or they may give their advice, while the power of

determining may be with the magistrates only. It is also necessary to

follow a contrary practice to what is established in democracies,

for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not

of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to the

magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for the

power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which is

always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we determine

concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose hands it

shall be.

CHAPTER XV

We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch of

public business contains many different Parts, as how many there shall

be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to time how

long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it six months,

others shorter, others for a year, others for a much longer time; or

whether they should be perpetual or for a long time, or neither; for

the same person may fill the same office several times, or he may not be

allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once: and also with respect to

the appointment of magistrates, who are to be eligible, who is to choose

them, and in what manner; for in all these particulars we ought properly

to distinguish the different ways which may be followed; and then to

show which of these is best suited to such and such governments.

Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the

name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office;

but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to be

reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first place;

for these are to be considered as very different from civil magistrates:

to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even ambassadors are

elected: there are some civil employments which belong to the citizens;

and these are either when they are all engaged in one thing, as when as

soldiers they obey their general, or when part of them only are, as in

governing the women or educating the youth; and also some economic, for

they often elect corn-meters: others are servile, and in which, if they

are rich, they employ slaves. But indeed they are most properly called

magistrates, who are members of the deliberative council, or decide

causes, or are in some command, the last more especially, for to command

is peculiar to magistrates. But to speak truth, this question is of

no great consequence, nor is it the province of the judges to decide

between those who dispute about words; it may indeed be an object of

speculative inquiry; but to inquire what officers are necessary in a

state, and how many, and what, though not most necessary, may yet be

advantageous in a well-established government, is a much more useful

employment, and this with respect to all states in general, as well as

to small cities.

In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one

person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a society,

where some may be passed over for a long time, and others never be in

office but once; and indeed everything is better done which has the

whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b] attention is

divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary that a few of

the citizens should execute many employments; for their numbers are so

small it will not be convenient to have many of them in office at the

same time; for where shall we find others to succeed them in turn? Small

states will sometimes want the same magistrates and the same laws as

large ones; but the one will not want to employ them so often as the

other; so that different charges may be intrusted to the same person

without any inconvenience, for they will not interfere with each

other, and for want of sufficient members in the community it will be

necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates are necessary in every

city, and how many, though not necessary, it is yet proper to have, we

could then the better know how many different offices one might assign

to one magistrate. It is also necessary to know what tribunals in

different places should have different things under their jurisdiction,

and also what things should always come under the cognisance of the same

magistrate; as, for instance, decency of manners, shall the clerk of the

market take cognisance of that if the cause arises in the market, and

another magistrate in another place, or the same magistrate everywhere:

or shall there be a distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as,

for instance, in decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it

relates to a man, another when it relates to a woman?

In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same?

I mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a

monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it

vary according to the different formation of the government? as in an

aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are well

educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy to the

freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities differ?

For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper, sometimes

otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the magistrate have

great powers, in that but small. There are also certain magistrates

peculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers are not proper in a

democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is necessary, whose

business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare those bills which

shall be brought before the people that they may have leisure to

attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in number the state

inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed must always be few

for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where there are both

these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is superior to

the senator's, the one having only a democratical power, the other an

oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate is lost in

those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one public assembly,

take all the business into their own hands; and this is likely to happen

either when the community in general are in easy circumstances, or when

they are paid for their attendance; for they are then at leisure often

to meet together and determine everything for themselves. A magistrate

whose business is to control the manners of the boys, or women, or who

takes any department similar to this, is to be found in an aristocracy,

not in a democracy; for who can forbid the wives of the poor from

appearing in public? neither is such a one to be met with in an

oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate to bear control. And

thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to treat at large of the

establishment of magistrates, beginning from first principles. Now, they

differ from each other in three ways, from which, blended together,

all the varieties which can be imagined arise. The first of these

differences is in those who appoint the magistrates, the second consists

in those who are appointed, the third in the mode of appointment; and

each of these three differ in three manners; for either all the citizens

may appoint collectively, or some out of their whole body, or some out

of a particular order in it, according to fortune, family, or virtue, or

some other rule (as at Megara, where the right of election was amongst

those who had returned together to their country, and had reinstated

themselves by force of arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again,

these several modes may be differently formed together, as some

magistrates may be chosen by part of the community, others by the whole;

some out of part, others out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot:

and each of these different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for

either all may elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may

either proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain

division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through the

whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and others

another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote or lot

of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of some, or

some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the vote of all,

others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve different methods

of electing the magistrates, without blending the two together. Of

these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely, to have all the

magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by vote or lot, or

both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by vote. In a free state

the whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of

the whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or

vote, or both: and they should elect either out of the whole community,

or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote.

In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some magistrates out of the whole

body of the citizens, some by vote, some by lot, others by both: by lot

is most correspondent to that form of government. In a free aristocracy,

some magistrates [1300b] should be chosen out of the community in

general, others out of a particular rank, or these by choice, those

by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the magistrates should be chosen out of

certain ranks, and by certain persons, and some of those by lot, others

by both methods; but to choose them out of the whole community is not

correspondent to the nature of this government. It is proper in an

aristocracy for the whole community to elect their magistrates out of

particular persons, and this by vote. These then are all the different

ways of electing of magistrates; and they have been allotted according

to the nature of the different communities; but what mode of proceeding

is proper for different communities, or how the offices ought to be

established, or with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean

by the powers of a magistrate, what should be his particular province,

as the management of the finances or the laws of the state; for

different magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of

the army differs from the clerk of the market.

CHAPTER XVI

Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to

consider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same manner

as we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges shall

consist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I mean

whether they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by for what

causes I mean, how many different courts shall be appointed; by how,

whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first determine how

many different courts there ought to be. Now these are eight. The

first of these is the court of inspection over the behaviour of the

magistrates when they have quitted their office; the second is to punish

those who have injured the public; the third is to take cognisance of

those causes in which the state is a party; the fourth is to decide

between magistrates and private persons, who appeal from a fine laid

upon them; the fifth is to determine disputes which may arise concerning

contracts of great value; the sixth is to judge between foreigners, and

of murders, of which there are different species; and these may all be

tried by the same judges or by different ones; for there are murders

of malice prepense and of chance-medley; there is also justifiable

homicide, where the fact is admitted, and the legality of it disputed.

There is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae,

which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has

run away, to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair

happens but seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to determine

causes wherein strangers are concerned, and this whether they are

between stranger and stranger or between a stranger and a citizen. The

eighth and last is for small actions, from one to five drachma's, or a

little more; for these ought also to be legally determined, but not to

be brought before the whole body of the judges. But without entering

into any particulars concerning actions for murder, and those wherein

strangers are the parties, let us particularly treat of those courts

which have the jurisdiction of those matters which more particularly

relate to the affairs of the community and which if not well conducted

occasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity,

either all persons must have a right to judge of all these different

causes, appointed for that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of

all, some of them by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote,

in others by lot. Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a]

will be just the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the

people only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part

either by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in

particular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which

means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned.

Besides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are

chosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all

three may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote,

lot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of these

appointments that which admits all the community to be judges in all

causes is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints that

certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the third,

which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but

particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state.

CHAPTER I

We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it

remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations

in government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the

destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of

polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be

used for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are

applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which

are to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered

separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought

first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all

of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and yet

have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus

democracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one

thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal

in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and oligarchies, from

supposing that those who are unequal in one thing are unequal in all;

that when men are so in point of fortune, that inequality extends to

everything else. Hence it follows, that those who in some respects are

equal with others think it right to endeavour to partake of an equality

with them in everything; and those who are superior to others endeavour

to get still more; and it is this more which is the inequality: thus

most states, though they have some notion of what is just, yet are

almost totally wrong; and, upon this account, when either party has not

that share in the administration which answers to his expectations, he

becomes seditious: but those who of all others have the greatest right

to be so are the last that are; namely, those who excel in virtue;

for they alone can be called generally superior. There are, too, some

persons of distinguished families who, because they are so, disdain to

be on an equality with others, for those esteem themselves noble who

boast of their ancestors' merit and fortune: these, to speak truth, are

the origin and fountain from whence seditions arise. The alterations

which men may propose to make in governments are two; for either they

may change the state already established into some other, as when

they propose to erect an oligarchy where there is a democracy; or a

democracy, or free state, where there is an oligarchy, or an aristocracy

from these, or those from that; or else, when they have no objection

to the established government, which they like very well, but choose to

have the sole management in it themselves; either in the hands of a few

or one only. They will also raise commotions concerning the degree in

which they would have the established power; as if, for instance, the

government is an oligarchy, to have it more purely so, and in the same

manner if it is a democracy, or else to have it less so; and, in like

manner, whatever may be the nature of the government, either to extend

or contract its powers; or else to make some alterations in some parts

of it; as to establish or abolish a particular magistracy, as some

persons say Lysander endeavoured to abolish the kingly power in Sparta;

and Pausanias that of the ephori. Thus in Epidamnus there was an

alteration in one part of the constitution, for instead of the philarchi

they established a senate. It is also necessary for all the magistrates

at Athens; to attend in the court of the Helisea when any new magistrate

is created: the power of the archon also in that state partakes of the

nature of an oligarchy: inequality is always the occasion of sedition,

but not when those who are unequal are treated in a different manner

correspondent to that inequality. Thus kingly power is unequal when

exercised over equals. Upon the whole, those who aim after an equality

are the cause of seditions. Equality is twofold, either in number or

value. Equality in number is when two things contain the same parts or

the same quantity; equality in value is by proportion as two exceeds

one, and three two by the same number-thus by proportion four exceeds

two, and two one in the same degree, for two is the same part of four

that one is of two; that is to say, half. Now, all agree in what is

absolutely and simply just; but, as we have already said they dispute

concerning proportionate value; for some persons, if they are equal in

one respect, think themselves equal in all; others, if they are superior

in one thing, think they may claim the superiority in all; from whence

chiefly arise two sorts of governments, a democracy and an oligarchy;

for nobility and virtue are to be found only [1302a] amongst a few;

the contrary amongst the many; there being in no place a hundred of

the first to be met with, but enough of the last everywhere. But to

establish a government entirely upon either of these equalities is

wrong, and this the example of those so established makes evident,

for none of them have been stable; and for this reason, that it is

impossible that whatever is wrong at the first and in its principles

should not at last meet with a bad end: for which reason in some things

an equality of numbers ought to take place, in others an equality in

value. However, a democracy is safer and less liable to sedition than an

oligarchy; for in this latter it may arise from two causes, for either

the few in power may conspire against each other or against the

people; but in a democracy only one; namely, against the few who aim

at exclusive power; but there is no instance worth speaking of, of

a sedition of the people against themselves. Moreover, a government

composed of men of moderate fortunes comes much nearer to a democracy

than an oligarchy, and is the safest of all such states.

CHAPTER II

Since we are inquiring into the causes of seditions and revolutions

in governments, we must begin entirely with the first principles from

whence they arise. Now these, so to speak, are nearly three in number;

which we must first distinguish in general from each other, and

endeavour to show in what situation people are who begin a sedition;

and for what causes; and thirdly, what are the beginnings of political

troubles and mutual quarrels with each other. Now that cause which of

all others most universally inclines men to desire to bring about a

change in government is that which I have already mentioned; for those

who aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition, if they see those

whom they esteem their equals possess more than they do, as well as

those also who are not content with equality but aim at superiority, if

they think that while they deserve more than, they have only equal with,

or less than, their inferiors. Now, what they aim at may be either just

or unjust; just, when those who are inferior are seditious, that they

may be equal; unjust, when those who are equal are so, that they may

be superior. These, then, are the situations in which men will be

seditious: the causes for which they will be so are profit and honour;

and their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour or loss of fortune by

mulcts, either on their own account or their friends, they will raise

a commotion in the state. The original causes which dispose men to the

things which I have mentioned are, taken in one manner, seven in number,

in another they are more; two of which are the same with those that

have been already mentioned: but influencing in a different manner;

for profit and honour sharpen men against each other; not to get the

possession of them for themselves (which was what I just now supposed),

but when they see others, some justly, others [1302b] unjustly,

engrossing them. The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence,

contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state. There are

also other things which in a different manner will occasion revolutions

in governments; as election intrigues, neglect, want of numbers, a too

great dissimilarity of circumstances.

CHAPTER III

What influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how

they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident; for when the

magistrates are haughty and endeavour to make greater profits than their

office gives them, they not only occasion seditions amongst each other,

but against the state also who gave them their power; and this their

avarice has two objects, either private property or the property of the

state. What influence honours have, and how they may occasion sedition,

is evident enough; for those who are themselves unhonoured while they

see others honoured, will be ready for any disturbance: and these things

are done unjustly when any one is either honoured or discarded contrary

to their deserts, justly when they are according to them. Excessive

honours are also a cause of sedition when one person or more are greater

than the state and the power of the government can permit; for then

a monarchy or a dynasty is usually established: on which account the

ostracism was introduced in some places, as at Argos and Athens: though

it is better to guard against such excesses in the founding of a state,

than when they have been permitted to take place, to correct them

afterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of

sedition, through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an

injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the

nobles conspired against the people on account of the decrees they

expected would pass against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition

and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have

no share in the administration. The rich also even in democracies,

despising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better

themselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after the battle

of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration, the democracy

was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the people was

lost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing happened at Syracuse

before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there was the same sedition

before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in state will

also arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists

of many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably to preserve its

symmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot was to

be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might

otherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form, if it

increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition

of parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may often

increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free

states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a

little after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in

a battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned

into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were

killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several

husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the

unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was

reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in

the Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in

a democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or

properties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments

also sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner

people; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of

election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by

negligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to

the constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened

at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the

election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a

democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very

often great alterations silently take place in the form of government

from people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the

census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a

little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state

also is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till

their differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a

city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every

given time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto

been originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted

their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable

to revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians

in founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the

Traezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence came the

proverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause

happened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had joined with

them in building the city; for they assuming upon these, on account of

the country being their own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new

citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of

the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those

who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and

also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The

Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to

the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the

Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled

[1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled

with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of

Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater

part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion

seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not

sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already

mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because

they have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal

to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion

disturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one

city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the

town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and

the Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the disposition of the

citizens is not the same, for those who live in the Piraeus are more

attached to a popular government than those who live in the city

properly so called; for as the interposition of a rivulet, however

small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any

trifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions; but they will not

so soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement between virtue

and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in

order, one cause having more influence than another; one of which that I

last mentioned.

CHAPTER IV

But seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from

them; for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling

quarrels are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise

between persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the

case with the Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the

government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were

in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other

seduced his mistress; he in his turn, offended with this, persuaded his

friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this the whole city

took part either with the one or the other, and the government was

overturned: therefore every one at the beginning of such disputes ought

to take care to avoid the consequences; and to smother up all quarrels

which may happen to arise amongst those in power, for the mischief lies

in the beginning; for the beginning is said to be half of the business,

so that what was then but a little fault will be found afterwards to

bear its full proportion to what follows. Moreover, disputes between men

of note involve the whole city in their consequences; in Hestiaea,

after the Median war: two brothers having a dispute about their paternal

estate; he who was the poorer, from the other's having concealed part

of the effects, and some money which his father had found, engaged the

popular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of

fashion. And at Delphos, [1304a] a quarrel about a wedding was the

beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for

the bridegroom, being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting

upon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her relations

resenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred money into his

pocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious

person. At Mitylene also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right

of heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the

Athenians, in which Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man

of fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in

procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and

excited the Athenians to attack them, being the host of that state.

There was also a dispute at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance,

between Mnasis, the father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of

Onomarchus, which brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The government

too of Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel that arose from an intended

marriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage,

the father of the young person to whom she was contracted, being archon,

punishes him, upon which account he, resenting the affront, associated

himself with those who were excluded from any share in the government,

and brought about a revolution. A government may be changed either into

an oligarchy, democracy, or a free state; when the magistrates, or any

part of the city acquire great credit, or are increased in power, as the

court of Areopagus at Athens, having procured great credit during the

Median war, added firmness to their administration; and, on the other

hand, the maritime force, composed of the commonalty, having gained the

victory at Salamis, by their power at sea, got the lead in the state,

and strengthened the popular party: and at Argos, the nobles,

having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea against the

Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse,

the victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the common

people, they changed their free state into a democracy: and at Chalcis,

the people having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles,

immediately seized the government: and at Ambracia also the people,

having expelled the tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the

supreme power in themselves. And this in general ought to be known,

that whosoever has been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether

private persons, or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part

of the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the

cause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them

the honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they,

on account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with

their former equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those

parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an

[1304b] equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part

which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be

noticed; for if one party is so much more powerful than the other, as

to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the

danger: for which reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue

will never be the cause of seditions; for they will be too few for that

purpose when compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the

causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and

revolutions therein are brought about in two ways, either by violence or

fraud: if by violence, either at first by compelling them to submit to

the change when it is made. It may also be brought about by fraud in

two different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived,

willingly consent to an alteration in their government, and are

afterwards obliged by force to abide by it: as, for instance, when the

four hundred imposed upon the people by telling them that the king

of Persia would supply them with money for the war against the

Lacedaemonians; and after they had been guilty of this falsity, they

endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power; or when they are

at first persuaded and afterwards consent to be governed: and by one of

these methods which I have mentioned are all revolutions in governments

brought about.

CHAPTER V

We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these

causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject

to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by

informing against men of property, they induce them to join together

through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies

unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is

what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island

of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness

of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with

each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes,

prevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them,

who were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to

conspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was

brought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by

the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them,

quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and

overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy

was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by

confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were

banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the

people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at

Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed;

and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the

same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues,

to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together,

either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on

public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the

fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both

demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and

indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason

for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues

were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their

eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers

are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in

a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as

tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too,

tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive

powers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at

Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence;

and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great

extent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed

in husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an

opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants;

which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people;

and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of

Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in

Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he

had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for

accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a

tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular

man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from

its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if

there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the

election is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in

office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the

people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least

in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and

not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which

democracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise.

CHAPTER VI

There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a

revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for

then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if

one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at

Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which

arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes

a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the

administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this

happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who

had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they

were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger

also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the

same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is

observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it

was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the

hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy

was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the

government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just

mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there

were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of

their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the

victory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly

at Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state

flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the

people were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so

few, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to

revolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of

the demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one

who flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their

demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over

the thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred.

The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy,

and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who

flattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will

always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect

themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain

ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos.

And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme

power, the demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn

the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when

some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for

those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the

people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions

when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are

desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves

or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported

Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a

colony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with

the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against

Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they

will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and

then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour

to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the

members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very

easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of

this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great

power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be

destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the

management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally,

but when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened

once at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a

very few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety, who

held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to

preserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at

Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of

war and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the

government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they

give the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as

Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general,

they will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear

of this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in

the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace,

from their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the

guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will

be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which

happened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power.

The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political

clubs, of which Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an

oligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting another, or

from their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their

marriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown:

and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the

same account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person

being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's

being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion

suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was

that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them

publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought

about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the despotism which

those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes

also may happen by accident in what we call a free state and in an

oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen

according to a certain census; for it often happens that the highest

census is fixed at first; so that a few only could have a share in

the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free state those of moderate

fortunes only; when the city grows rich, through peace or some other

happy cause, it becomes so little that every one's fortune is equal to

the census, so that the whole community may partake of all the honours

of government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little,

and insensible approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions

and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they

are owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter,

not into governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same

government; as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law

to vest it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise.

CHAPTER VII

Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons

in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in

this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both

these states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of

a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein

they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to

happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited and think

themselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon,

called the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others, descendants

of citizens), who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were

sent to found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are

disgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, to

whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings:

or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the

reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans:

and also when some are too poor and others too rich, which will most

frequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian

war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;"

for some persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might

be divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be

higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's intention

at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's

at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from

want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the cause of which

evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic and

the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an aristocracy from the

same causes, and also from virtue not being properly joined to power;

but chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the

democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free

states endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call

aristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other,

and on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for

that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy,

and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on

which account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider

the foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live

where equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank,

very often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole,

whichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party

supporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an

aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change

into a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured,

directly take part with the contrary side) and a free state into an

oligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys that

equality he has a right to and fully possesses what is his own. And what

I have been speaking of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates

being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a

lower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of

the nobles possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too

much of an oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching

greatly on the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well

inured to war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every

one out of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as

all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to

have rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in

the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they

please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the

Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state was

neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy

chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed by degrees,

as we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general; and this

happens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever

anything which in the least regards the state is treated with contempt,

after that something else, and this of a little more consequence, will

be more easily altered, until the whole fabric of government is entirely

subverted, which happened in the government of Thurium; for the law

being that they should continue soldiers for five years, some young

men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their

officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs,

and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first

endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to

continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that

the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who

are called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose

it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if

that law was not repealed they would permit the management of all other

public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they

endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they

found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was

altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In

short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or

from without; from without when they have for their neighbour a state

whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the

same thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both

the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one,

when conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the other the

democracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions

in governments.

CHAPTER VIII

We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in

general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first

place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned

for their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for

things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are

contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much

care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and

this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence;

for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in

a family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income;

for the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if

every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense

is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together

are large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of

anything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place,

no credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people

with false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The

different ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already

mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies

continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government,

but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who

have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who

have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also

introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office;

nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the

property of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each

other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a

democracy desire to have established in the state is not only just,

but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which

reason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which

are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one

continue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of

the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort

of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up

amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both

aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted

into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are

magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a

long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies

and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state

establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the

other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments

are sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption

at a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who

are alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state;

for which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of

the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they

may preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting

the state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care

ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes

of the nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already

engaged in them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil

at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the

politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or

free state on account of the census, if that happens to continue the

same while the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take

a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare

it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the

census is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five

years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it

was at the time when the census was first established in the state,

let there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these

according to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the census

larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done in

oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the one,

an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will

be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or

democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies,

monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a

rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour

to confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short

time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear

prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours

which were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather

by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the

law, that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his

fortune or friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be

contrived that he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote

innovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living,

there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of every

one, and see that these are not contrary to the genius of the state

in which he lives, whether it may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any

other form of government; and, for the same reason, those should be

guarded against who are most prosperous in the city: the means of doing

which is by appointing those who are otherwise to the business and the

offices of the state. I mean, to oppose men of account to the common

people, the poor to the rich, and to blend both these into one body, and

to increase the numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and

this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of

condition. But above all, in every state it is necessary, both by the

laws and every other method possible, to prevent those who are employed

by the public from being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy;

for then the people will not be so much displeased from seeing

themselves excluded from a share in the government (nay, they will

rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) as at

suspecting that the officers of the state steal the public money, then

indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because they are

deprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy

them. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an

aristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both

the rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to

a share in the government is democratical; that the rich should be

in office is aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public

employment whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will

not desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had

rather attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as

they want nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their

fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the

principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort.

To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be

delivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of

the accounts be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions.

But, as the magistrates are to execute their offices without any

advantages, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who

execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich

should be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor

even the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It

would be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer to

exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments

of plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is

necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public

employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to

let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own

rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit

any person to have more than one; for by this means property will be

more equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better

circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy

to allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a

preference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an

oligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be filled

only by those who are best qualified to discharge them.

CHAPTER IX

There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the

first departments in government; first of all, an affection for the

established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely

equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice

correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are placed in;

for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there

must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all

these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what manner the

choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is

an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b]

constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall one

prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them the

generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which

reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than

his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of

conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the state

or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these

require greater virtue than the generality are possessed of, but only

that knowledge which is common to all. It may be asked, if a man has

abilities equal to his appointment in the state, and is affectionate to

the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since

these two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to

the public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are often

deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs,

though they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their

serving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws

contain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its

preservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often

insisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it

greater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought

not to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect;

namely, to preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a

democracy destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to

an oligarchy destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue

extend it to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a

little from perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a

flat one, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this

particularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of

the part is lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at

all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with

other parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with

respect to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something

vary from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if

any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will

make the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no

government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore

should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an

oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue

without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of

circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of

another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an

inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in

democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people

superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the

rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak

in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to

support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths

also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they

now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be adverse

to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;" whereas they

ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their

oaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all things which I

have mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is,

what is now most despised, to educate your children for the state; for

the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of

no service if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in

the principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law

established; of an oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals

in one man, there are in the city. But to educate a child fit for the

state, it must not be done in the manner which would please either those

who have the power in an oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but

so as they may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments.

But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up

too delicately, and the children of the poor hardy with exercise

and labour; so that they are both desirous of and able to promote

innovations. In democracies of the purest form they pursue a method

which is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is, that they

define liberty wrong: now, there are two things which seem to be the

objects of a democracy, that the people in general should possess the

supreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to

be equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law: now, their

freedom and equality consists in every one's doing what they please:

that is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; "as his

inclination guides," in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for

no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government,

but protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in

different states, and the means of their preservation.

CHAPTER X

It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of corruption,

and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same things which have

been said of other governments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a

kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of an

oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it is the worst that man

can submit to, as being composed of two, both of which are bad, and

collectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both

these states. These two species of monarchies arise from principles

contrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort

of people against the multitude, and kings are appointed out of those,

who are chosen either for their superior virtue and actions flowing from

virtuous principles, or else from their noble descent; but a tyrant is

chosen out of the meanest populace; an enemy to the better sort, that

the common people may not be oppressed by them. That this is true

experience convinces us; for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere

demagogues, who gained credit with the people by oppressing the nobles.

Some tyrannies were established in this manner after the cities were

considerably enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded

the power which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing

despotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the

superior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed

officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious

affairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme power

over all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was easy

to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was ready at

hand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the honours of

the state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed originally the

kingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours of the state.

Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens,

Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by having been

demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of

an aristocracy, and is bestowed according to worth, as either virtue,

family, beneficent actions, or these joined with power; for those who

have been benefactors to cities and states, or have it in their powers

to be so, have acquired this honour, and those who have prevented a

people from falling into slavery by war, as Codrus, or those who have

freed them from it, as Cyrus, or the founders of cities, or settlers of

colonies, as the kings of Sparta, Macedon, and Molossus. A king desires

to be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may be

secure in the possession of it, and that the people in general meet with

no injury; but a tyrant, as has been often said, has no regard to the

common good, except for his own advantage; his only object is pleasure,

but a king's is virtue: what a tyrant therefore is ambitious of

engrossing is wealth, but a king rather honour. The guards too of a king

are citizens, a tyrant's foreigners.

That a tyranny contains all that is bad both in a democracy and an

oligarchy is evident; with an oligarchy it has for its end gain, as the

only means of providing the tyrant with guards and the luxuries of life;

like that it places no confidence in the people; and therefore deprives

them of the use of arms: it is also common to them both to persecute the

populace, to drive them out of the city and their own habitations. With

a democracy it quarrels with the nobles, and destroys them both

publicly and privately, or drives them into banishment, as rivals and

an impediment to the government; hence naturally arise conspiracies

both amongst those who desire to govern and those who desire not to be

slaves; hence arose Periander's advice to Thrasybulus to take off the

tallest stalks, hinting thereby, that it was necessary to make away with

the eminent citizens. We ought then in reason, as has been already

said, to account for the changes which arise in a monarchy from the

same causes which produce them in other states: for, through injustice

received, fear, and contempt, many of those who are under a monarchical

government conspire against it; but of all species of injustice,

injurious contempt has most influence on them for that purpose:

sometimes it is owing to their being deprived of their private fortunes.

The dissolution too of a kingdom and a tyranny are generally the same;

for monarchs abound in wealth and honour, which all are desirous to

obtain. Of plots: some aim at the life of those who govern, others at

their government; the first arises from hatred to their persons; which

hatred may be owing to many causes, either of which will be sufficient

to excite their anger, and the generality of those who are under the

influence of that passion will join in a conspiracy, not for the sake

of their own advancement, but for revenge. Thus the plot against

the children of Pisistratus arose from their injurious treatment of

Harmodius's sister, and insulting him also; for Harmodius resenting the

injury done to his sister, and Aristogiton the injury done to Harmodius.

Periander the tyrant of Ambracia also lost his life by a conspiracy, for

some improper liberties he took with a boy in his cups: and Philip was

slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had

received from Attains; as was Amintas the Little by Darda, for insulting

him on account of his age; and the eunuch by Evagoras the Cyprian in

revenge for having taken his son's wife away from him....

Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have, through

resentment, either killed those who caused them to be inflicted or

conspired against them, even when they had kingly power, as at Mitylene

Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the Penthelidee, who used

to go about striking those they met with clubs. Thus, in later times,

Smendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and dragging him away from

his wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause of the conspiracy against

Archelaus, for he urged others on: the occasion of his resentment was

his having delivered him to Euripides the poet to be scourged; for

Euripides was greatly offended with him for having said something of the

foulness of his breath. And many others have been killed or conspired

against on the same account. Fear too is a cause which produces the

same effects, as well in monarchies as in other states: thus Artabanes

conspired against Xerxes through fear of punishment for having hanged

Darius according to his orders, whom he supposed he intended to pardon,

as the order was given at supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a]

dethroned and killed in consequence of the contempt they were held in by

the people; as some one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him

spinning with his wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of

him, it may very probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired

against Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a

conspiracy, and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's

friends will do this if they despise him; for from the confidence he

places in them, they think that they shall not be found out. Those

also who think they shall gain his throne will conspire against a king

through contempt; for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the

danger, on account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it.

Thus a general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the

monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and

his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its effeminacy:

thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus, conspired

against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will excite men

to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain; as in the

instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who are of a

bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst kings, will

of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for strength and

courage united inspire great bravery: whenever, therefore, these join

in one person, he will be very ready for conspiracies, as he will easily

conquer. Those who conspire against a tyrant through love of glory

and honour have a different motive in view from what I have already

mentioned; for, like all others who embrace danger, they have only glory

and honour in view, and think, not as some do, of the wealth and pomp

they may acquire, but engage in this as they would in any other noble

action, that they may be illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a

tyrant, not to succeed in his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt

but the number of those who act upon this principle is small, for we

must suppose they regard their own safety as nothing in case they should

not succeed, and must embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do)

when he made war upon Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said,

that let the advantage he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to

have gained it; and that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had

gained footing in his country, he should think his death sufficiently

glorious. A tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other

states are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an

opposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it;

and what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of

opposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny, as

says Hesiod, "a potter against a potter;" for the extreme of a democracy

is a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from their

different forms of government--for which reason the Lacedaemonians

destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during the prosperity

of their state. Nor are they only destroyed from without, but also

from within, when those who have no share in the power bring about a

revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to Dionysius; to the first,

by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, who nattered Gelon's

son, and induced him to lead a life of pleasure, that he himself might

govern; but the family joined together and endeavoured to support the

tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but those whom they made of their party

seized the opportunity and expelled the whole family. Dion made war

against his relation Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first

expelled and then killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly

induce men to conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of

these, namely hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is

often the cause of their destruction: for though, for instance, those

who raised themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but

those who received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately

all of them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they

soon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part

of their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases

this is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels

them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater

obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under

the direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion through

contempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and many

others. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is accompanied

with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but hatred is free

from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as the destruction

of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government and an extreme

democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for these are divided

tyrannies.

Kingdoms are seldom destroyed by any outward attack; for which reason

they are generally very stable; but they have many causes of subversion

within; of which two are the principal; one is when those who are

in power [1313a] excite a sedition, the other when they endeavour to

establish a tyranny by assuming greater power than the law gives them.

A kingdom, indeed, is not what we ever see erected in our times, but

rather monarchies and tyrannies; for a kingly government is one that

is voluntarily submitted to, and its supreme power admitted upon great

occasions: but where many are equal, and there are none in any respect

so much better than another as to be qualified for the greatness and

dignity of government over them, then these equals will not willingly

submit to be commanded; but if any one assumes the government, either by

force or fraud, this is a tyranny. To what we have already said we shall

add, the causes of revolutions in an hereditary kingdom. One of these

is, that many of those who enjoy it are naturally proper objects of

contempt only: another is, that they are insolent while their power is

not despotic; but they possess kingly honours only. Such a state is soon

destroyed; for a king exists but while the people are willing to obey,

as their submission to him is voluntary, but to a tyrant involuntary.

These and such-like are the causes of the destruction of monarchies.

CHAPTER XI

Monarchies, in a word, are preserved by means contrary to what I have

already mentioned as the cause of their destruction; but to speak to

each separately: the stability of a kingdom will depend upon the power

of the king's being kept within moderate bounds; for by how much the

less extensive his power is, by so much the longer will his government

continue; for he will be less despotic and more upon an equality of

condition with those he governs; who, on that account, will envy him the

less.

It was on this account that the kingdom of the Molossi continued so

long; and the Lacedaemonians from their government's being from the

beginning divided into two parts, and also by the moderation introduced

into the other parts of it by Theopompus, and his establishment of the

ephori; for by taking something from the power he increased the duration

of the kingdom, so that in some measure he made it not less, but bigger;

as they say he replied to his wife, who asked him if he was not ashamed

to deliver down his kingdom to his children reduced from what he

received it from his ancestors? No, says he, I give it him more lasting.

Tyrannies are preserved two ways most opposite to each other, one of

which is when the power is delegated from one to the other, and in this

manner many tyrants govern in their states. Report says that Periander

founded many of these. There are also many of them to be met with

amongst the Persians. What has been already mentioned is as conducive

as anything can be to preserve a tyranny; namely, to keep down those who

are of an aspiring disposition, to take off those who will not submit,

to allow no public meals, no clubs, no education, nothing at all, but

to guard against everything that gives rise to high spirits or mutual

confidence; nor to suffer the learned meetings of those who are at

leisure to hold conversation with each other; and to endeavour by every

means possible to keep all the people strangers to each other; for

knowledge increases mutual confidence; and to oblige all strangers to

appear in public, and to live near the city-gate, that all their actions

may be sufficiently seen; for those who are kept like slaves seldom

entertain any noble thoughts: in short, to imitate everything which the

Persians and barbarians do, for they all contribute to support slavery;

and to endeavour to know what every one who is under their power does

and says; and for this purpose to employ spies: such were those women

whom the Syracusians called potagogides Hiero also used to send out

listeners wherever there was any meeting or conversation; for the people

dare not speak with freedom for fear of such persons; and if any one

does, there is the less chance of its being concealed; and to endeavour

that the whole community should mutually accuse and come to blows with

each other, friend with friend, the commons with the nobles, and the

rich with each other. It is also advantageous for a tyranny that all

those who are under it should be oppressed with poverty, that they may

not be able to compose a guard; and that, being employed in procuring

their daily bread, they may have no leisure to conspire against their

tyrants. The Pyramids of Egypt are a proof of this, and the votive

edifices of the Cyposelidse, and the temple of Jupiter Olympus, built by

the Pisistratidae, and the works of Polycrates at Samos; for all these

produced one end, the keeping the people poor. It is necessary also to

multiply taxes, as at Syracuse; where Dionysius in the space of five

years collected all the private property of his subjects into his own

coffers. A tyrant also should endeavour to engage his subjects in a war,

that they may have employment and continually depend upon their general.

A king is preserved by his friends, but a tyrant is of all persons the

man who can place no confidence in friends, as every one has it in his

desire and these chiefly in their power to destroy him. All these things

also which are done in an extreme democracy should be done in a tyranny,

as permitting great licentiousness to the women in the house, that they

may reveal their husbands' secrets; and showing great indulgence to

slaves also for the same reason; for slaves and women conspire not

against tyrants: but when they are treated with kindness, both of them

are abettors of tyrants, and extreme democracies also; and the people

too in such a state desire to be despotic. For which reason flatterers

are in repute in both these: the demagogue in the democracy, for he is

the proper flatterer of the people; among tyrants, he who will servilely

adapt himself to their humours; for this is the business of [1314a]

flatterers. And for this reason tyrants always love the worst of

wretches, for they rejoice in being flattered, which no man of a liberal

spirit will submit to; for they love the virtuous, but flatter none. Bad

men too are fit for bad purposes; "like to like," as the proverb says. A

tyrant also should show no favour to a man of worth or a freeman; for he

should think, that no one deserved to be thought these but himself; for

he who supports his dignity, and is a friend to freedom, encroaches upon

the superiority and the despotism of the tyrant: such men, therefore,

they naturally hate, as destructive to their government. A tyrant

also should rather admit strangers to his table and familiarity than

citizens, as these are his enemies, but the others have no design

against him. These and such-like are the supports of a tyranny, for

it comprehends whatsoever is wicked. But all these things may be

comprehended in three divisions, for there are three objects which a

tyranny has in view; one of which is, that the citizens should be of

poor abject dispositions; for such men never propose to conspire against

any one. The second is, that they should have no confidence in each

other; for while they have not this, the tyrant is safe enough from

destruction. For which reason they are always at enmity with those of

merit, as hurtful to their government; not only as they scorn to be

governed despotically, but also because they can rely upon each other's

fidelity, and others can rely upon theirs, and because they will not

inform against their associates, nor any one else. The third is, that

they shall be totally without the means of doing anything; for no one

undertakes what is impossible for him to perform: so that without power

a tyranny can never be destroyed. These, then, are the three objects

which the inclinations of tyrants desire to see accomplished; for all

their tyrannical plans tend to promote one of these three ends, that

their people may neither have mutual confidence, power, nor spirit.

This, then, is one of the two methods of preserving tyrannies: the other

proceeds in a way quite contrary to what has been already described,

and which may be discerned from considering to what the destruction of

a kingdom is owing; for as one cause of that is, making the government

approach near to a tyranny, so the safety of a tyranny consists in

making the government nearly kingly; preserving only one thing, namely

power, that not only the willing, but the unwilling also, must be

obliged to submit; for if this is once lost, the tyranny is at an end.

This, then, as the foundation, must be preserved: in other particulars

carefully do and affect to seem like a king; first, appear to pay a

great attention [1314b] to what belongs to the public; nor make such

profuse presents as will offend the people; while they are to supply

the money out of the hard labour of their own hands, and see it given

in profusion to mistresses, foreigners, and fiddlers; keeping an exact

account both of what you receive and pay; which is a practice some

tyrants do actually follow, by which means they seem rather fathers of

families than tyrants: nor need you ever fear the want of money while

you have the supreme power of the state in your own hands. It is also

much better for those tyrants who quit their kingdom to do this than to

leave behind them money they have hoarded up; for their regents will

be much less desirous of making innovations, and they are more to be

dreaded by absent tyrants than the citizens; for such of them as he

suspects he takes with him, but these regents must be left behind. He

should also endeavour to appear to collect such taxes and require such

services as the exigencies of the state demand, that whenever they are

wanted they may be ready in time of war; and particularly to take care

that he appear to collect and keep them not as his own property, but the

public's. His appearance also should not be severe, but respectable, so

that he should inspire those who approach him with veneration and not

fear; but this will not be easily accomplished if he is despised. If,

therefore, he will not take the pains to acquire any other, he ought to

endeavour to be a man of political abilities, and to fix that opinion of

himself in the judgment of his subjects. He should also take care not to

appear to be guilty of the least offence against modesty, nor to suffer

it in those under him: nor to permit the women of his family to treat

others haughtily; for the haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many

tyrants. With respect to the pleasures of sense, he ought to do directly

contrary to the practice of some tyrants at present; for they do not

only continually indulge themselves in them for many days together, but

they seem also to desire to have other witnesses of it, that they may

wonder at their happiness; whereas he ought really to be moderate in

these, and, if not, to appear to others to avoid them-for it is not the

sober man who is exposed either to plots or contempt, but the drunkard;

not the early riser, but the sluggard. His conduct in general should

also be contrary to what is reported of former tyrants; for he ought to

improve and adorn his city, so as to seem a guardian and not a tyrant;

and, moreover., always to [1315a] seem particularly attentive to the

worship of the gods; for from persons of such a character men entertain

less fears of suffering anything illegal while they suppose that he who

governs them is religious and reverences the gods; and they will be less

inclined to raise insinuations against such a one, as being peculiarly

under their protection: but this must be so done as to give no occasion

for any suspicion of hypocrisy. He should also take care to show such

respect to men of merit in every particular, that they should not think

they could be treated with greater distinction by their fellow-citizens

in a free state. He should also let all honours flow immediately from

himself, but every censure from his subordinate officers and judges. It

is also a common protection of all monarchies not to make one person too

great, or, certainly, not many; for they will support each other: but,

if it is necessary to entrust any large powers to one person, to take

care that it is not one of an ardent spirit; for this disposition is

upon every opportunity most ready for a revolution: and, if it should

seem necessary to deprive any one of his power, to do it by degrees,

and not reduce him all at once. It is also necessary to abstain from all

kinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which

you must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a

delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to

the quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour and

principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never employ

personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in

which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt; and, upon

the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater

honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs

against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and

guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so

that they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore

of those who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear

to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing

their own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight

with an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at.

As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the

poor, it is necessary that both these should find equal protection from

him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their

power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself

that party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have

no occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of

their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his

own forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be

superfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which

the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to

appear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs,

not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect

the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should,

therefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his

government will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of

imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who

perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable.

Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous

to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be

altogether wicked, but only so in part.

CHAPTER XII

Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest

duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is

true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that

they used their power with moderation, and were in many particulars

obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never

fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his

government should be popular. He is reported also to have presented a

person with a crown who adjudged the victory to another; and some say

that it is the statue of that judge which is placed in the forum.

They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court

of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of

the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and

six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander

forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the

reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed

without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an

able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it

was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that

out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son

eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest

we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not

continue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for

Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth.

Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other tyrannies have

continued a very short time. We have now gone through the general cases

of corruption and [1316a] means of preservation both in free states and

monarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon

the changes which different governments are liable to: but his discourse

is faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the best

and first governments are liable to; for he only assigns the general

cause, of nothing being immutable, but that in time everything will

alter [***tr.: text is unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature

will then produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in

this, probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some

persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but

why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed

government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things

that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the cause of the

alteration of all things, we find that those which did not begin

to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so that, if

anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter

at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be

changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter,

they alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and

not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other

changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it changes into

an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy

into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as from a

democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect

to a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in it; or

if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what other

state it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an

indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to

alter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle

would be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as

at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as was

Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or

into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage.

An oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most

of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of

Panaetius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of

Anaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to

suppose, that a state is changed into an oligarchy because those who are

in power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who

are by far richer than their fellow citizens think it unfair that those

who have nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the state

with themselves, who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not

allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to

prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is

creditable, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is

also absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of

the poor and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them

more than to the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess

not equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no

one member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet

a democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich

should be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and

the other attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes,

yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury,

and paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the

greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who

have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,

they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,

nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is

there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any

other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have

spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state,

or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise

seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do

as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although

there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is

treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was

but one of each sort.

CHAPTER I

We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the

state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different

magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and

what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the

destruction and preservation of governments are owing.

As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other

states, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything which

we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot

to each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for

them; and also to inquire into the combinations of all these different

modes of government which we [1317a] have mentioned; for as these are

blended together the government is altered, as from an aristocracy to

be an oligarchy, and from a free state to be a democracy. Now, I mean

by those combinations of government (which I ought to examine into, but

have not yet done), namely, whether the deliberative department and the

election of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an

oligarchy, or the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part

only to an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy,

or whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according

to the nature of the government. But we will first consider what

particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also

what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,

what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly, not

only which of these governments is best for a state, but also how

it ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of

briefly.

And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same

time show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call

an oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of

a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the

manner in which these are compounded together different species of

democracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of

various natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being so

many democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned;

namely, there being different sorts of people; for in one country the

majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired servants; if

the first of these is added to the second, and the third to both of

them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or

worse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same government; the

other is that which we will now speak of. The different things which are

connected with democracies and seem to make part of these states, do,

from their being joined to them, render them different from others: this

attending a few, that more, and another all. It is necessary that he who

would found any state which he may happen to approve of, or correct one,

should be acquainted with all these particulars. All founders of states

endeavour to comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the

same kind with it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have

already described in treating of the preservation and destruction of

governments. I will now speak of these first principles and manners, and

whatever else a democratical state requires.

CHAPTER II

Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have

been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for

they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one

part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according

to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by

worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power

should be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority

determine should be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have

more power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one

mark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion

of that state; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they

say, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live

as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence

arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any

account, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as

that person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to

that equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and

such being the government, it follows that such rules as the following

should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out

of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all:

that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those

offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no

census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any

office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few,

and very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should

be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible:

that the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes

whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or

of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large judge

the magistrates when they come out of office, and decide concerning

public affairs as well as private contracts: that the supreme power

should be in the public assembly; and that no magistrate should be

allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances, and of no

consequence to public business. Of all magistrates a senate is best

suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving

their attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for then the

people will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have

already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if

possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens--who have any share in the

management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges,

and magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates,

the judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also

those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be

paid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of

family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a

government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and

mechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be

for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been

long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to

diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things,

then, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that

principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is,

that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality,

which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the

people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more

share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that

all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the

equality and liberty of the state best preserved.

CHAPTER III

In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.

Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should be

equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power with

the five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this manner?

but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out

of the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the power of

creating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then established

according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is

guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that

is just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of an oligarchy

say, that that is just which those who have most approve of; and that we

ought to be directed by the value of property. Both the propositions are

unjust; for if we agree with what the few propose we erect a tyranny:

for if it should happen that an individual should have more than the

rest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice, this man alone

has a right to the supreme power; but if superiority of numbers is to

prevail, injustice will then be done by confiscating the property of the

rich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality is,

which both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition

of right which is common to them both; for they both say that what the

majority of the state approves of ought to be established. Be it so; but

not entirely: but since a city happens to be made up of two different

ranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which

is approved of by both these, or the greater part: but should there be

opposite sentiments, let that be established which shall be approved

of by the greater part: but let this be according to the census; for

instance, if there should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and

six of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure,

and the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five

of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together

should determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen

to be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or

court of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before

them, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But although,

with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult

to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do than to persuade

those who have it in their power to encroach upon others to be guided

thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the

powerful pay no regard thereunto.

CHAPTER IV

There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is composed

of those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the

most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one would place

so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the

husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed where the

majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their property is

but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold public

assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their own

business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they be

desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their

own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the offices of

government, which will be attended with no great profit; for the major

part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour (a proof of

this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do

now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual

occupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon

get rich, others are removed from poverty); besides, their having the

right of election and calling their magistrates to account for their

conduct when they come out of office, will satisfy their desire of

honours, if any of them entertain that passion: for in some states,

though the commonalty have not the right of electing the magistrates,

yet it is vested in part of that body chosen to represent them: and it

is sufficient for the people at large to possess the deliberative power:

and this ought to be considered as a species of democracy; such was that

formerly at Mantinsea: for which reason it is proper for the democracy

we have been now treating of to have a power (and it has been usual for

them to have it) of censuring their magistrates when out of office,

and sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates

should be elected, and according to a certain census, which should vary

with the rank of their office, or else not by a census, but according

to their abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus

constituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be

always filled with the best men with the approbation of the people;

who will not envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should

be content with this part in the administration; for they will not be

governed by their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their

power with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is

delegated to censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the

state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do

whatsoever they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check

to that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a]

necessary and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof

should be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are

unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident

that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because

the people are such and have such powers as they ought to have. To

establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which were

observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for

instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain

quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly

also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their original lot of

land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which forbade any one to

add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to follow the law of

the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this particular we are now

speaking of; for they having but very little ground, while they were

a numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, did not

include all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a

manner that, according to the census, the poor had more power than

the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds and

herdsmen; for they have many things in common with them, and, by their

way of life, are excellently qualified to make good soldiers, stout in

body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of

the people of whom other democracies are composed are much worse than

these; for their lives are wretched nor have they any business with

virtue in anything they do; these are your mechanics, your exchange-men,

and hired servants; as all these sorts of men frequent the exchange and

the citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly; whereas the

husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet

together; nor are they equally desirous of doing it with these others!

When a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the land

lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a good

democracy or a free state for the people in general will be obliged to

live in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy,

though there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal

assembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in

what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it

will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b] should

proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the people from

the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without

distinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few

citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless

well supported by laws and manners. We have already noticed almost every

cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have

taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and

make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they

could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally

born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say,

if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to

this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed.

They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common

people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and

then stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the

state disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common

people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of

an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it

becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in

such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of

increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the

democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities,

and to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those

common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the

people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be

broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is practised in a tyranny

seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as, for instance, the

licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; for this to

a certain degree is useful in such a state; and also to overlook every

one's living as they choose; for many will support such a government:

for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than as

prudence would direct.

CHAPTER V

It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would

support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or

too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be

constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a

few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by

all those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the

preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful,

and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those things

which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to suppose that

that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of

government which contributes to make them more purely so, but what will

contribute to their duration: but our demagogues at present, to flatter

the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts; for which

reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should

act directly opposite to what they do, and enact a law to prevent

forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the

treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses: for those who

are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their

punishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to

condemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing

by it: they should also take care that the causes which are brought

before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the

utmost severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for

it is not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for

in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to

each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in

it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately

established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common

people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it,

this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the

nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by

taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice:

which things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then,

the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public

assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have

very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days

only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although

they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did;

and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not

choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly

be so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a

different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at

present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money

amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply, while

the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true patriot

in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the community are

not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government; he

therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and

as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the

public money should be put by, and then divided at once amongst the

poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to

purchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at least to give

each of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of trade and

husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at

once, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In

the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be

obliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this

was the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the

affections of the people; for by continually sending some of their

community into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a

sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and

supplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to

imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the

poor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain

the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of

electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by

lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the

administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the

same may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by

vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies

ought to be established.

CHAPTER VI

What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how

an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state

should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of

oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some

species of democracy.

The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to

what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different

census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the

latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the

former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a

part of the administration who was within the census; which should be

so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by means

thereof be superior to those who have no share in the government; for

those who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to

be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner

ought that oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to

that which is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest

to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it

requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of

sound and healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and

well found for sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while

a diseased body or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support

the [1321a] least shock; so the worst-established governments want most

looking after. A number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy;

for these are opposed to those rights which are founded in rank: on

the contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due

regulation of the different orders in the society.

CHAPTER VII

As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of

people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as those

who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the horsemen,

the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the

nature of the country can admit a great number of horse; there a

powerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety of the

inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support

the expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune.

Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior

in power to the other, may be established; for the heavy-armed are

rather made up of men of substance than the poor: but the light-armed

and the sailors always contribute to support a democracy: but where the

number of these is very great and a sedition arises, the other parts of

the community fight at a disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is

to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of

light-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed: for it is with

those that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an

insurrection; for these being lighter are easily a match for the horse

and the heavy-armed: so that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops

from these is to form it against itself: but as a city is composed of

persons of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should

teach their sons, while they were very young, a light and easy exercise;

but, when they are grown up, they should be perfect in every warlike

exercise. Now, the admission of the people to any share in the

government should either be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or

else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased

from any mechanic employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen

according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect

to the magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to

have in a state, the services they are bound to do the public should be

expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous

of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard their

magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for their

honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon entering into

their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and erect some public

structure, that the people partaking of the entertainment, and seeing

the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public

structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: add

to this also, that the nobles will have their generosity recorded: but

now this is not the conduct which those who are at present at the head

of an oligarchy pursue, but the contrary; for they are not more desirous

of honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more

properly be called little democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on

what principles a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.

CHAPTER VIII

After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the

magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what

purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary magistrates

no state can exist, nor without those which contribute to its dignity

and good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that in small

states the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many: also to

know well what offices may be joined together, and what ought to be

separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators

in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate should be

appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good order; for of

necessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers to

supply each other's mutual wants: and this is what is most productive

of the comforts of life; for the sake of which men seem to have joined

together in one community. A second care, and nearly related to the

first, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in

the city, that they may be an ornament; and also to take care of all

buildings which are likely to fall: and to see that the highways are

kept in proper repair; and also that the landmarks between different

estates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that account;

and all other business of the same nature. Now, this business may be

divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities

they appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another

the fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the inspectors

of the city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant nearly

about the same objects, only in the country, is to take care of what

is done out of the city. The officers who have this employment we call

inspectors of the lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business

of all three of them is the same. There must also be other officers

appointed to receive the public revenue and to deliver it out to those

who are in the different departments of the state: these are called

receivers or quaestors. There must also be another, before whom all

private contracts and sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well

as proceedings and declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided

amongst many, but there is one supreme over the rest; these are called

proctors, notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose

business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult;

namely, to take care that sentence is executed upon those who are

condemned; and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to

have the charge of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very

disagreeable on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will

engage therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do,

will they be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most

necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without

that judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society

could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should

not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the

other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which

are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst different

persons. And as different magistrates judge different causes, let the

causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to those which are

already brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and another

see it executed: as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the care

of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of

the markets have passed, and the like in other cases: for by so much the

less odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much

the easier will they be properly put in force: therefore for the same

persons to pass the sentence and to execute it will subject them to

general hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they will be considered

as the enemies of all. Thus one person has often the custody of the

prisoner's body, while another sees the sentence against him executed,

as the eleven did at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate

these offices, and to give great attention thereunto as equally

necessary with anything we have already mentioned; for it will certainly

happen that men of character will decline accepting this office, and

worthless persons cannot properly be entrusted with it, as having

themselves rather an occasion for a guard than being qualified to guard

others. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from

others; nor should it be continually allotted to any individuals, but

the young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns

to take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary

magistrates, ought to be first mentioned: next to these are others no

less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of

great skill and fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city,

and provide everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is,

both in war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take

care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are

sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is

only one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are

horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes

put distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others under

them, according to their different divisions; all of which join together

to make one military body: and thus much for this department. Since some

of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money,

it is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment

should be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and

correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all these magistrates

there is one who is supreme over them all, who very often has in his own

power the disposal of the public revenue and taxes; who presides over

the people when the supreme power is in them; for there must be some

magistrate who has a power to summon them together, and to preside as

head of the state. These are sometimes called preadvisers; but where

there are many, more properly a council. These are nearly the civil

magistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other

persons whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and

those who are to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper

repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever

else belongs to public worship. This charge is sometimes entrusted to

one person, as in very small cities: in others it is delegated to many,

and these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of

holy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are

those who are appointed to have the general care of all those public

sacrifices to the tutelar god of the state, which the laws do not

entrust to the priests: and these in different states have different

appellations. To enumerate in few words the different departments of

all those magistrates who are necessary: these are either religion,

war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbours, highways.

Belonging to the courts of justice there are scribes to enroll private

contracts; and there must also be guards set over the prisoners, others

to see the law is executed, council on either side, and also others to

watch over the conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst

the magistrates also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their

advice in public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy

and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very

attentive to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves;

such as those who have the government of the women; who are to see the

laws are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their

education. To these may be added those who have the care of their

gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public

spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are not

of general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are obliged

to employ their wives and children in servile offices for want of

slaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust the

supreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and senators;

guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an

oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning

all magistrates.

CHAPTER I

He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning what

government is best, ought first to determine what manner of living is

most eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also be equally

uncertain what government is best: for, provided no unexpected accidents

interfere, it is highly probable, that those who enjoy the best

government will live the most happily according to their circumstances;

he ought, therefore, first to know what manner of life is most desirable

for all; and afterwards whether this life is the same to the man and

the citizen, or different. As I imagine that I have already sufficiently

shown what sort of life is best in my popular discourses on that

subject, I think I may very properly repeat the same here; as most

certainly no one ever called in question the propriety of one of the

divisions; namely, that as what is good, relative to man, may be divided

into three sorts, what is external, what appertains to the body, and

what to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make

a man happy: for no one would say that a man was happy who had no

fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no prudence; but was afraid of the

flies that flew round him: nor would abstain from the meanest theft if

he was either hungry or dry, or would murder his dearest friend for

a farthing; and also was in every particular as wanting in his

understanding as an infant or an idiot. These truths are so evident that

all must agree to them; though some may dispute about the quantity and

the degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is sufficient

for happiness; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all such

things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds: but to such we

reply, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in these

cases, that these external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them.

As to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or

both, certain it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose

understandings are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although

their fortune is but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of

wealth, are deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects

may easily convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its

boundary, as a machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either

necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good

quality of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful

it is, if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well

as noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject

take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we allow

they are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if the soul

is more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both in itself

and with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that the best

accidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the

sake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is on this

account that wise men should desire them, not the soul for them. Let us

therefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much happiness as he

possesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to their dictates; since

for this we have the example of GOD Himself, _who is completely happy,

not from any external good, but in Himself, and because such is His

nature_. For good fortune is something different from happiness, as every

good which depends not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but

it is not from fortune that any one is wise and just: hence it follows,

that that city is happiest which is the best and acts best: for no one

can do well who acts not well; nor can the deeds either of man or city

be praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or

wise, or prudent in a man, the same things are just, wise, and prudent

in a city.

Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon

this subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation

of it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present

suppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and

as a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments

which virtue usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not

convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered hereafter,

at present we shall proceed according to our intended method.

CHAPTER II

It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual

man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for

whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the

happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a

life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the

city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also

if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy

city the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require

consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life

to be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or

whether to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs;

and also what form of government is to be preferred, and what

disposition of the state is best; whether the whole community should be

eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and

some only: as this, therefore, is a subject of political examination

and speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the first of

these is what we are at present engaged in, the one of these I am not

obliged to speak to, the other is the proper business of my present

design. It is evident that government must be the best which is so

established, that every one therein may have it in his power to act

virtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue

is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable a public life of

active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without and

spent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a

philosopher; and one of these two different modes of life both now

and formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most

virtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no

little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense

must naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a

citizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is

the greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that

still is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others

hold the quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life

is the only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity

of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged

in public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their

sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of

government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states the

object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so

that the generality of political institutions, wheresoever dispersed,

if they have any one common object in view, have all of them this,

to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from the laws of the

Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they

educated their children, that all which they had in view was to make

them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have power enough

and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that account; as were the

Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some there are laws to

heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that at Carthage they

allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had

served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia, that a man who had

not himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a halter; among

the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of

the cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the

Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb

as he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things

of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom.

Probably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this

subject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business

of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern

and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for

how can that belong either to the politician or legislator which is

unlawful? for that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but

unjustly also: for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing

of this in the arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor

the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients,

the other to his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic

government is a political one, and what they would not allow to be just

or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise

over others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but

think it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic

power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for

dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to

assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper

objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or

sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild

animals which are eatable.

Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself

while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be

so situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its

constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then

have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of

war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the

means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine

carefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may

partake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which

results from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from

others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring

states to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what

good offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the

best governments will be considered hereafter.

CHAPTER III

We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue

is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to

both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political

governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is

different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:

others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is

impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that

virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in

some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that

the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true, for

a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common

servile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing

virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a

submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the government of

freemen differs not more from the government of slaves than slavery and

freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been

already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is

also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many noble ends are

produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already

determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme

power is of all things best, as that will enable a man to command very

many useful services from others; so that he who can obtain this ought

not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this

purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for the son, or

the son for the father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most

eligible: but to be a member of the community and be in felicity is

best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme

good was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others: but

it is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere

supposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable

who thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by

nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a

master to a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue

can never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst

equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is

equal and right; but that equals should not partake of what is equal, or

like to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature

is not right; therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the

community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to

follow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must

be joined to the other also: and, if we are right in what we have now

said, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that

both with respect to the community as well as the individual an active

life is the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to

other persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical

which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more

so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment and

understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore

is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others

follow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the

workmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states

which choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive;

for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each

other; for there are many opportunities for this among the different

citizens; the same thing is true of every individual: for, was it

otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the universe be perfect; to

neither of whom can anything external separately exist. Hence it is

evident that that very same life which is happy for each individual is

happy also for the state and every member of it.

CHAPTER IV

As I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and

considered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I

should first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which one

should form according to one's wish; for no good state can exist without

a moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things therefore

ought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them such as are

impossible: I mean relative to the number of citizens and the extent

of the territory: for as other artificers, such as the weaver and the

shipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for their work,

since so much the better they are, by so much [1326a] superior will the

work itself necessarily be; so also ought the legislator and politician

endeavour to procure proper materials for the business they have in

hand. Now the first and principal instrument of the politician is the

number of the people; he should therefore know how many, and what they

naturally ought to be: in like manner the country, how large, and what

it is. Most persons think that it is necessary for a city to be large to

be happy: but, should this be true, they cannot tell what is a large one

and what a small one; for according to the multitude of the inhabitants

they estimate the greatness of it; but they ought rather to consider its

strength than its numbers; for a state has a certain object in view, and

from the power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its greatness

ought to be estimated; as a person might say, that Hippocrates was a

greater physician, though not a greater man, than one that exceeded him

in the size of his body: but if it was proper to determine the strength

of the city from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be

collected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it;

for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and

foreigners; but from those who are really part of the city and properly

constitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a proof of a

large city, but in a state where a large number of mechanics inhabit,

and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great; for the greatness of

the city, and the number of men in it, are not the same thing. This too

is evident from fact, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to

govern properly a very numerous body of men; for of all the states which

appear well governed we find not one where the rights of a citizen are

open to an indiscriminate multitude. And this is also evident from the

nature of the thing; for as law is a certain order, so good law is of

course a certain good order: but too large a multitude are incapable of

this, unless under the government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends

the universe. Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually

essential to beauty, the perfection of a city consists in the largeness

of it as far as that largeness is consistent with that order already

mentioned: but still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well

as everything else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of

these, if they are neither too little nor too big, have their

proper powers; but when they have not their due growth, or are badly

constructed, as a ship a span long is not properly a ship, nor one of

two furlongs length, but when it is of a fit size; for either from its

smallness or from its largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with

a city; one that is too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of

self-defence, but this is essential to a city: one that is too large is

capable of self-defence in what is necessary; but then it is a nation

and not a city: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a form

of government to it: for who would choose to be the general of such

an unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a stentor? The

first thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of such

numbers as will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live

happily in their political community: and it follows, that the more the

inhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater will the city be:

but this must not be, as we have already said, without bounds; but what

is its proper limit experience will easily show, and this experience is

to be collected from the actions both of the governors and the governed.

Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the inferior magistrates and

to act as judges, it follows that they can neither determine causes

with justice nor issue their orders with propriety without they know the

characters of their fellow-citizens: so that whenever this happens not

to be done in these two particulars, the state must of necessity be

badly managed; for in both of them it is not right to determine too

hastily and without proper knowledge, which must evidently be the case

where the number of the citizens is too many: besides, it is more easy

for strangers and sojourners to assume the rights of citizens, as they

will easily escape detection in so great a multitude. It is evident,

then, that the best boundary for a city is that wherein the numbers are

the greatest possible, that they may be the better able to be sufficient

in themselves, while at the same time they are not too large to be under

the eye and government of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the

extent of a city.

CHAPTER V

What we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a country;

for as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will commend it

if it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what will make the

inhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to supply them

with all the necessaries of life; for it is the having these in plenty,

without any want, which makes them content. As to its extent, it should

be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at their ease with freedom

and temperance. Whether we have done right or wrong in fixing this limit

to the territory shall be considered more minutely hereafter, when

we come particularly to inquire into property, and what fortune is

requisite for a man to live on, and how and in what manner they ought

to employ it; for there are many doubts upon this question, while each

party insists upon their own plan of life being carried to an excess,

the one of severity, the other of indulgence. What the situation of the

country should be it is not difficult to determine, in some particulars

respecting that we ought to be advised by those who are skilful in

military affairs. It should be difficult of access to an enemy, but

easy to the inhabitants: and as we said, that the number of [1327a]

inhabitants ought to be such as can come under the eye of the

magistrate, so should it be with the country; for then it is easily

defended. As to the position of the city, if one could place it to one's

wish, it is convenient to fix it on the seaside: with respect to

the country, one situation which it ought to have has been already

mentioned, namely, that it should be so placed as easily to give

assistance to all places, and also to receive the necessaries of life

from all parts, and also wood, or any other materials which may happen

to be in the country.

CHAPTER VI

But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea,

there are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or hurtful

to a well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of persons

brought up under a different system of government is disserviceable

to the state, as well by impeding the laws as by their numbers; for a

multitude of merchants must necessarily arise from their trafficking

backward and forward upon the seas, which will hinder the well-governing

of the city: but if this inconvenience should not arise, it is evident

that it is better, both on account of safety and also for the easier

acquisition of the necessaries of life, that both the city and the

country should be near the sea; for it is necessary that those who are

to sustain the attack of the enemy should be ready with their assistance

both by land and by sea, and to oppose any inroad, both ways if possible

but if not, at least where they are most powerful, which they may

do while they possess both. A maritime situation is also useful for

receiving from others what your own country will not produce, and

exporting those necessaries of your own growth which are more than you

have occasion for; but a city ought to traffic to supply its own wants,

and not the wants of others; for those who themselves furnish an open

market for every one, do it for the sake of gain; which it is not proper

for a well-established state to do, neither should they encourage such

a commerce. Now, as we see that many places and cities have docks and

harbours lying very convenient for the city, while those who frequent

them have no communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too

far off, but are surrounded by walls and such-like fortifications, it is

evident, that if any good arises from such an intercourse the city will

receive it, but if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by

a law declaring and deputing whom the state will allow to have an

intercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval power, it is by

no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain degree;

and this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself, but also

because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the

neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as

by land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the

state should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and enables

her to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary that her

force should correspond with her actions. As for that multitude of

people which a maritime power creates, they are by no means necessary to

a state, nor ought they to make a part of the citizens; for the mariners

and infantry, who have the command, are freemen, and upon these depends

a naval engagement: but when there are many servants and husbandmen,

there they will always have a number of sailors, as we now see happens

to some states, as in Heraclea, where they man many triremes, though

the extent of their city is much inferior to some others. And thus we

determine concerning the country, the port, the city, the sea, and a

maritime power: as to the number of the citizens, what that ought to be

we have already said.

CHAPTER VII

We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of the

community ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive who

will cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the most

celebrated, and also the other different nations of this habitable

world. Those who live in cold countries, as the north of Europe, are

full of courage, but wanting in understanding and the arts: therefore

they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not being politicians,

they cannot reduce their neighbours under their power: but the Asiatics,

whose understandings are quick, and who are conversant in the arts, are

deficient in courage; and therefore are always conquered and the

slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as it were between these

two boundaries, so partake of them both as to be at the same time both

courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece continues free, and

governed in the best manner possible, and capable of commanding the

whole world, could they agree upon one system of policy. Now this is the

difference between the Grecians and other nations, that the latter have

but one of these qualities, whereas in the former they are both happily

blended together. Hence it is evident, that those persons ought to be

both sensible and courageous who will readily obey a legislator, the

object of whose laws is virtue. As to what some persons say, that the

military must be mild and tender to those they know, but severe and

cruel to those they know not, it is courage which [1328a] makes any one

lovely; for that is the faculty of the soul which we most admire: as

a proof of this, our resentment rises higher against our friends and

acquaintance than against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus

accusing his friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends

insult me? The spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit

who are of this disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It

also is not right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those

you know not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who

are of a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the

wicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already

said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them;

which is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to

receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury done

them, they consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying, "Cruel

are the wars of brothers;" and this, "Those who have greatly loved

do greatly hate." And thus we have nearly determined how many the

inhabitants of a city ought to be, and what their natural disposition,

and also the country how large, and of what sort is necessary; I say

nearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as great accuracy in

those things which are the objects of the senses as in those which are

inquired into by the understanding only.

CHAPTER VIII

As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them

without which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in

a political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be

considered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one

whole is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the

community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for

instance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the benefit

of one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this there is

nothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the other

uses it; as, for instance, between any instrument employed in making any

work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between the house and

the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on the house. Thus

property is necessary for states, but property is no part of the state,

though many species of it have life; but a city is a community of

equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life possible: but the

happiest life is the best which consists in the perfect practice of

virtuous energies: as therefore some persons have great, others little

or no opportunity of being employed in these, it is evident that this

is the cause of the difference there is between the different cities and

communities there are to be found; for while each of these endeavour to

acquire what is best by various and different means, they give [1328b]

rise to different modes of living and different forms of government. We

are now to consider what those things are without which a city cannot

possibly exist; for what we call parts of the city must of necessity

inhere in it: and this we shall plainly understand, if we know the

number of things necessary to a city: first, the inhabitants must

have food: secondly, arts, for many instruments are necessary in life:

thirdly, arms, for it is necessary that the community should have an

armed force within themselves, both to support their government against

those of their own body who might refuse obedience to it, and also

to defend it from those who might attempt to attack it from without:

fourthly, a certain revenue, as well for the internal necessities of

the state as for the business of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief

concern, a religious establishment: sixthly in order, but first of all

in necessity, a court to determine both criminal and civil causes. These

things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every state; for a city

is a number of people not accidentally met together, but with a purpose

of ensuring to themselves sufficient independency and self-protection;

and if anything necessary for these purposes is wanting, it is

impossible that in such a situation these ends can be obtained. It is

necessary therefore that a city should be capable of acquiring all these

things: for this purpose a proper number of husbandmen are necessary to

procure food, also artificers and soldiers, and rich men, and priests

and judges, to determine what is right and proper.

CHAPTER IX

Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all

these different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible

to continue the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges,

or counsellors; or shall we appoint different persons to each of those

employments which we have already mentioned; or shall some of them be

appropriated to particulars, and others of course common to all? but

this does not take place in every state, for, as we have already said,

it is possible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common to

some; and this is the difference between one government and another:

for in democracies the whole community partakes of everything, but in

oligarchies it is different.

Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is

admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we

have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue;

it follows, that in the best-governed states, where the citizens are

really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should

be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise,

as being ignoble and destructive to virtue; neither should they be

husband-[1329a] men, that they may be at leisure to improve in virtue

and perform the duty they owe to the state. With respect to the

employments of a soldier, a senator, and a judge, which are evidently

necessary to the community, shall they be allotted to different persons,

or shall the same person execute both? This question, too, is easily

answered: for in some cases the same persons may execute them, in

others they should be different, where the different employments require

different abilities, as when courage is wanting for one, judgment for

the other, there they should be allotted to different persons; but when

it is evident, that it is impossible to oblige those who have arms

in their hands, and can insist on their own terms, to be always under

command; there these different employments should be trusted to one

person; for those who have arms in their hands have it in their option

whether they will or will not assume the supreme power: to these two

(namely, those who have courage and judgment) the government must be

entrusted; but not in the same manner, but as nature directs; what

requires courage to the young, what requires judgment to the old; for

with the young is courage, with the old is wisdom: thus each will be

allotted the part they are fit for according to their different merits.

It is also necessary that the landed property should belong to these

men; for it is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are

the men proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the

rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is

not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the

principle we at first set out with; for to be happy it is necessary

to be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while he

considers only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought

to examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed

property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them to

have husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There remains

of the different classes of the people whom we have enumerated, the

priests, for these evidently compose a rank by themselves; for neither

are they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen nor the mechanics; for

reverence to the gods is highly becoming every state: and since the

citizens have been divided into orders, the military and the council,

and it is proper to offer due worship to the gods, and since it is

necessary that those who are employed in their service should have

nothing else to do, let the business of the priesthood be allotted

to those who are in years. We have now shown what is necessary to the

existence of a city, and of what parts it consists, and that husbandmen,

mechanic, and mercenary servants are necessary to a city; but that

the parts of it are soldiers and sailors, and that these are always

different from those, but from each other only occasionally.

CHAPTER X

It seems neither now nor very lately to have been known [1329b] to those

philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city ought to

be divided by families into different orders of men; and that the

husbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other;

which custom is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete; also

Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common meals seem

also to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been established

in Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more remote period

in Italy; for those who are the best judges in that country say that

one Italus being king of AEnotria., from whom the people, changing their

names, were called Italians instead of AEnotrians, and that part of

Europe was called Italy which is bounded by the Scylletic Gulf on the

one side and the Lametic on the other, the distance between which

is about half a day's journey. This Italus, they relate, made the

AEnotrians, who were formerly shepherds, husbandmen, and gave them

different laws from what they had before, and to have been the first who

established common meals, for which reason some of his descendants still

use them, and observe some of his laws. The Opici inhabit that part

which lies towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, who both now are and formerly

were called Ausonians. The Chones inhabited the part toward Iapigia and

the Ionian Sea which is called Syrtis. These Chones were descended

from the AEnotrians. Hence arose the custom of common meals, but the

separation of the citizens into different families from Egypt: for the

reign of Sesostris is of much higher antiquity than that of Minos. As

we ought to think that most other things were found out in a long, nay,

even in a boundless time (reason teaching us that want would make us

first invent that which was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then

those things which were requisite for the conveniences and ornament of

life), so should we conclude the same with respect to a political state;

now everything in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote antiquity,

for these people seem to be the most ancient of all others, and to have

acquired laws and political order; we should therefore make a proper

use of what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have

omitted. We have already said, that the landed property ought to belong

to the military and those who partake of the government of the state;

and that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of people;

and how large and of what nature the country ought to be: we will first

treat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen, how many and

of what sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold that property

ought to be common, as some persons have said, only thus far, in

friendship, it [1330a] should be their custom to let no citizen want

subsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed that they are

proper in well-regulated cities; my reasons for approving of them shall

be mentioned hereafter: they are what all the citizens ought to partake

of; but it will not be easy for the poor, out of what is their own, to

furnish as much as they are ordered to do, and supply their own house

besides. The expense also of religious worship should be defrayed by the

whole state. Of necessity therefore the land ought to be divided into

two parts, one of which should belong to the community in general, the

other to the individuals separately; and each of these parts should

again be subdivided into two: half of that which belongs to the public

should be appropriated to maintain the worship of the gods, the other

half to support the common meals. Half of that which belongs to the

individuals should be at the extremity of the country, the other half

near the city, so that these two portions being allotted to each person,

all would partake of land in both places, which would be both equal and

right; and induce them to act in concert with greater harmony in any war

with their neighbours: for when the land is not divided in this manner,

one party neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other

makes it a matter of too much consequence and more than is necessary;

for which reason in some places there is a law which forbids the

inhabitants of the borders to have any vote in the council when they are

debating upon a war which is made against them as their private interest

might prevent their voting impartially. Thus therefore the country ought

to be divided and for the reasons before mentioned. Could one have one's

choice, the husbandmen should by all means be slaves, not of the same

nation, or men of any spirit; for thus they would be laborious in

their business, and safe from attempting any novelties: next to these

barbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition

to these we have already mentioned. Of these, let those who are

to cultivate the private property of the individual belong to that

individual, and those who are to cultivate the public territory belong

to the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for

what reason it is very proper that they should have the promise of their

liberty made them, as a reward for their services, shall be mentioned

hereafter.

CHAPTER XI

We have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country should

communicate both with the sea and the continent as much as possible.

There are these four things which we should be particularly desirous of

in the position of the city with respect to itself: in the first place,

health is to be consulted as the first thing necessary: now a city

which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow from thence is

esteemed most healthful; next to this that which has a northern position

is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should next be contrived that

it may have a proper situation for the business of government and for

defence in war: that in war the citizens may [1330b] have easy access

to it; but that it may be difficult of access to, and hardly to be taken

by, the enemy. In the next place particularly, that there may be plenty

of water, and rivers near at hand: but if those cannot be found, very

large cisterns must be prepared to save rain-water, so that there may

be no want of it in case they should be driven into the town in time of

war. And as great care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants,

the first thing to be attended to is, that the city should have a good

situation and a good position; the second is, that they may have good

water to drink; and this not be negligently taken care of; for what

we chiefly and most frequently use for the support of the body must

principally influence the health of it; and this influence is what the

air and water naturally have: for which reason in all wise governments

the waters ought to be appropriated to different purposes, and if they

are not equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary water,

that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for other

uses. As to fortified places, what is proper for some governments is

not proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel is proper for a

monarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a plain suits a democracy;

neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather many strong places. As

to the form of private houses, those are thought to be best and most

useful for their different purposes which are distinct and separate

from each other, and built in the modern manner, after the plan of

Hippodamus: but for safety in time of war, on the contrary, they should

be built as they formerly were; for they were such that strangers could

not easily find their way out of them, and the method of access to

them such as an enemy could with difficulty find out if he proposed

to besiege them. A city therefore should have both these sorts of

buildings, which may easily be contrived if any one will so regulate

them as the planters do their rows of vines; not that the buildings

throughout the city should be detached from each other, only in some

parts of it; thus elegance and safety will be equally consulted. With

respect to walls, those who say that a courageous people ought not to

have any, pay too much respect to obsolete notions; particularly as

we may see those who pride themselves therein continually confuted by

facts. It is indeed disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so,

to the enemy, to endeavour to take refuge within their walls--but since

it very often happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful

for the bravery and courage of those few who oppose them to resist,

if you would not suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the

enemy, it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety

under the shelter and protection of walls more especially since so many

missile weapons and machines have been most ingeniously invented to

besiege cities with. Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall

would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an

enemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as if an individual should

not have a wall to his house lest it should be thought that the owner

of it was a coward: nor should this be left unconsidered, that those who

have a city surrounded with walls may act both ways, either as if it had

or as if it had not; but where it has not they cannot do this. If this

is true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care must be taken

that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a defence

in time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the modern

improvements also: for as those who make offensive war endeavour by

every way possible to gain advantages over their adversaries, so should

those who are upon the defensive employ all the means already known, and

such new ones as philosophy can invent, to defend themselves: for those

who are well prepared are seldom first attacked.